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ABSTRACT 
 
Market-heavy pension systems, in which low or moderate state benefits are topped 
up by private welfare arrangements, have long been expected not only to create 
dualisms, but also to fuel patterns of politics that perpetuate and even increase such 
dualisms over time. The starting point of this research is the observation that while 
some market-heavy pension systems indeed remain dualised in the post-industrial 
context, others have become more universal, either through changes to the structure 
of the state pension or through regulation to extend the coverage of private 
pensions.  
My research objective is to explain the universalising changes that have occurred. I 
show that the very institutional features that are usually expected to lead to further 
dualisation, namely a reliance on market-based arrangements, the prevalence of 
targeting and limited earnings replacement, contribute to bringing about 
universalising reforms. In particular, I show how under certain conditions these 
institutional features help structure the policy preferences of key political actors 
such that those actors usually associated with the extension of state provision 
embrace market means, while those associated with private provision push for the 
expansion of the state pension.  
I use fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of nine market-heavy 
pension systems over the three decades since 1980 to map the combinations of 
causal conditions under which universalising reforms have occurred. In addition, I 
present case outlines linking the institutional conditions to the reform outcomes via 
the policy preferences of key political actors. In doing so I provide a causal logic that 
reinforces the results of the fsQCA and offers a substantial explanation for the 
introduction of universalising reform in some market-heavy systems, as well as for 
the absence of such reform in others. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
UNIVERSALISM: WHAT IT IS, WHY IT MATTERS, AND 
WHY IT IS UNEXPECTED IN CONTEMPORARY MARKET-
HEAVY PENSION SYSTEMS 
 
The struggle to contain state spending in post-industrial societies has generated 
great interest in private pensions as a means of reducing public expenditure on what 
has long been the largest category of social transfer. Much emphasis has been placed 
on understanding the extent to which private pensions might be beneficial for 
economic growth and fiscal position, as well as the effect of private pensions on 
pensioner poverty and inequality.  
At a time of great interest in private pensions it is however important to 
develop an understanding not only of their economic effects, by also of how they 
stratify social relations. How, in other words, does the role that private pensions 
play in a pension system affect who receives what type of benefits, and on what 
basis. Developing such an understanding is important not only for its own sake, but 
also because it allows us to understand the political dynamics that will affect the 
development of market-heavy pension systems for years to come.   
Where private pensions are prevalent, it is widely expected that social rights 
will be fragmented or ‘dualised’ with different social groups entitled to receive 
benefits on different terms, and that this dualisation will persist over time with 
implications for inequality and the future evolution of the pension system. And yet, 
at a time when the fragmentation of social entitlements seems increasingly common, 
some pension systems which rely heavily on the market for the provision of 
retirement income have become more universal and less fragmented. 
How did this happen? This is the question I seek to answer in this thesis. 
There is a need to reassess how market-heavy pension systems structure social 
relations, and the political dynamics that they generate. Before I start, I use this 
introductory chapter to discuss the key concepts and theoretical expectations upon 
which my research question is based. In section one I set out what is meant in this 
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thesis by the terms universalism and dualisation, and in section two I explain why 
any trends towards more universal coverage would be surprising in market-heavy 
pension systems. The final section presents the argument and structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 UNIVERSALISM AND MARKET-HEAVY WELFARE STATES 
 
Universalism is a distributional principle. It determines eligibility to benefits or 
services in the event of the occurrence of some predefined social risk such as ill 
health, or the loss of income due to unemployment or retirement. A central feature 
of universalism is comprehensive coverage (Esping-Andersen, 1990, Scruggs and 
Allan, 2006, Titmuss, 1958, Anttonen et al., 2012). This means access to benefits and 
services for all those who face the relevant risk. In the rich world where social risks 
are addressed primarily within a framework of sovereign nation states, the 
universalist ideal is embodied most closely when eligibility to benefits is conditional 
on nothing but the occurrence of a particular risk and either citizenship or 
residence.  
Where eligibility to benefits or services is based instead on contributions, 
coverage is usually conditional on employment and hence less than universal; the 
extent to which coverage is restricted depends on how tightly benefits are tied to 
contributions. Under such arrangements, a distinction can be drawn between 
welfare ‘insiders’ who have access to the contributory benefit, and welfare 
‘outsiders’ with insufficient contributions records who do not (Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 
2012). This distinction is the first of several ‘dualisms’ that are typically contrasted 
to the concept of universalism. 
Means-tested benefits restrict coverage by targeting eligibility on the basis 
of need. The more tightly benefits and services are targeted on the poor, the fewer 
the people that are covered by them and the less universal they will be. Conversely, 
looser targeting of state benefits leads to more universal coverage. Means-testing 
may be the predominant organising principle for a certain benefit or service, or it 
may play a supplementary role, forming a social safety net to underpin contributory 
arrangements. In the latter case entitlement to means-tested benefits is gained as a 
last resort and is conditional on failure to build up entitlement to a specified 
minimum through ‘normal’ contributory means. Such supplements do not make the 
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benefit system as a whole more universal. On the contrary, by allocating benefits to 
different categories of recipients according to different rules, contributory systems 
supplemented by means-tested safety nets constitute a second classic manifestation 
of dualism (Anttonen et al., 2012: 18).  
The universalism of benefits or services is therefore seen in this thesis as 
varying continuously according to how much any needs-based or contributory 
arrangements a) restrict coverage or b) fragment the system and lead to different 
people receiving benefits under different rules. By making comprehensive, non-
fragmented coverage the defining feature of universalism, I distance myself from 
theorists in the British tradition for whom universalism required not only inclusion 
within a common system, but also that benefits be flat-rate (most famously 
Beveridge, 1942) as well as from certain Nordic theorists for whom universalism is 
intrinsically linked with redistribution and equality of outcome (for instance Vabø 
and Szebehely, 2012). I do this because such interpretations are incompatible with 
the post-industrial context. The following paragraphs explain why this is the case. 
In the post-industrial context, the distribution of income is broader and gives 
rise to a middle class for whom universal flat-rate benefits cannot preserve 
accustomed living standards. Old age pensions are a classic illustration of the 
consequences. In the absence of a contributory element to the state pension capable 
of providing earnings-related benefits, the middle classes tend to opt for a private 
pension supplement (Esping-Andersen, 1990, Korpi and Palme, 1998). The resulting 
reliance on voluntary private pensions results in a third manifestation of dualism, 
between those with access to private insurance and those without.  
This form of dualism has been well documented. Since they began to develop 
in the late nineteenth century, private pensions have rarely covered more than half 
of the working population. Until deindustrialisation, the pattern of provision across 
countries was of a dualism between the largely white collar professionals who had 
access to private schemes, and the largely blue collar workers who depended on 
state benefits. Today, voluntary private pensions continue to be characterised by 
patchy coverage and access. Although there is an element of chance to whether an 
individual is covered by an occupational pension (Bridgen and Meyer, 2008), the 
uneven distribution of private pension coverage varies systematically by sector, 
with the manufacturing sector now displaying the best and the low-skilled service 
sector the worst coverage rates. Coverage increases steeply with income, and part-
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time workers and those in temporary contracts are also less likely to be enrolled in 
private pension plans (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2012: 105, Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012). Such patterns of coverage do not only create 
a dualism of access to private pension arrangements. They also create a dualism of 
access to employer contributions, and a dualism of access to the tax subsidies with 
which governments incentivise private pensions (Esping-Andersen, 1990, Titmuss, 
1958). From comparative data, it is clear that this type of fiscal welfare is very 
significant in magnitude (Yoo and de Serres, 2004).  
Taking into account the dualisms that voluntary private pensions create and 
their inability to offer universal protection from social risks, Korpi, Palme, and 
Esping-Andersen adopt a pragmatic interpretation of universalism which departs 
from the ideal of citizenship-based benefits and makes an earnings-related element 
to state benefits crucial (Esping-Andersen, 1990, Korpi and Palme, 1998). In the 
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen wrote how the ‘Nordic 
solution’ to the growing middle class was to provide ‘a luxurious second tier, 
universally inclusive earnings-related insurance scheme on top of the flat-rate 
egalitarian one… by guaranteeing benefits tailored to expectations, this solution 
reintroduced benefit inequalities, but effectively blocks off the market. It thus 
succeeds in retaining universalism’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26). Korpi and Palme 
made a similar argument, explaining how the universalising ‘encompassing model’ 
of their typology ‘combined flat-rate benefits based on citizenship with a full 
coverage of earnings-related benefits’ to reduce the incentive for higher income 
groups to resort to dualising private insurance (Korpi and Palme, 1998).  
Of course any contributory system based on earnings will inevitably fall 
short of full coverage and universal inclusivity. However the underlying assumption 
of these authors is that in a post-industrial context, middle class demands for 
pension arrangements that preserve accustomed standards of living in old age make 
the relevant comparison not between a pension with an earnings-related element 
and an ideal-typical citizenship-based pension, but rather between a pension system 
with an earnings-related element organised publically, and a pension system with an 
earnings-related element organised privately. It is on this basis that the 
‘encompassing model’ can be regarded as the gold standard of universalism in 
pension policy, and on this basis also that I adopt an interpretation of universalism 
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which centres around the coverage of benefits and the dualisms they create rather 
than their redistributive potential.  
When it comes to the treatment of private benefits however, I depart from 
Esping-Andersen and Korpi in a crucial way, by drawing a distinction between 
voluntary private benefits and private benefits which are quasi-mandatory. I draw this 
distinction on the basis of a wave of recent research which has questioned the 
importance of the private-public mix, and has suggested that public and private 
means of addressing social risks may be functionally equivalent (Bridgen and Meyer, 
2009; see also Arza, 2008, Goodin and Rein, 2001, Trampusch, 2009, Hyde and 
Dixon, 2009, Hacker, 2004, Le Grand, 2007). The central theme of this research is 
the importance of regulation for shaping patterns of private provision. In particular, 
existing work on the expansion of private pension coverage has emphasised the role 
of collective self-regulation in creating private pension systems with near universal 
coverage. The Netherlands is an oft-cited example; supplementary private pensions 
based on collective agreements have long been quasi-mandatory and as a result over 
ninety per cent of the working population is covered (Meyer and Bridgen, 2012, 
Trampusch, 2009).  
Such coverage rates are comparable to the coverage rates of contributory 
state pensions (Scruggs, 2004), allowing private pensions with broad coverage rates 
to fulfil a function similar to that of the social insurance tier in the encompassing 
model. Notwithstanding the important fact that private benefits, however broad 
their coverage, are likely to remain less homogeneous in terms of benefit rules than 
their public equivalent, the difference between voluntary and quasi-mandatory 
private pensions cannot be ignored. On this basis, it is a point of departure for this 
thesis that the structure and coverage of private benefits should be taken into 
account when assessing the universalism of any benefit system.  
Drawing together the preceding paragraphs, it is possible to summarise the 
understanding of universalism that I adopt throughout this thesis. I take 
comprehensive, non-fragmented coverage to be the defining feature of universalism. 
When assessing the universalism of any benefit system, I take both privately and 
publically provided benefits into account, and I consider the system's universalism 
to vary continuously according to how much any privately provided benefits, 
means-testing, or contributory arrangements a) restrict coverage and b) fragment 
the system leading to different people receiving different benefits under different 
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roles. In this way I adopt a view of universalism that is compatible with the post-
industrial context, and can be contrasted to the dualisms that arise from 
contributory, means-tested, and voluntary private arrangements. 
 
1.2 UNIVERSALISM IN AN AGE OF DUALISATION 
 
One theme that emerges strongly from the comparative politics literature is that of 
dualisation. Whereas the post-war years of welfare expansion are associated with 
the unifying of social protection and the development of more universal welfare 
arrangements, academic observers now increasingly note the expansion of dual 
social policies that differentiate rights, entitlements and services provided to 
different categories of recipients (Emmenegger et al., 2012: 14). The past two to 
three decades have been an ‘age of dualisation’ in which new and deepened divides 
have surfaced between various groups of insiders and outsiders (Emmenegger et al., 
2012: 8). 
The empirical focus of most of this work lies in the reform trajectories of 
Continental European welfare arrangements. In these countries the mismatch 
between status preserving insurance and post-industrial patterns of employment 
has in large part been addressed by a strengthening of the link between the amount 
and duration of contributions and the volume and duration of benefits. Old age 
pensions, unemployment benefits and disability allowances have all been affected as 
benefit calculation formulas have been changed and stricter retirement rules 
introduced. Typically, unemployed or disabled people now need to have contributed 
for longer to be entitled to full benefits; the number of years of contributions 
required for entitlement to a full pension has also in many cases been increased 
(Palier, 2010: 343, Scruggs and Allan, 2004, Emmenegger et al., 2012: 8).  
As qualifying conditions for social insurance are tightened, and it becomes 
harder for people with atypical employment profiles to qualify, social insurance no 
longer covers the whole working population. In order to compensate for this 
reduced coverage, a new layer of tax-financed, means-tested social assistance has 
either been expanded or created for those with insufficient contributions (Palier, 
2010). In what is seen by many as a return to Bismarkian origins when policies for 
the worker (Arbeiterpolitik) were clearly distinguished from policies for the poor 
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(Armenpolitik) the politics of retrenchment in continental Europe has thus seen ‘the 
institutionalization of a new dualism within social protection’ through the creation 
of separate, inferior arrangements for atypical workers, organized around tax-
financed, non-contributory and income-tested benefits (Palier, 2010: 359). 
Despite the continental European focus of the dualisation literature, the 
expansion of dual social policies is considered to be a broader trend, particularly 
likely to occur also in Liberal welfare regimes (Emmenegger et al., 2012: 16). Liberal 
welfare regimes, in which residual state benefits offering low to moderate 
replacement rates are topped up by private welfare arrangements, are expected not 
only to create dualisms, but also to fuel a pattern of politics that perpetuates and 
increases such dualisms over time.  
The reasoning behind this is as follows. Where there is a dualism between 
those who rely on state benefits and those who rely on private benefits, state 
benefits will be eroded over time and will have a smaller redistributive impact than 
if they had been encompassing and universal (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001). For 
Korpi and Palme, this is the ‘paradox of redistribution’ and occurs when the 
interests of the middle classes are decoupled from the interests of the working class 
(Korpi and Palme, 1998). For Pierson (2001) and other scholars of the ‘new politics’ 
it is not class but rather the size of the welfare clientele that matters, but the 
argument is much the same. Where state benefits are low and leave room for the 
market, the army of welfare state beneficiaries will be smaller and benefits will be 
more prone to retrenchment and re-commodification in the context of austerity 
(Pierson, 1996). Market-heavy welfare systems are certainly not expected to 
generate support for welfare state expansion, looser eligibility conditions, or the 
extension of social rights.  
For no policy area is this logic likely to apply so strongly as for the classic 
example of path dependent change, the policy area of pensions (Myles and Pierson, 
2001). Korpi and Palme look specifically at the dynamics of different pension 
systems. They argue that ‘basic social security’ pensions which provide a low level of 
entitlements based on contributions and ‘targeted’ pensions where eligibility to a 
low level of benefits is based on need, are not conducive to future benefit generosity. 
By expecting the middle classes to safeguard their standards of living through 
private insurance, public pensions in such market-heavy systems tend to become a 
concern primarily for those on low incomes and do not generate the cross-class 
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coalitions necessary for their preservation, let alone their extension (Korpi and 
Palme, 1998). Emmenegger et al. concur, noting without surprise that they have 
observed the extension of pension qualifying periods in countries traditionally 
reliant on a Beveridgean pension system and those that introduced public earnings-
related schemes relatively late (Emmenegger et al., 2012: 8).   
Although both targeted and flat-rate pension arrangements leave state 
benefits dependent on the loyalties of a numerically weak and often politically 
residual social group, targeted pensions are additionally prone to retrenchment. This 
is because with targeted benefits, it is particularly obvious that the reciprocity of the 
system is very low. Those who benefit from means-testing and those who finance it 
are rarely the same people. Welfare winners are thus perceived to be those who pay 
little or no tax and receive targeted benefits, and stand in stark contrast to those 
who pay tax but do not receive any benefits. In a classic account of the moral logic of 
the welfare state, Rothstein explains how systems dominated by universal benefits 
and services and systems dominated by targeting generate very different public 
discussions and public perceptions of benefit recipients (Rothstein, 1998). Whilst 
the universal welfare state is strengthened by the prevention of a debate about how 
much society should give to those who cannot take care of themselves, in a targeted 
system public discussion often centres around what the well-adjusted majority 
should do about the less well-adjusted and socially marginalized minority 
(Rothstein, 1998: 158). The fairness of the policy is open to challenge, as the 
majority start asking ‘a) where the line between the needy and the non-needy 
should be drawn, and b) whether the needy themselves are not to blame for their 
predicament’ (Rothstein, 1998: 159).  
Moreover, it is expected that the fragility of state pensions in market heavy 
systems will be accompanied by increasingly patchy coverage of occupational 
pensions, as employers become increasingly reluctant providers of retirement 
income. In this vein, Seeleib-Kaiser warns of a ‘widening of dualism and an increase 
of outsiders, as fewer pensioners will be able to rely on employer provided benefits 
to maintain the achieved living standard’ (Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012: 170). This 
expected institutional drift is the result of  increasing costs to employers of offering 
private pension benefits while the benefits of so doing become more uncertain. 
Occupational pensions were less costly for employers in times of high consumer 
demand, full employment, booming stock markets and good pension fund 
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performance. Growing longevity raises the projected costs of defined benefit 
schemes for employers (Clark, 2003) and the increasing importance of shareholder 
value further increases pressure to cut costs associated with expensive DB schemes 
(Cutler and Waine, 2001). At the same time, the benefits to employers of offering 
private pension benefits have been decreasing, as deindustrialisation has reduced 
the need for companies to retain their workers for long periods of time (Sass, 1997). 
The combined result of these changes is that more firms have cut back on the 
occupational benefits that they offer. 
In sum, the past two to three decades can be characterised as an age of 
dualisation, of new and deepened divides between various groups of insiders and 
outsiders. While the literature has mainly focused on the social insurance systems of 
Continental Europe, dualisation is expected to have occurred also in those systems 
where state benefits offer moderate or low replacement rates and are topped up by 
private welfare arrangements - particularly where those benefits are targeted, and 
particularly in the policy area of pensions, where the fragility of state benefits is 
expected to be matched by increasingly patchy private coverage.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE, ARGUMENT AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
In this thesis I focus on an institutional setting where dualisation is strongly 
expected to have occurred, the group of market-heavy pension systems. I define 
market-heavy pension systems as those pension systems where the ratio of private 
to public expenditure is higher than the OECD average, and I focus on the eighteen 
mature welfare states included by Esping-Andersen in his Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and commonly used in comparative welfare 
state research thereafter. This is to the notable exclusion of less frequently analysed 
Iceland and Israel, as well as the more recently privatized systems of Latin America 
and Central and Eastern Europe.  
Two OECD datasets provide figures for expenditure on private and public 
pension benefits as a percentage of GDP (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, 2013a, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2013b). The two datasets vary slightly in the private pension 
expenditure that they report. Since no clear reason is given for the differences in 
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recorded private pension expenditure, I make use of both sources to identify my 
universe of cases. Table 1 below expresses the data from each source as a ratio of 
private to public pension expenditure, for the two years for which both sets of 
information are available. For the purposes of this thesis, my universe of market-
heavy pension systems consists of those countries which on the basis of the 
available data have a ratio of private to public pension expenditure that is 
consistently higher than the OECD average. 
Table 1. Public and Private expenditure on pensions, as a % of GDP 
Missing data: OECD Factbook 2013 has missing data for Finland 2005; France 2005; Ireland 2005, 2009; 
Japan 2005, 2009; Norway 2009; and Switzerland 2009. OECD Pensions at a Glance 2013 has missing 
data for Japan 2005; and New Zealand 2005, 2009. 
OECD Pensions at a Glance 2013 OECD Factbook 2013 
Country 2005 Country 2009 Country 2005 Country 2009 
  
Netherlands 1.10     
Netherlands 1.06 Switzerland 0.92 Australia 1.12 
  
Canada 1.03 Canada 0.81 Switzerland 0.78 Australia 1.31 
Switzerland 0.89 
United 
Kingdom 
0.74 Netherlands 0.70 Netherlands 0.76 
United 
Kingdom 
0.86 Australia 0.59 Denmark 0.63 Denmark 0.70 
United 
States 
0.63 
United 
States 
0.57 
United 
Kingdom 
0.54 Canada 0.60 
Australia 0.56 Denmark 0.40 Canada 0.49 
United 
Kingdom 
0.52 
Denmark 0.41 Japan 0.30 United States 0.48 United States 0.43 
Sweden 0.28 Sweden 0.30 New Zealand 0.30 New Zealand 0.40 
Ireland 0.25 Ireland 0.21 Norway 0.29 Belgium 0.33 
OECD 0.21 OECD 0.21 OECD 0.24 OECD 0.28 
Belgium 0.17 Belgium 0.14 Belgium 0.14 Sweden 0.16 
Norway 0.12 Norway 0.12 Sweden 0.13 Finland 0.07 
Italy 0.10 Italy 0.10 Austria 0.02 France 0.03 
Germany 0.07 Germany 0.08 Italy 0.01 Germany 0.03 
Austria 0.04 Austria 0.05 Germany 0.01 Austria 0.01 
Finland 0.03 Finland 0.03 
  
Italy 0.01 
France 0.03 France 0.02 
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I therefore exclude Sweden, Norway and Belgium, in which the ratio of 
private to public expenditure is higher than the OECD average in only one of the two 
datasets, and Japan, where only one data point is available. This leaves me with a 
universe of nine market-heavy pension systems: Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom. These pension systems are a heterogeneous bunch, spanning 
different welfare regimes, embedded in different political systems, and displaying 
broad variation in pension structure. They have little in common beyond a reliance 
on market means1. 
I created my own database of reforms that have occurred in these nine 
market-heavy pension systems over the past three decades. My data show that, 
whilst some of these pension systems have fulfilled theoretical expectations by 
becoming more dualised in the post-industrial context, others have experienced 
reforms that have made them more universal. It is my research objective in this 
thesis to explain these universalising changes.  
In a nutshell my argument is the following. In those pension systems that 
have become more universal, the very institutional features most expected to lead to 
further dualisation - namely market-heaviness, reliance on targeting, and limited 
earnings-replacement for high income earners from the state pension - are actually 
responsible for contributing to a universalist turn. In particular, under certain 
conditions these institutional features help structure the policy preferences of key 
political actors such that actors usually associated with the extension of state 
provision such as trade unions and left-of-centre political parties embrace market 
means, while actors associated with private provision such as the pension industry 
and non-left parties push for the expansion of the state pension.  
The structure of this thesis is as follows. The next chapter presents the 
unexpected universalising reforms that are to be explained. It shows that there have 
been two broad types of universalising reforms, those that have occurred through 
the extension of state provision, and those that have occurred through regulation to 
extend the coverage of private pensions. Since this chapter is based on my own 
                                                             
1 Data for the full list of OECD countries is presented in Appendix A. 
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database of pension reforms that have occurred between 1980 and 2009, the 
chapter starts with a discussion of this database, as well as with a discussion of how 
I identify universalising reforms.  
Chapter three reviews the extensive literature that seeks to explain welfare 
state change and social policy reforms. It examines what this literature has to say 
about the universalising reforms presented in chapter two, and develops some 
theoretical propositions that form the starting point for the empirical work that 
follows. The chapter then moves on to discuss the research design of the thesis, 
linking the theoretical propositions to the chosen research methods. I explain that, 
since the literature review suggests that universalising reforms are causally rather 
complex, I model my explanation in terms of set-relations using an approach called 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis which is capable of dealing with conditions that do 
not display their effect on their own but only together with other conditions, as well 
as with the possibility that alternative factors can produce the same outcome.  
Since I expect universalising reform through the extension of state pensions 
and universalising reform through the extension of private pensions to mobilize 
political actors in different ways, I conduct two separate Qualitative Comparative 
Analyses. Chapters four and five present these two analyses and discuss the results, 
mapping the combinations of causal conditions under which public and private 
pensions have become more universal respectively.  
In chapter six I present three ‘country cases’. These are brief narratives 
which link the institutional conditions identified in the previous chapters to the 
universalising changes of interest via the policy preferences of key political actors. 
My case selection is informed by the Qualitative Comparative Analyses. I present a 
narrative of changes to the Australian state pension, and two separate narratives of 
changes to the UK state pension and changes to the UK’s private pensions. In doing 
so I take a step closer to the causal logics at work, reinforcing the results of the 
Qualitative Comparative Analyses to offer a substantial explanation for the 
introduction of universalising reform in some market-heavy systems and for the 
absence of such reform in others. 
My final chapter summarises the argument developed over the course of the 
thesis, and discusses my theoretical contributions. I reflect on the main limitations 
of the thesis, and discuss the further research towards which my work points. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
A SYSTEMATIC LOOK AT MARKET-HEAVY PENSION 
SYSTEMS EXPOSES SURPRISING PATTERNS OF 
UNIVERSALISING CHANGE 
 
This chapter presents the empirical puzzle that is the subject of this thesis. It 
presents a number of reforms which have occurred over the past three decades that 
have made market-heavy pension systems more universal, either by changing the 
structure of the state pension or by introducing regulation to extend the coverage of 
private occupational pensions. The chapter is based on my own detailed database of 
pension reforms that have occurred in market-heavy pension systems between 
1980 and 2009, from which I identified a number of changes affecting universalism. 
I begin therefore with a discussion of this database and of the types of legislative 
change that I count as universalising reform, before presenting the universalising 
reforms to be explained.  
 
2.1 MEASURING UNIVERSALISING CHANGE 
 
MY DATABASE OF UNIVERSALISING CHANGE 
 
Data on expenditures or entitlements reflects pension arrangements long gone, and 
cannot capture recent reforms. For this reason, any account of the recent evolution 
of a pension system must come from understanding recent legislative changes. Some 
databases of pension reforms do exist, but they are few and are not sufficiently 
detailed to develop an understanding of reforms affecting universalism2. In order 
therefore to develop a clear picture of how market-heavy pension systems have 
evolved since 1980, I built my own database of reforms.  
                                                             
2 EDACWOWE, the European Data Centre for Work and Welfare produces a comprehensive list of comparative data 
sources on work and welfare. 
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I did this by drawing on a wealth of secondary sources, government reports, 
and the International Social Security Association (ISSA) reform database. The ISSA 
database is a collection of press releases and statements about reforms which can be 
filtered to search for reforms to Old Age, Survivors and Disability benefits. Although 
these statements focus mainly on reforms to the state pension and date back only to 
1995, they offer a wealth of information about past reforms. Where necessary, I 
cross-checked any inconsistencies using the ILO's NATLEX database, a 
comprehensive list of national legislation related to labour market reforms which 
can be filtered to search for pension reforms and offers links to the relevant legal 
documents, and the Fondatione Rodolfo Debenedetti (FRDB) Social Reform Database. 
Although the FRdB database covers only three of the nine market-heavy pension 
systems, and classifies reforms in a broad brush way only according to whether they 
are marginal or structural and whether they increase or decrease the generosity of 
the system, the detailed notes accompanying the database offer short reform 
descriptions which although not exhaustive, provide useful complementary 
information.  
The result of this process was a list of major reforms in each market-heavy 
pension system that includes not only reforms to the state pension, but also 
regulatory reforms affecting private pensions. For each major reform I recorded the 
main changes that were made, ignoring only minor or administrative changes. I 
documented twenty-seven types of change. I coded each change according to the 
criteria laid out in the codebook in Appendix A. For example, the type of reform 
‘RET_AGE’ captures any changes made to the retirement age. Reforms that increase 
the statutory retirement age are coded 1, and reforms that decrease the statutory 
retirement age are coded -1. Where there has been no change made to the 
retirement age in a given year, I code a value of zero. By coding in this way, I capture 
the direction but not the magnitude of change.  
For most types of change, this is the only reasonable way to quantify them. 
For example, in 2009 Australia increased the rate of the Age Pension by $30 per 
week, and pension supplements were consolidated and increased by $2.49 per 
week. This increased the generosity of the state pension. But how does this compare 
in magnitude to Canada’s 1997 reform after which pensions were to be calculated 
on the 5-year average of the Year’s Maximum Pensionable Earnings instead of the 3-
year average? Or to the UK’s reform in 1986 which extended the reference period 
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for SERPS benefits from 20 years to life-time career and reduced the SERPS 
replacement rate from 25 to 20 percent? Comparing the magnitude of these changes 
is prohibitively complex, so I capture only their direction, in the indicator 
‘BEN_GEN’. For this indicator, changes that increase the pension benefit received for 
a given contribution history are coded 1, and changes that decrease the pension 
benefit received for a given contribution history are coded -1. 
The full list of reforms can be found in Appendix C. The wide variety of 
sources I consulted and reconciled make me confident that the list is sufficiently 
comprehensive and that major reforms have not been overlooked. This initial, a-
theoretical list of legislative changes forms the basis from which I identify those 
reforms that affect universalism, and provides an understanding of the broader 
reform context which is crucial for my subsequent analysis of why the reforms 
happened. In the following paragraphs, I discuss the types of change that I consider 
to be universalising. 
 
IDENTIFYING UNIVERSALISING CHANGE 
 
Following from the discussion in chapter one, the universalism of benefits or 
services is seen here to vary continuously according to how much any needs-based 
or contributory arrangements restrict coverage, or fragment the system and lead to 
different people receiving benefits under different rules. Specifically, this means that 
any policies which loosen targeting, include new categories of people under social 
insurance, loosen eligibility requirements to the state pension, or alter the benefit 
calculation formula such that people previously receiving means tested benefits now 
receive benefits as a contributory right, can all constitute shifts towards 
universalism in a pension system. The following paragraphs discuss each type of 
reform in more detail. 
Policies that tighten the targeting of state benefits decrease universalism. 
Targeting can be tightened by withholding benefits either at a lower income or asset 
threshold, or at an increased rate. Conversely reforms that loosen the targeting of 
state benefits increase universalism, by withholding benefits either at a higher 
income or asset threshold, or at a lower rate. By the same logic, the introduction of 
affluence tests - a form of targeting that excludes the wealthy from the receipt of 
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state benefits and is usually administered through the tax system - also constitutes a 
move away from universalism, whilst policies that reduce or abolish affluence tests 
should be seen as moves towards universalism. 
One very straightforward way to increase the universalism of a pension 
system is to extend the coverage of the state pension to new categories of recipients, 
for example by bringing the self-employed into the social insurance system where 
previously they were not eligible to pay contributions and receive the corresponding 
benefits. The coverage of the state pension is also affected by how tightly 
contributory benefits are linked to employment history. The more tightly benefits 
are linked to employment history, the higher the number of people who fail to 
acquire eligibility to a state pension that is sufficient to lift them clear of reliance on 
means-tested benefits. Other things equal therefore, the tighter the eligibility 
requirements, the less universal the contributory pension; it will cover fewer people 
and leave more reliant on targeted benefits. Thus, policies that introduce or extend 
credits for periods out of work due to unemployment or care responsibilities, or that 
lower the contributions required for access to contributory benefits, both constitute 
moves towards universalism. 
Where a contributory state pension is supplemented by a means-tested 
safety net, policies that render the state pension more residual by reducing the value 
of contributory or residency-based benefits also constitute a move away from 
universalism. This is because, providing that the means test remains unaltered, a 
more residual state pension means more people will receive means-tested benefits 
that would previously have been eligible for those benefits on the basis of 
contributions or residency. It is by this logic that changes in the benefit formula for 
earnings-related benefits or moves towards less generous indexation arrangements 
can also constitute moves away from universalism. 
In addition to these changes to the state pension, and following the 
discussion in chapter one, I also count as universalising some regulation that 
extends the coverage of private pensions. Such regulation may take several forms. 
First, it may take the form of collective self-regulation, whereby coverage of 
occupational pensions is extended by means of collective agreements. In this case 
occupational benefits offered by one firm may be extended to cover employees in 
the entire industry or sector. Second, the regulation may be top-down. Top-down 
governmental regulation to increase the coverage of occupational pensions may 
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consist of mandating that employers provide access to an occupational pension, 
introducing auto-enrolment whereby employees are enrolled by default into an 
occupational pension scheme where they remain unless they actively opt-out, or 
mandating that employers and/or employees make contributions to an occupational 
pension scheme. In this thesis, I take as universalising only such regulation 
(collectively bargained or otherwise) which includes a mandatory employer 
contribution. Table 2 below summarizes how I identify universalising change. 
Table 2. Identifying universalising change 
Tier affected Type of change 
Means-tested 
pension 
 Looser targeting 
       Higher income or asset threshold 
       Lower withdrawal rate 
       Abolition/loosening of affluence test 
Contributory 
pension 
 Inclusion of new social groups in social insurance 
 Looser eligibility requirements 
       Lower contribution thresholds 
       Introduction of contributions credits  
 Change to benefit calculation formula or indexation 
such that people previously receiving means tested 
benefits now receive benefits as a contributory 
right 
Private pensions  Extension of employer contributions by collective 
agreement 
 Top-down introduction of mandatory employer 
contributions 
 
2.2 CHANGES TO THE STATE PENSION 
 
Overall between 1980 and 2008 there has been an increase in the number of 
universalising reforms to the state pension in market-heavy pension systems, and a 
simultaneous decrease in reforms that shift towards targeting.  
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Table 3 presents the number of universalising and de-universalising reforms that 
occurred per decade. 
 
Table 3. Total number of universalising and de-universalising reforms 
Decade Number of universalising reforms Number of de-universalising reforms 
1980s 2 7 
1990s 4 6 
2000s 6 2 
 
This trend towards universalism has been driven by the UK, Australia, New Zealand 
and Ireland, as the list of reforms in Table 4 shows.  
 
Table 4. Reforms to the state pension affecting universalism 
Country Year Description of reform Name of reform 
Australia 1983 Means testing tightened- tightened 
income testing of pensions for those 
aged over seventy 
Social Security and 
Repatriation Legislation 
Amendment Act 
Australia 1984 Means testing tightened- assets 
test re-introduced and either income 
or assets test to be applied, 
depending on which test gives lower 
pension level. 
Social Security and 
Repatriation (Budget 
Measures and Assets Test) 
Act 
Australia 2000 Means testing loosened- reduced 
the asset and income taper test rates 
from 50% to 40%. Increased the 
income and asset test ‘free’ areas by 
2.5% 
 
Australia 2007 Means testing loosened- halved the 
assets test taper rate to increase 
incentives to save. The assets test 
threshold was raised from $343,750 
to $529,250. 
Tax Laws Amendment 
(Simplified 
Superannuation) Act 2007 
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Canada 1989 Affluence test introduced- 
introduced OAS ‘clawback’ from high 
income pensioners 
 
Canada 1997 Shift towards targeting- Pensions 
to be calculated on the 5-year 
average of the Year’s Maximum 
Pensionable Earnings instead of the 
3-year average 
 
    
Denmark 1987 Means testing loosened- loosened 
the income test for the Pension 
Supplement. More people entitled to 
the full means-tested benefit 
Lettelese af 
Samspilsproblemer 
Denmark 1993 Shift towards targeting- reduction 
of basic pension, and increase in 
Pension Supplement by equal 
amount. 
Konsekvenser af 
skattereform 
Denmark 1996 Contribution credits- recipients of 
sickness, maternity and 
unemployment benefits received 
twice the normal ATP contribution 
Dobbelt ATP for folk pa 
overforselsindkomster 
Denmark 2003 Shift towards targeting- 
introduction of the ‘elderly check’, a 
tightly targeted benefit paid only to 
pensioners with no income aside 
from the state pension.  
Budget  
    
Ireland 1988 Coverage of state pension 
extended- introduced compulsory 
PRSI for the self-employed 
Social Welfare Act 
Ireland 1991 Coverage of state pension 
extended- introduced compulsory 
PRSI for the part-time workers 
 
Ireland 1994 Coverage of state pension 
extended- up to twenty years spent 
caring for children or incapacitated 
adults to be disregarded when 
averaging the social insurance 
record  
Homemakers’ Scheme 
Ireland 1997 Eligibility conditions for state 
pension tightened- increased the 
minimum contributions required for 
Social Welfare Act 
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eligibility to the Old Age 
(Contributory) State pension 
Ireland 2006 Means testing loosened- increased 
the means test disregard from EUR 
7.60 per week to EUR 20.00 
Social Welfare Law Reform 
and Pensions Act 
    
New 
Zealand 
1985 Affluence test introduced- 
introduced the taxation Surcharge 
 
New 
Zealand 
1990 Affluence test increased- taxation 
surcharge rate increased from 20-
25% 
 
New 
Zealand 
1997 Affluence test abolished- surcharge 
abolished entirely, leaving universal 
pension with no form of targeting 
Taxation (Superannuitant 
Surcharge Abolition) Act 
    
Switzerland 1985 Means testing tightened- lowering 
of complementary benefits for 
pensioners with own savings 
Zweite Revision des 
Bundesgesetzes uber 
Erganzungsleistungen zur 
AHV/IV 
Switzerland 2003 Shift towards targeting- cutbacks 
in pension indexation 
11th AHV/AVS revision 
    
United 
Kingdom 
1980 Shift towards targeting- pensions 
no longer uprated by the better of 
earnings or prices, but by prices only 
Social Security Act 
United 
Kingdom 
1999 Shift towards targeting- renamed 
the main means-tested pension 
‘Minimum Income Guarantee’. 
Increased its generosity substantially 
and temporarily indexed it to 
earnings rather than prices. 
Welfare Reform and 
Pensions Act 
United 
Kingdom 
2000 Contribution credits- introduced 
credits for carers and disabled 
people with broken work records to 
enable them to build up entitlements 
to the state pension 
 
United 
Kingdom 
2002 Means testing loosened- replaced 
the Minimum Income Guarantee 
with the Pension Credit. The Pension 
Credit system offset some of the 
State Pension Credit Act 
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disincentive effects of the means-
tested Minimum Income Guarantee 
by introducing a Savings Credit 
element to reward people over 65 
for their savings. 
United 
Kingdom 
2007 Eligibility conditions for state 
pension loosened and a shift away 
from targeting- loosened eligibility 
conditions for receipt of the Basic 
State Pension 
Re-introduced earnings uprating 
 
Pensions Act 
United 
States 
1981 Means testing tightened- instead of 
the first $60 of earned or unearned 
income being excluded, now the first 
$20 were excluded, and instead of 
the next $195 of the remainder of 
quarterly earned income being 
excluded, now the next $65 was 
excluded 
Public Law 97-35 
United 
States 
1993 
1996 
Means testing tightened- placed 
restrictions on DI and SSI benefits to 
Drug Addicts and Alcoholics 
1993 and 1996 SSA 
Amendment Acts 
  
In Ireland, reforms over the last three decades have dramatically increased the 
number of people qualifying for pensions based on their social insurance record 
rather than through means testing, by extending the coverage of the contributory 
state pension to the self-employed (1988) and to part-time workers (1991), 
introducing a system of disregards for carers (1994) and loosening the means test 
(2007).  In Australia, New Zealand and the UK too, reforms that shifted away from 
universalism in the 1980s have been replaced in recent years with universalising 
reforms.  
Reforms in the 1980s made the Australian Age Pension less universal by 
tightening the means tests (1983, 1985). The trend since has been reversed as in the 
2000s Australia passed two universalising reforms which together extended 
coverage significantly by loosening the means test. In New Zealand the affluence test 
which was introduced in 1986 and increased further in 1990 was repealed in 1997, 
leaving a universal flat-rate state pension conditional only on residence. The UK also 
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moved towards targeting initially, by moving from earnings to price indexation of 
the state pension in 1980. But in the last decade the UK passed three reforms 
increasing the universalism of the state pension, introducing credits for carers and 
disabled people with broken work records to enable them to build up entitlements 
to the state pension (2000), loosening the means test on the Minimum Income 
Guarantee (2002), and re-introducing earnings uprating as well as lowering the 
required contributions for a full basic state pension from 45 years to 30 years 
(2007).  
In Switzerland and Denmark no clear trend emerges. In Denmark reforms 
loosening the income test for the pension supplement (1987) and introducing 
contribution credits for benefits recipients (1996) alternated with reforms that 
shifted towards targeting (1993, 2003), whilst in Switzerland reforms tightening the 
means test (1983) and shifting individuals towards targeting (2003) have been 
punctuated by the introduction of contribution credits (1995). In the meantime the 
US, Canada and the Netherlands do not introduce any universalising reforms at all. 
Thus, although market-heavy pension systems overall have seen an increase in 
reforms that make the state pension more universal, there is cross-national 
variation around this trend, which has been driven by four countries – the UK, New 
Zealand, Australia and Ireland.  
Moreover, where reforms have made the state pension more universal, they 
have done so in a variety of ways. The universalising reforms that have occurred do 
not all have the same redistributive impact, nor do they benefit the same political 
groups. While the UK reforms of 2007 for example benefit welfare outsiders by 
making it easier for them to receive state benefits as a matter of contributory right, 
in the fully means-tested system of Australia the insider/outsider distinction is of 
little relevance. Similarly, while the loosening of means tests extended statutory 
pensions among the low and middle-income groups in Australia, the repeal of the 
affluence test in New Zealand extended coverage among the wealthy. Conceptually 
this variation is not a problem. As discussed in chapter one, the concept of 
universalism is best understood as inclusion within a common system and not 
redistribution or equality. However, the heterogeneous distribution of benefits has 
implications for the politics driving these reforms, and any explanation must be able 
to account for these diverse patterns. 
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2.3 CHANGES TO PRIVATE PENSIONS 
 
I now turn my attention to private pensions. In the Netherlands, state regulation of 
the labour market introduced in the 1950s required that all benefits negotiated at 
the bargaining table be extended to non-union workers. This led very early on to 
supplementary private pensions that were quasi-universal, covering over ninety per 
cent of the working population, despite low union membership (Myles and Pierson, 
2001:315). In all other market-heavy pension systems, private pension remained 
wholly voluntary until the 1980s. Over the past three decades however there has 
been a clear trend towards more universal private pensions within market-heavy 
pension systems. Of the nine countries analysed in this thesis, only Ireland, Canada 
and the US now rely on employer voluntarism in private pension contributions. The 
trend is summarized in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5. Regulatory changes extending private pension coverage in market-heavy pension 
systems 
Country Year Reform Description 
Switzerland 1982 Bundesgesetz über die 
Berufliche Vorsorge 
Mandatory employer and 
employee contributions to 
occupational pensions 
Australia 1985 Accord between ACTU and 
Labor Government 
Wage claim moderation in 
exchange for government support 
for the extension of occupational 
superannuation 
Denmark 1991 Collective agreements Extension of occupational 
pensions 
Australia 1992 Superannuation Guarantee 
(Administration) Act 
Mandatory employer 
contributions to a private pension 
plan 
Netherlands 1994  Made illegal to exclude part-time 
workers from occupational 
pension schemes 
Switzerland 1997 Verordnung uber die 
obligatorische berufliche 
Vorsorge von Arbeitslosen 
Unemployment insurance funds 
to deduct a contribution from 
unemployment benefits and 
make an ‘employer’s 
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Personen contribution’, thereby extending 
occupational pension provision to 
the unemployed 
Switzerland 2003  1st BVG/LPP Revision  Improved occupational pension 
coverage for low-income earners 
Improved occupational pension 
coverage for part-time employees 
 
New 
Zealand 
2007 Taxation (KiwiSaver) Act Introduced mandatory employer 
contributions to Kiwisaver 
schemes (unless employee ‘opts-
out’) 
United 
Kingdom 
2008 Pensions Act Introduced mandatory employer 
contributions to workplace 
pension schemes (unless 
employee ‘opts-out’) 
 
In Switzerland mandatory occupational pensions were introduced in 1982, and 
subsequent reforms in 1997 and 2003 extended occupational pensions to the 
unemployed, low-income earners and part-time employees (Bonoli, 2006: 230). In 
Australia a corporatist agreement between organised labour and government 
extended occupational pension coverage in 1985, and in 1992 top-down legislation 
introduced the Superannuation Guarantee, which made it mandatory for employers 
to contribute to a private pension plan. In Denmark, private pension coverage was 
extended through collective agreements in the 1991 collective bargaining round. 
There was no accompanying legislation, however as the vast majority of employees 
were unionised the result was similar to Dutch quasi-universal coverage 
(Ebbinghaus, 2011: 409, Myles and Pierson, 2001). In the Netherlands, top-down 
reform in 1994 increased universalism further by making it illegal to exclude part-
time workers from occupational pension schemes. Finally, in New Zealand the 
Taxation (KiwiSaver) Act 2007 introduced mandatory employer contributions to 
private pension or ‘Kiwisaver’ schemes and in the UK, mandatory employer 
contributions into a workplace pension scheme were introduced by the 2008 
Pensions Act.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Overall between 1980 and 2008 market-heavy pension systems have become more 
universal. While the US and Canada did not introduce any universalising changes in 
the period under consideration, they were the only countries not to do so. In Ireland, 
a series of reforms extended the coverage of the state pension, whereas Switzerland, 
the Netherlands and Denmark introduced regulatory extensions of private pension 
coverage. In the UK, Australia and New Zealand, it was both private and public 
pensions that became more universal. The next four chapters make use of the cross-
national variation set out in this chapter to explain why universalising changes 
occurred where and when they did. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS AND 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This chapter reviews the wealth of literature that seeks to explain social policy 
reforms and welfare state change. The purpose of the chapter is threefold. First, to 
assess how far existing theory can go towards explaining the universalising reforms 
presented in the previous chapter. Second, to build on the existing literature to 
develop theoretical expectations that form the starting point for the empirical work 
that follows. Third, to link the theoretical expectations to my chosen research 
methods, in a discussion of my research design. 
 
3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
My literature review starts with the work of those who sought to explain the 
development of the welfare state in the context of industrialisation and economic 
growth. Focusing on an age of social policy expansion, this work often looked in 
detail at the relationship between the power resources of social classes and the 
development of more or less universal benefits. I present this body of work in two 
stages, starting from the categorical relationship posited by power resource theory, 
and finishing with the insights of those who claim the relationship varied historically 
depending on the institutional context. I then turn my attention to the post-
industrial context, where the focus has been on retrenchment and restructuring 
rather than expansion. I explore how party and interest group behaviour is expected 
to have changed, and discuss some rare but thought-provoking accounts of 
expansionary and universalising reform. Finally, I turn my attention to work that has 
sought to explain the development of private welfare provision, paying special 
attention to those analyses that offer insights into the regulatory preferences of key 
interest groups. 
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POWER RESOURCE THEORY 
 
Most explanations of the extension of social rights are set in the context of 
industrialisation and economic growth. They deal with the emergence of western 
welfare states over a period spanning from the beginning of the twentieth century to 
the end of the post-war ‘golden age’ of welfare expansion in the 1980s. Here the 
main driving force was industrialisation, which created a new set of demands for 
protection against the risks of old age, sickness, disability and unemployment, as 
well as the economic growth necessary to meet these demands.  
According to Power Resource Theory, the broad and amorphous trend of 
welfare expansion was given nationally distinct form by political parties and related 
class actors such as trade unions and employers, who responded to these 
socioeconomic changes in different ways (Korpi, 1983, Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
Stephens, 1979). As representatives of social constituencies which were defined in 
terms of industrial classes, these actors pursued a clear policy agenda and were 
bearers of clear ideological stances (Häusermann et al., 2010: 9).  
Left-of-centre or Social Democratic parties represented the interests of the 
working class or the labour movement. The average male production worker had a 
standard employment profile, working full-time, and largely uninterrupted until 
retirement. As such, the labour movement favoured benefits entitlement to which 
was gained on the basis of contributory right. According to Power Resource Theory, 
the Left was ‘always violently opposed’ to means-tested social assistance, which it 
perceived to be conspicuously designed to promote social dualisms by punishing 
and stigmatizing recipients (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 126).  
Yet despite the labour movement’s preference for contributory benefits and 
its scant interest in the extension of coverage to other socioeconomic groups, Social 
Democratic parties are associated in Power Resource Theory not with contributory 
insurance, but rather with the development of universal benefits. According to 
Power Resource Theory this is because the working class could nowhere secure a 
political majority on its own, and benefits were extended to include other 
socioeconomic groups in order to gain political support. The origins of universal 
benefits in Scandinavian countries were thus the result of a pragmatic class 
compromise between the working class and farmers (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 30, 
46).  
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Later, in the post-war context of increasing income disparities, 
‘encompassing’ welfare states that supplemented universal flat-rate benefits with 
earnings-related insurance were according to Power Resource Theory the result of a 
class compromise between representatives of labour and a new middle class of 
white-collar workers. For Power Resource theorists, this latter political compromise 
exemplifies the distrust of the political left for market solutions to social problems, 
and the strategic use of encompassing universal benefits to block off political 
support for the market is a key aspect of the post-war Social Democratic agenda 
(Korpi and Palme, 1998, Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
Secular right-of-centre parties represented the interests of employers, who 
were averse to the high non-wage labour costs and de-commodification that 
encompassing universalistic policies involved. They also represented the prospering 
middle classes, a group which was insulated from many social risks by virtue of its 
savings and property ownership. Right-of-centre parties were therefore associated 
by Power Resource Theory with individualism, self-reliance and fiscal restraint. 
They had a preference for market solutions to welfare problems, and believed that 
the state should encourage the market both passively by guaranteeing only a 
minimum, and actively by subsidizing private welfare schemes. In terms of welfare 
arrangements, the secular right was therefore associated with the development of 
residual welfare states in which means-tested assistance, modest universal 
transfers, or modest social insurance plans were prevalent, offering low to moderate 
replacement rates (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26-27).  
Power Resource Theory thus associates the political left with the 
development of universal benefit systems and a marginal role of means-testing and 
private welfare, while the secular political right is associated with a prevalence of 
means-testing and privately provided benefits. In this way, partisan politics are 
meant to have shaped the qualitative differences between western welfare states. 
The ‘Liberal’ welfare regime or the ‘basic social security’ model found in the 
Anglophone countries is borne of the social policy preferences of the secular 
political right, and the ‘Social Democratic’ regime or ‘encompassing’ model of 
Scandinavia has been crafted by the pragmatic compromises of representatives of 
labour.  
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HISTORICAL REAPPRAISALS 
 
This static connection between the power resources of class actors and the 
development of the welfare state has been called into question. Most prominently, a 
body of ‘employer-centred’ research emerged challenging the view of welfare state 
development as the outcome of labour mobilization in trade unions and social 
democratic parties (Swenson, 1991, Mares, 2001, Estevez-Abe et al., 2001, Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). This work questioned the assumption of employer hostility to the 
welfare state, showing how in some cases the welfare state does not only impose 
costs on employers but also provides direct and tangible benefits to them.  
Though insightful, employer-centred approaches do not much alter the 
Power Resource understanding of the development of universal benefit 
arrangements. For one, employers rarely initiated the extension of social citizenship 
rights or set the agenda for welfare state expansion. Rather than being ‘protagonists’ 
in the development of the welfare state, in most cases they were ‘consenters’ of 
proposals that reflected their second or lower level preferences (Korpi, 2006: 183, 
202). Moreover, employer support for generous state provision has generally been 
limited to social insurance arrangements which complement the production of 
goods and services that rely on firm or industry specific skills. There has been no 
attempt to claim employer support for the development of citizenship or residence 
based benefits which de-commodify labour and erode employer control (Mares, 
2001, Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). 
Of more relevance to the development of universal benefit arrangements, a 
second line of argument questioning the Power Resource view seeks to show that 
the static connection between Social Democratic parties and universalism is not 
borne out historically. In this view, class interests did determine the outcome of 
battles over welfare policy, but these varied and those that stood to gain from 
universalising reform differed between nations and over time (Baldwin, 1990: 290). 
According to Baldwin, the origins of universalism in the paradigmatic 
Scandinavian case do not lie in the interests of the working class. Far from being the 
‘clever tactitioners’ of Power Resource Theory, initiating the cross-class coalitions 
around universalism, Baldwin’s account of the first legislative pensions initiatives of 
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the end of the nineteenth century casts Scandinavian Social Democratic parties as 
reluctant consenters  (Baldwin, 1990: 157). The protagonists in moves to introduce 
non-contributory tax-financed pensions in Denmark in 1891 and largely tax-
financed pensions in Sweden in 1913 were instead parties of the centre and the 
right, who represented a ‘rising agrarian bourgeoisie’ keen not to be excluded from 
the increasingly generous benefits reserved for the poor (Baldwin, 1990: 63). Aware 
that in a predominantly rural society, they could not come to power if they limited 
their concern to urban wage earners, the Social Democrats eventually granted 
‘grudging approval’ to the policy proposals of the right parties, but the first 
universalising policies were ‘only continued, not created’ by Social Democrats 
(Baldwin, 1990: 63, 94).  
Moreover, according to Baldwin, the post-war extension of these first 
universalising initiatives displays a similar pattern.  The sharp decrease in the 
means-testing of the Swedish statutory pension in 1946 was ‘an issue favoured by 
the bourgeois parties and thrust upon the left by its political rivals’ (Baldwin, 1990: 
114). The groups with most to gain were a minority of affluent independents and 
salaried employees; it was they who already had significant social provision or other 
means of their own that barred them from receipt of statutory benefits under the 
status quo. Once again, increased universalism was driven by the political right. For 
the Social Democrats, universalising reform did enter the agenda a little later, as the 
spread of post-war affluence allowed increasing numbers of workers to build up 
private savings. But they did not initiate the policy. Middle-class interests were the 
origin of a concept that Social Democrats later adopted as their own (Baldwin, 1990: 
114).     
Yet Baldwin does not identify universalism with the political right. Rather, 
he shows that partisan interest in universalising policies varied historically with 
changes in the institutional and socio-economic context. In Denmark and the UK for 
example, it was the political left that drove post-war moves towards universalism. In 
these countries the broad prevalence of private provision meant that it was the 
working class that had particular cause to end the means testing that otherwise 
undermined their eligibility to benefits. By contrast in continental Europe, where 
fears of an unruly working class had earlier prompted Bismark to introduce 
contributory social insurance specifically focused on ‘the proletariat’ the pension 
politics of the immediate post-war period pitted worker’s desires for universal 
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insurance to broaden the risk pool against the desire of secure self-employed and 
salaried employees to stay out of the contributory system. Later, when the labour 
market position of the self-employed and salaried workers began to worsen, the 
right-of-centre parties that represented them began to support universal social 
insurance just as the left began to express ambivalence to universal benefits on the 
grounds of fairness (Baldwin, 1990).  
Writing about welfare states outside of Europe, Castles (1985, Castles, 1994) 
lends support to Baldwin’s claims. In an analysis of the Australian case, Castles 
explains how the wage earner’s welfare state, where a minimum wage supplied a 
functional alternative to citizenship rights, meant that the labour movement was in 
favour of means-tested benefits and opposed to contributory insurance that would 
reduce wages below the accustomed standard - whether such insurance was 
encompassing or otherwise.  
What emerges from Castles’ and Baldwin’s work is that it is not possible to 
associate universalism with the left and means-testing with the right in the 
development of advanced welfare states. What we see instead historically is that 
party support for universalism or means-testing has varied across countries and 
over time, because institutional and socioeconomic context affected which groups 
stood to gain from such reform. This view is in line with what is now a broad 
consensus in the literature explaining welfare state stability and change (Streeck 
and Thelen, 2005, Beland, 2005, Pierson, 1996, Hall and Soskice, 2001). In a nutshell, 
explanations of reform must pay attention to how political institutions and existing 
welfare state structures shape the policy preferences of key political actors in the 
face of socioeconomic pressures, as well as the power of these actors to influence 
the policymaking process.  
Yet the universalising reforms of interest in this thesis have occurred in a 
very different context to those reforms studied by Castles, Baldwin, and the Power 
Resource Theorists. Welfare states have matured, economic growth has slowed, and 
employment patterns have changed, ushering in new social risks and new patterns 
of class politics. It is therefore to this context that the literature review now turns.  
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THE POST-INDUSTRIAL CONTEXT 
 
Perhaps the most prominent stream of research on the development of post-
industrial welfare states suggests that the importance of partisan politics has 
declined considerably (Pierson, 2001, Castles, 2001b, Huber and Stephens, 2001). 
On the one hand, the retrenchment desires of right-of-centre governments are 
considered limited by resistance from welfare beneficiaries reluctant to lose the 
benefits to which they have been entitled. This resistance to reform is structured by 
existing policies, mediated by electoral and labour market institutions, and 
overcome by institutional entrepreneurs deploying strategies of blame avoidance, 
framing and obfuscation  (Pierson, 1996, Weaver, 1986, Starke, 2006). On the other 
hand, the expansionary desires of trade unions and left-of-centre parties are said to 
be constrained by the ‘permanent austerity’ that has resulted from the slower 
growth, higher unemployment, increased economic openness, demographic aging 
and maturing social commitments of the past thirty years (Pierson, 2001). Unable to 
pursue traditional Social Democratic policies in the post-industrial context 
(Kitschelt, 1994), left-of-centre parties have adjusted their policies and shifted 
towards quasi-markets, competition, privatisation, fiscal discipline, and reforms to 
promote personal responsibility (Le Grand, 2007, Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993).  
 Of course, there are those that insist that parties and interest groups still 
matter, and in much the same way as they used to (Korpi and Palme, 2003). Hicks 
(1999: 220-1) points to the continuous importance of Social Democracy as a 
defender of the welfare state against retrenchment. Scruggs and Allan (2004) claim 
that left-of-centre parties are associated with less retrenchment because they 
represent the beneficiaries of the welfare state. Jensen (2011) shows that Social 
Democratic governments can introduce expansionary reforms in a corporatist 
setting. And others like Anderson (2001) have challenged the idea of union 
powerlessness.  
 Others still suggest that party roles have been reversed, with left-of-centre 
parties now more capable of retrenchment than right-of-centre parties (Ross, 2000, 
Green-Pedersen, 2001, Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998). These authors point to the 
effect of a ‘Nixon goes to China’ logic. In a nutshell, since left-of-centre parties are 
associated with defending the welfare state, they have more leeway in retrenching 
or restructuring it. Left-of-centre parties ‘own’ the welfare state issue, and voters 
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will tend to believe them when they accuse right-of centre governments of being ‘on 
an ideological crusade against the welfare state’ (Green-Pedersen, 2001: 967). If 
therefore a right-of-centre government proposes welfare state retrenchment, it will 
be a very tempting vote-seeking strategy for left-of-centre parties to firmly oppose. 
On the other hand, left-of-centre parties have much to gain from initiating welfare 
state retrenchment and little to lose, since due to their reputation right-of-centre 
parties have no votes to gain by attacking a left-of-centre government for welfare 
state retrenchment (Ross, 2000, Green-Pedersen, 2001: 967).  
 Yet austerity is not the only challenge facing mature post-industrial welfare 
states. The post-industrial context not only imposes constraints on the welfare state, 
but also generates new demands, as the New Social Risk literature shows. In 
particular, the mismatch between contributory insurance and the discontinuous 
employment patterns prevalent in the labour markets of advanced post-industrial 
economies means more people than ever before struggle to build up entitlements to 
contributory benefits. This does not just contribute to tight fiscal conditions. It also 
has implications for party behaviour, and it opens the door for reforms that adapt 
existing institutional arrangements to the new labour market structures (Bonoli, 
2005, Taylor-Gooby, 2004, Häusermann, 2010). 
Unlike the Power Resource view that left-of-centre parties represent the 
industrial working class, and unlike Rueda and King, who see left-of-centre parties 
as representatives of the ‘shrinking, largely male core of secure and privileged 
employees’ (Rueda, 2007), a number of authors have suggested that left-of-centre 
parties in the post-industrial context increasingly represent those with 
discontinuous employment biographies (Kitschelt, 1994, Häusermann et al., 2012). 
These new constituencies of the left-of-centre parties include high-skilled middle-
class voters, many of them women working in the service sector with atypical 
employment patterns (Kitschelt, 1994) as well as low-skilled labour market 
outsiders (Häusermann et al., 2012). They are considered to have little interest in 
contributory benefits and a preference for means-tested or universal benefits that 
are not affected by their discontinuous employment biographies (Häusermann et al., 
2012).  
In addition to being represented by left-of-centre parties, the interest of 
those with atypical employment patterns may be furthered as a result of what 
Häusermann (2010) calls ‘modernizing compromises’. Häusermann has shown how 
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in the context of Continental European pension systems where the mismatch 
between contributory arrangements and atypical employment biographies is stark 
and the demand for institutional modernisation particularly acute, policymakers 
have succeeded in passing a variety of reforms benefiting politically weak labour 
market outsiders. She shows that they have done this by engineering 'modernising 
compromises' - reform packages that secure the support of cross-class coalitions. A 
key condition for modernising compromises is an institutional context that favours 
negotiation and compromise, allowing policymakers to blur opposition to 
retrenchment by compensating cuts with policies aimed to foster cross-class 
conflict. According to Häusermann such an institutional context exists where labour, 
business, and political parties are fragmented, because this generates opportunities 
for coalitional engineering. By contrast, where economic interests and political 
parties are more concentrated, coalitions are more stable and actors cannot easily 
opt in and out of reform coalitions (Häusermann, 2010:7). 
This work offers rare insights into a number of reforms in Continental 
Europe that it would be difficult to explain using existing theories of post-industrial 
politics. Yet it stops short of explaining universalising reforms. Since according to 
Häusermann (Häusermann, 2010, Häusermann et al., 2012) the misfit of 
contributory systems with discontinuous employment biographies can be addressed 
either through universalising reforms or by increasingly targeting benefits to those 
‘in need’, it is not clear why universalising reforms would be introduced. In a context 
of austerity a shift towards targeting is indeed much more likely; there is very little 
reason to expect that costly universalism will be the chosen path.  
Moving away from the institutional mismatch between contributory 
insurance and atypical employment patterns that characterises the contributory 
systems of Continental Europe, Green-Pedersen (2003) points to the prevalence of 
means-testing as a source of institutional disharmony that might be more directly 
relevant to explaining universalising reforms. In his analysis of recent Danish 
pension reforms, Green-Pedersen observes that ‘moves in the universal direction in 
Denmark…were mostly driven by right wing parties focusing on making work and 
savings pay’ (Green-Pedersen, 2003: 18). He argues that right wing parties pushed 
for more universal benefits ‘because they are more market conforming than income 
or means tested benefits. Universal benefits do not damage incentives to take a job 
or save for your own pension’ (Green-Pedersen, 2003: 5). By this account, the 
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Danish right-of-centre parties introduced universalising reforms to the state 
pension primarily because such reforms were expected to have the effect of 
reducing disincentives to save privately for retirement.  
 
THE SUBTERRANEAN POLITICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 
 
Whilst the development of public pensions has been the subject of much academic 
scrutiny, the development of private pensions has received relatively little attention. 
Nevertheless, a clear account has been put forward by scholars of comparative 
pension politics on the issue of why private pensions evolved to be peripheral in 
some countries and of central importance in others. According to the comparative 
literature, it was the failure of the so-called ‘latecomers’ to build a significant 
earnings-related pension either during the ‘first critical juncture’ of pension 
evolution prior to or around the First World War, or during the ‘second critical 
juncture’ after the Second World War and until 1980 that explains much of their 
subsequent development. In these ‘latecomers’, the market is crowded in, leading to 
the classic and self-perpetuating dualism of retirement income between those with 
access to private provision and those who rely solely on the state pension 
(Ebbinghaus, 48-50; Myles and Pierson, 315-318).  
What is less convincingly explained however is why countries where private 
pensions have evolved to be of central importance (i.e. countries with market-heavy 
pension systems) vary in how dualising their private pensions are. Why do some 
countries develop near universal private pension coverage while others retain 
voluntary and dualising arrangements?  
In light of the extension of private pension coverage in the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Australia, it became standard to assume that increased universalism 
in private pensions is won at the bargaining table (Myles and Pierson, 2001) and as 
such that it is a development which is almost as inevitable for those countries with 
the institutional capacity for collective self-regulation as it is impossible for those 
without. As Ebbinghaus writes, differences in the coverage of occupational pensions 
are the result of long-standing differences in ‘bargaining institutions, the willingness 
of employers to regulate, and the overall bargaining coverage, as well as state 
support’ (Ebbinghaus, 2011: 381).  
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In line with this view, the top-down introduction of mandatory occupational 
pensions in Switzerland in 1982 after being accepted by a large majority in a 
national referendum is considered a case of Swiss exceptionalism. According to 
Bonoli, ‘the idea of mandating occupational pensions did of course surface in other 
countries, but was generally opposed by employers. Its adoption in a country like 
Switzerland, where employers are extremely influential political actors, is thus 
particularly striking, and can only be understood with reference to the country’s 
peculiar political institutions, especially the popular initiative’ (Bonoli, 2006: 230). 
However, the reforms set out in chapter two cast doubt on the idea of Swiss 
exceptionalism and require explanation. Take first the introduction of mandatory 
employer contributions to ‘Kiwisaver’ schemes in New Zealand in 2007, and the 
introduction of mandatory employer contributions into a workplace pension 
scheme in the UK in 2008. Here private pensions were made more universal not 
through collective bargaining but rather through top-down regulation, in two 
countries without Switzerland’s ‘peculiar political institutions’. In addition, although 
Dutch pensions were initially made more universal through collective bargaining, 
subsequent regulatory reform in 1994 increased universalism by making it illegal to 
exclude part-time workers from occupational pension schemes. And in Switzerland 
the reforms of 1997 and 2003 that extended occupational pensions to low-income 
earners, part-time employees and the unemployed were not put to referendum. 
Clearly then, top-down regulatory reform extending private pensions is 
neither impossible nor exceptional. What is less clear is how to explain where such 
reform happens, and when. Comparative social policy research is rather state-
centric. It focuses on reforms to publicly provided and administered solutions to 
social risk and has very little to say about regulatory reforms that affect private 
benefits. There is, as Leiserling puts it ‘no tradition of regulation analysis in social 
policy’ (Leiserling, 2005: 11). 
Those analyses that do address the politics of private welfare consider it to 
differ greatly from the familiar politics of welfare state reform – it is a ‘subterranean’ 
politics which is less visible to the public, where the scope of conflict is more 
restricted (Hacker, 2002: 42). According to Hacker, public awareness of private 
welfare arrangements is generally low and the public is hard to mobilize. In this 
‘complex and low-salience policy field’ information about policy effects is scarce and 
unevenly distributed, and the political actors most actively involved in the policy 
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process are labour groups, businesses, and third-party providers whose interest in 
the policy under consideration is intense enough to prompt mobilization and to 
justify the costs of information gathering (Hacker, 2002: 43).  
The question of how unions, employers and pension providers view the 
regulatory extension of private pension coverage has only rarely been directly 
addressed, and the question of how these groups then affect the regulatory process 
even less so. Nevertheless, drawing from the work of a disparate group of scholars, 
what emerges is a pretty substantial set of expectations regarding how these three 
interest groups might view regulation extending private pension coverage. 
Of the three major political actors affected by the regulatory extension of 
private pension coverage, it is employers whose expected preferences are clearest. 
For employers, private occupational pensions are associated with monetary costs on 
the one hand, and benefits in terms of human resource management on the other 
(McCarthy, 2006, Sass, 1997: 18-37). While the costs associated with occupational 
pensions vary with the size of the firm and the risk profile of its employees, the 
benefits depend on the skills profile of the firm’s employees, and the ‘control’ that 
the employer has over the scheme (Mares, 2001: 195-203). As such, employers are 
expected to favour private sector voluntarism, and resist regulatory measures that 
increase their costs and reduce their control (Meyer and Bridgen, 2012: 391).  As 
Bonoli writes, ‘employers have traditionally been willing to provide [occupational 
pension coverage] to highly valued staff, but have always resented the imposition of 
rules that generate higher labour costs for low-skilled employees’ (Bonoli, 2006). 
Opposition to compulsory employer contributions is expected to be 
particularly strong in small firms where the costs are relatively large, and for firms 
employing predominantly low-skilled labour where the benefits of ‘tying’ the 
worker to the firm are relatively small. Moreover, employer opposition to 
compulsory contributions can be expected to grow as the costs to employers of 
offering private pension benefits increase and the benefits become more uncertain. 
Occupational pensions were less costly for employers in times of high consumer 
demand, full employment, booming stock markets and good pension fund 
performance. Growing longevity raises the projected costs of defined benefit 
schemes for employers (Clark, 2003) and the increasing importance of shareholder 
value further increases pressure to cut costs associated with expensive defined 
benefit schemes (Cutler and Waine, 2001). At the same time, the benefits to 
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employers of offering occupational pensions are decreasing, as deindustrialisation 
has reduced the need for companies to retain their workers for long periods of time 
(Sass, 1997).  
Representatives of the pension industry are assumed to share employer 
concerns about the costs of regulation, and have historically strongly resisted 
regulatory incursions into their affairs (Meyer and Bridgen, 2012, Hacker, 2002, 
Immergut et al., 2006). However, as Bridgen and Meyer point out, ‘for insurers, 
concerns about the costs and regulation of compulsion are mitigated by its potential 
for increasing business’ (Meyer and Bridgen, 2012: 391). As Hacker shows in his 
(2010) analysis of US healthcare reform, it is possible for the prospect of increasing 
business to outweigh insurer concerns about regulatory costs. Hacker analyses the 
role of the insurance industry in passing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act in March 2010. According to Hacker, the reform was possible because the health 
insurance industry, which had previously been fiercely opposed to public 
involvement in the market for health insurance, changed its mind in the face of years 
of decreasing coverage and declining revenues. It agreed to accept greater public 
regulation and involvement in return for greater guaranteed financing. This reform 
of the US health system bore striking resemblance to the universalising reforms to 
private pensions of interest in this thesis; it involved new regulation of private 
health insurance and resulted in a significant extension of coverage (Hacker, 2010: 
865). The expected preferences of pension industry representatives regarding the 
regulatory extension of private pension coverage are therefore more ambiguous 
than they are for employers. 
While Power Resource Theory associates unions with the development of 
earnings-related state pensions as discussed above, a number of studies note that 
unions have often revealed second-order preferences for a comprehensive system of 
occupational pensions. In particular, historical accounts of the extension of private 
pension coverage in Denmark, the Netherlands, Australia and Switzerland 
emphasise the role of unions (Bonoli, 2006, Anderson, 2006, Green-Pedersen, 2006, 
Commonwealth Treasury of Australia, 2001). In each case occupational pensions 
had become so prominent that the development of a state earnings-related pension 
was considered politically infeasible, as it faced resistance from a significant number 
of employees who already had secure occupational benefits. As a result, union 
representatives of those parts of the workforce with no form of earnings 
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replacement in old age (often blue-collar unions) pushed for the extension of private 
pensions to cover their members instead. In this way, the extension of private 
occupational benefits has been pursued by unions as a ‘second best’ option to the 
state earnings-related alternative (Hacker, 2002, Meyer and Bridgen, 2012: 390). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this literature review, I have searched existing work on social policy development 
for insights that can help explain the universalising reforms presented in chapter 
two. While much has been written about the development of universal state 
benefits, these explanations are set in the context of industrialisation and economic 
growth, and it is unclear whether they still apply to today’s reforms. Yet in the post-
industrial context of austerity and new social risks, universalising reform has 
received much less attention. Similarly, although the development of market-heavy 
pension systems is well understood, regulatory change within these pension 
systems is less so, and the politics behind regulation to extend private pension 
coverage have not been directly addressed. In the next section I draw from the 
reviewed literature to form some initial theoretical expectations as to why there has 
been a shift towards universalising reform in some market-heavy pension systems. 
 
3.2 DEVELOPING MY THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS 
 
On the basis of the preceding review, I expect universalising change that has 
occurred through reform of the state pension, and universalising change that is the 
result of the regulation of private pensions, to mobilize political actors in different 
ways. While the literature shows that public pension reforms are highly salient 
electorally, regulatory reform extending employer contributions to private pensions 
is not usually considered to be the sort of reform that mobilises the mass electorate. 
In line with this view, I consider it unlikely that those without access to private 
pensions know or care enough about their future pension adequacy to mobilize in 
favour of regulatory reform. Such reform does however have distributional 
implications, and I expect these to mobilise organised interests. For this reason, I 
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develop separately my theoretical expectations for why universalising reforms 
occurred in public pensions and for why they occurred in private pensions.  
Of course, public and private spheres of provision are intimately related, and 
the policy preferences of any political actor regarding one sphere are likely to be 
affected by the state of the other sphere. Regarding the development of private 
pensions, my initial theoretical expectations explicitly reflect this. Regarding the 
development of public pensions, they do not. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
policy preferences of relevant actors regarding the development of public pensions 
may be influenced by regulation of the private sphere (Meyer and Bridgen, 2012), I 
start with the expectation that universalising reforms to the state pension can be 
explained independently and see how far this takes me. 
 
PRIVATE PENSIONS 
 
My review of the literature identified three key groups with a stake in the regulatory 
reform of private pensions, that is, unions, employers and representatives of the 
pension industry. Of these, employers can most clearly be expected to oppose 
regulation to make private pensions more universal and cling to employer 
voluntarism. The position of pension industry representatives is more ambiguous. 
As private pension coverage stagnates, pension insurers are likely to be negatively 
affected because fewer people are saving. In this context, some pension insurers 
may be more inclined to accept regulation of their affairs despite their historical 
aversion to regulatory intervention. In light of this ambiguity, I expect pension 
industry representatives to be ‘consenters’ in universalising reforms to private 
pensions. Since unions have often supported the extension of private pensions as a 
second-best alternative to a state earnings-related pension, I put forward the idea 
that a) it is unions who have been the driving force behind recent top-down 
regulation to extend private pension coverage, and b) they have pushed for such 
regulation wherever there has been an absence of a significant earnings-related 
state pension.  
Yet of course, neither unions nor other interest groups are directly involved 
in introducing top-down social policy legislation. How then might such demands 
play out politically in the absence of the institutional capacity for collective self-
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regulation? Under what conditions will union demands for the top-down regulatory 
extension of private pension coverage produce results in the face of employer 
opposition? Here I draw simply from Power Resource Theory in expecting that 
union demands for mandatory employer contributions to occupational pensions will 
produce results when a strong left government is in power. However, following 
Häusermann (2010) I also expect that union demands for the extension of private 
pension coverage may be met when a non-left government is in power, as part of a 
'modernising compromise' in which they pass cost-cutting reforms in a fragmented 
political setting.  
 
STATE PENSIONS 
 
Turning now to the state pension, I take as my starting point the idea that targeting 
may create opportunities for universalising reform. However, rather than expecting 
universalising reform to result from any ideological commitment of right-of-centre 
governments to encouraging the market as Green-Pedersen does (Green-Pedersen, 
2003), I draw from Baldwin in emphasising the causal role of particular social 
interests. From Baldwin’s account, I derive two ‘logics’ of reform that stem from the 
prevalence of means testing.   
First, I draw on Baldwin’s account of German pension politics in the 
immediate post-war period. Here workers mobilized in favour of universal 
insurance to broaden the risk pool, against the desires of secure self-employed and 
salaried employees to stay out of the contributory system. I expect that this logic is 
all the more salient where those uncovered by contributory insurance are reliant on 
means-tested benefits, since those who pay for both their own pension through 
social insurance contributions as well as the means tested benefits of others through 
general taxation have an even stronger interest in reforms to broaden the coverage 
of the contributory system. Therefore, the first ‘logic’ that I expect to be relevant in 
explaining universalising reform stems from the mismatch between the prevalence 
of means-testing and a contributory system with restricted coverage. Hereafter, I 
call this the ‘cost sharing’ logic. 
Second, and likely to be of greater relevance in the mature pension systems 
of interest in this thesis, I draw from Baldwin’s account of the universalising post-
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war pension reforms in Sweden, Denmark and the UK. In particular, my point of 
departure is Baldwin’s claim that these reforms were a response to the demands of 
those who had significant private provision that barred them from receipt of state 
benefits under the status quo. Whereas in Sweden, those with significant private 
means were ‘affluent independents and salaried employees’ represented by 
bourgeois parties, in Britain and Denmark, private pensions had become so 
prevalent that they were not confined to those on high incomes. In these cases it was 
therefore not only the core constituencies of the right, but also those of the left that 
stood to gain from universalising reform.  
The second ‘logic’ that I expect to be relevant in explaining universalising 
reform to the state pension therefore stems from the mismatch between the 
prevalence of means-testing and the prevalence of private pensions. Hereafter I call 
this the ‘private savings’ logic. Where targeted pensions are prevalent, those who 
have saved privately for retirement may find their state pension reduced, and for 
this reason may benefit from universalising reforms such as lowering the rate at 
which public pensions are withdrawn with growing pension income or lowering 
contributions requirements to the state pension. Notwithstanding the uneven 
coverage of voluntary private pensions in favour of those on high incomes, I expect 
that in market-heavy systems private pensions will be sufficiently prevalent that 
those affected by means-testing will cut across the political spectrum. I expect in 
other words that both right and left-of-centre parties will count amongst their 
constituents a significant number of individuals who stand to gain from 
universalising reforms.  
 However, in a post-industrial setting, I expect that universalising reform is 
less feasible for left-of-centre parties than it is for right-of-centre parties. In this I am 
guided by the ‘Nixon-goes-to-China’ logic that reputation matters. Although the 
phrase is usually used to refer to the ability of left-of-centre parties to retrench, the 
underlying logic is that reputation matters. I expect that just as left-of-centre parties 
‘own’ the welfare state issue, right-of-centre parties ‘own’ the fiscal rectitude issue. 
If this is the case, voters will tend to believe right-of-centre parties when they accuse 
left-of-centre governments of being fiscally reckless. If a left-of-centre government 
proposed welfare state expansion, it would be a tempting vote-seeking strategy for 
right-of-centre parties to oppose. On the other hand, a right-of-centre party would 
have much to gain from initiating popular expansionary reforms and little to lose, as 
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due to their reputation for fiscal profligacy left-of-centre parties would be unlikely 
to gain votes by attacking welfare state expansion. By this logic therefore, it is right-
of-centre parties that I expect to initiate universalising public pension reforms. 
 In sum then, I approach my empirical analysis of the universalising changes 
presented in chapter two with the following theoretically derived propositions. 
 
1) Regulatory change to make private pensions more universal is the result of union 
demands for the extension of private pension coverage in the absence of a 
significant earnings-related state pension. Where there is no institutional capacity 
for collective self-regulation, these demands are addressed when either:  
a. A strong left government is in power  
Or  
b. A non-left government seeks to pass cost-cutting reforms in a fragmented 
political system 
 
2) Reforms that make the public pension more universal stem from the prevalence of 
means-testing. They occur under right-of-centre governments as a result of either:  
a. A mismatch between means testing and a contributory system with restricted 
coverage (because those insured under the status quo could benefit from 
universalising reform) 
Or  
b. A mismatch between the prevalence of means-testing and the prevalence of 
private pensions (because those who save privately for retirement and find 
their eligibility for state benefits reduced under the status quo could benefit 
from universalising reform) 
 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The theoretical propositions that I have developed regarding the universalising 
reforms of interest in this thesis are causally rather complex. Although I expect that 
universalising reforms to the state pension will take place where means-testing is 
prevalent, I do not expect that the prevalence of means-testing alone will be 
sufficient for universalising reform to occur. Instead, I expect that the prevalence of 
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means-testing will lead to universalising reform only under a right-of-centre 
government. Similarly, I expect regulatory reforms mandating the extension of 
private pension coverage will not occur wherever there is a strong left government, 
but only where the absence of a state solution to the problem of earnings 
replacement in old age leads to union demands for the extension of private pension 
coverage as a second-best alternative. Any method used to analyse the reforms in 
question must therefore be capable of capturing conjunctural causation, i.e. where 
causally relevant conditions do not display their effects on their own, but only 
together with other conditions. 
Equally importantly, according to the theoretical propositions developed in 
the previous section, universalising reforms may happen for a number of different 
reasons. While in some contexts right-of-centre governments might universalise the 
state pension in response to the mismatch between means-testing and private 
pensions, in other contexts universalising reform to the state pension may be driven 
by the mismatch between means-testing and a contributory system with restrictive 
coverage. Similarly, in some contexts union demands for the extension of private 
pension coverage as a second-best alternative to a state solution may lead to the 
extension of private pension coverage through collective agreements. Where instead 
the institutional capacity for collective self-regulation is absent, such demands might 
find their political expression through a strong left government, and in fragmented 
political settings the same demands might lead to reform when a right-of-centre 
government engineers a modernising compromise. Thus, any method used to 
explain universalising change must be able to capture equifinality, i.e. where 
alternative causal logics produce the same outcome.  
 
INTRODUCING QCA 
 
Such causal complexity can be captured by modelling social phenomena in terms of 
set-relations, in particular by using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the set-
theoretic approach most directly associated with causal interpretation (Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2012, Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). QCA was developed in the late 
1980s by Charles Ragin for the macro-comparative analysis of social phenomena. 
Initial applications were in comparative politics and historical sociology, and often 
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had the welfare state as the object of study (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009: 3). The 
epistemological roots of the approach are empiricist, positivist and deterministic. 
QCA draws on J.S. Mill’s ‘method of agreement’ and ‘method of difference’ which 
seek to establish the cause of an event by systematically matching and contrasting 
cases in such a way as to eliminate all other possible causes (Berg-Schlosser et al., 
2009: 3).  
The foundations of the QCA approach are set out in a book called ‘The 
Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies’ 
(Ragin, 1987). As the title suggests, Ragin presents QCA as a ‘synthetic strategy’ to 
‘integrate the best features of the case-oriented approach with the best features of 
the variable-oriented approach’ (Ragin, 1987: 84). On the one hand, QCA breaks 
down cases into variables – a number of conditions and an outcome. On the other 
hand, each case is also considered to be ‘a complex combination of properties, a 
specific whole that should not be lost in the course of analysis’ (Berg-Schlosser et al., 
2009: 6). In this way QCA allows for the systematic comparison of cases, while at the 
same time doing justice to within-case complexity (Ragin and Rihoux, 2009: xviii).  
Here it is useful to make a distinction between QCA as a logical procedure, 
and QCA as a research approach. The 'QCA procedure', which is described below, is a 
formalised process of comparison. It aims to allow replicability and to force a 
greater precision of causal claims than pure qualitative methods. The 'QCA 
approach' is the broader research process within which the QCA procedure is 
embedded. It involves a 'holistic' focus on individual cases, in order to allow a 
greater insight into the causal mechanisms underlying social phenomena than pure 
quantitative methods (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009: 14, Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012: 9, De Meur et al., 2009: 161). 
 
THE QCA PROCEDURE 
 
The formalised QCA procedure starts with the process of 'calibration' - the assigning 
of set membership scores to cases. A set is a boundary that defines a concept; for 
example, a particular country may or may not be a member of the set of countries 
with market-heavy pension systems. Cases are assigned membership in previously 
defined sets that represent a) the outcome of interest and b) the conditions that are 
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considered to be causally relevant in explaining this outcome. Sets may be ‘crisp’, 
admitting only the possibility of full membership (represented by a membership 
score of 1) or full non-membership (represented by a membership score of 0). 
Alternatively, sets may be ‘fuzzy’, admitting of differences in degree of set 
membership and allowing for set membership scores that fall anywhere between 
the values of 1 and 0 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
Once set membership scores have been calibrated, the QCA procedure 
consists of identifying conditions or combinations of conditions that are subsets or 
supersets of the outcome of interest. These indicate relationships of sufficiency and 
necessity respectively. This procedure is carried out using specialist software which 
performs an algorithmic transformation of assigned membership scores into a ‘truth 
table’. The truth table lists all logically possible combinations of causal conditions 
alongside the empirical instances of each configuration, and then the software uses 
an algorithm based on Boolean algebra to ‘minimise’ the truth table and identify 
combinations of causal conditions that are necessary and/or sufficient for producing 
the outcome. The combinations of necessary and sufficient conditions that make up 
the results of the QCA procedure are summarized in the form of a solution formula 
and parameters of fit (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
  
INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
 
The statements of necessity and sufficiency that result from the QCA procedure must 
be interpreted if they are to offer a causal explanation for the outcome of interest. As 
Goldthorpe points out, 'logical methods… do not, in themselves, provide an account 
of the actual processes involved (Goldthorpe 1997: 14 in De Meur et al., 2009: 159). 
The QCA procedure does not describe a process, but rather 'the conditions that are 
present or absent when an outcome of interest is observed or not observed' (De 
Meur et al., 2009: 160). As such, the QCA procedure cannot in itself shed much light 
on the causal mechanisms at work.  
It is therefore the task of the researcher to develop causal explanations, and 
to spell out the causal links between conditions and outcomes in a narrative fashion 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2010: 412). For this reason detailed knowledge of 
individual cases is inherent to the QCA approach, and discussions of carefully chosen 
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'typical' or 'deviant' cases are very useful for making sense of the results of the QCA 
procedure and inducing theoretical meaning (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 305-
312).   
I conduct my empirical research with this in mind. I start with a set of causal 
propositions formulated through the synthesis of a diverse literature. Throughout 
the QCA process I build an understanding of the reform context and policy history of 
each of the nine countries under study. In addition, I present both typical and 
deviant country cases. These provide explanatory narratives that link the 
institutional conditions identified in the QCA to policy outcomes of universalising 
change through the preferences of relevant political actors. In this way, the country 
cases allow me to build upon my initial theoretical propositions.  
The centrality of case knowledge to the QCA approach makes it well suited to 
go beyond the testing of hypotheses or existing theories. In particular, QCA is well 
suited to build upon and extend theoretical arguments that are 'modest and context-
sensitive in the tradition of ‘grounded’ approaches that are historical, qualitative and 
empirically differentiated’ (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009: 7). In other words, QCA is 
suited to ‘medium range’ theorising and the 'modest generalisation' of causal 
explanations to similar cases rather than to the development of universal causal 
explanations in the form of ‘grand’ social theories (Ragin, 1987, De Meur et al., 2009: 
171, Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009: 12). As such, QCA is an approach that fits well with 
the historical institutionalist flavour of the theoretical expectations developed in the 
previous section. 
 
SELECTION AND CALIBRATION OF CONDITIONS AND OUTCOMES 
 
The selection and calibration of conditions involve moving back and forth between 
prior theoretical knowledge, and empirical insights and case knowledge gained 
during the research process (Ragin, 2000, Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). This 
'iterative' nature of QCA stands in contrast with the principles of research based on 
inferential statistics, which require that the data has not been screened prior to 
testing the hypothesis. QCA conditions are selected because they are expected to be 
relevant for producing the outcome of interest, on the basis of both initial hunches 
and established theoretical and empirical knowledge (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). 
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Thereafter, it is encouraged that preliminary findings are used as justification for 
adding, dropping and reconceptualising conditions.  
The process of calibration proceeds in the same way. Explicit arguments 
based on both theory and on the researcher’s developing case knowledge should 
justify the choice of threshold that determines whether a case is more in or more out 
of a set. This threshold reflects the point of maximum ambiguity regarding a case’s 
membership in the concept of interest, and is also known as the ‘0.5 anchor’. 
Choosing where to place the 0.5 anchor is the most important decision to be taken in 
the calibration process. In crisp sets, it is the only decision that needs to be made. 
With fuzzy sets, the position of anchors for full membership and full non-
membership must also be chosen, and the researcher must specify how the 
underlying raw data translate into set membership scores given the qualitative 
anchors chosen. It is good QCA practice to discuss and document these calibration 
decisions in detail and as transparently as possible (Ragin, 2008). All the data 
necessary to replicate the analysis should be provided, and the use of multiple 
empirical sources for calibrating each set is encouraged (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012, Schneider and Wagemann, 2010).  
With the iterative nature of the QCA approach in mind, I select initial 
conditions on the basis of the theoretical propositions developed in the previous 
section. I run and interpret a large number of fsQCAs with various combinations of 
conditions. I revise my models by adding, dropping and recalibrating conditions 
until they can be interpreted convincingly in light of my case knowledge. Two 
models result from this iterative process, one addressing universalising reforms in 
public pensions, and the other universalising change in private pensions. While the 
final model addressing changes to private pensions does not depart from the initial 
theoretical propositions, the final model addressing public pension reforms includes 
two conditions introduced on a purely inductive basis. These final models are 
presented in chapters four and five respectively. In line with the centrality of the 
calibration process in the QCA procedure, a large part of these two chapters are 
dedicated to presenting and justifying the calibration of set-membership scores for 
the final conditions.  
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FUZZY-SET QCA 
 
Fuzzy sets are so called due to conceptual boundaries that cannot be sharply defined 
and not because of imprecise empirical measurement (Ragin, 2000). As Schneider 
and Wagemann explain, ‘the problem of identifying where exactly the difference is 
between a bald and a non-bald person is not resolved by knowing the precise 
number of hairs remaining’ (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 27).  If a given case 
has a fuzzy-set membership score of, say, 0.8, this reflects precise empirical 
information about that case. Fuzzy sets therefore contain more rather than less 
information than crisp sets, and consequently set higher standards for subset 
relations. For this reason I use fuzzy sets wherever possible, reserving the use of 
crisp sets for when conditions naturally lend themselves to being dichotomous or 
due to data availability. The type of set used determines the type of QCA algorithm 
used. Since crisp-set conditions can be integrated into a fuzzy set QCA but fuzzy set 
conditions cannot be included in a crisp-set QCA my analyses are fuzzy-set.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To summarise, in designing my research I am primarily guided by the type of causal 
relationships that I expect to find, on the basis of my reading of the existing 
literature. In particular, I expect that universalising reforms will not result from a 
uni-causal and context-invariant logic, but rather that they will occur as part of a 
complex causal interplay between a number of aspects of the institutional context. 
For this reason, I use the QCA approach to conduct my empirical investigation. 
Since I expect universalising reform through the extension of state pensions 
and universalising reform through the extension of private pensions to mobilize 
political actors in different ways, I conduct two separate fuzzy-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analyses. I select initial conditions on the basis of the theoretical 
expectations developed in the previous section, and draw on the case knowledge 
gained during the iterative research process to revise my models by adding, 
dropping and reconceptualising conditions. The final models presented in the next 
two chapters are interpreted in light of both typical and deviant country cases. 
These cases, which are presented in chapter six, provide explanatory narratives. 
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They link the institutional conditions identified in the QCA to policy outcomes of 
universalising change through the preferences of relevant political actors, and allow 
me to build upon my initial theoretical expectations.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
MAPPING THE CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH 
UNIVERSALISING CHANGE IN PUBLIC PENSIONS 
 
In this chapter I present a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of reforms that 
have made the state pension more universal in nine market-heavy pension systems 
over almost three decades from 1980 to 2009. I begin with a detailed discussion of 
the model - I explain my case selection in section one, and the choice, measurement 
and calibration of outcomes and causal conditions in sections two and three 
respectively. I section four I present and discuss my results.  
 
4.1 CHOOSING COUNTRY-DECADES AS CASES 
 
I split my data into three decades 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009, and I run 
my QCA not with nine country cases, but with twenty-seven country-decade cases. 
Since country-decades are analytical constructs rather than pre-existing conceptual 
units such as countries, the choice of country-decades as cases requires some 
justification. 
First and foremost, the use of country-decades as cases offers analytical 
leverage by introducing variation in causal conditions over time. By contrast, the use 
of simple country cases would produce a purely cross-national analysis. At best, this 
might yield an explanation of why most countries passed universalising reform 
whilst others did not, without explaining within-country shifts in policy direction 
over time. At worst, the tendency of causally relevant structural, institutional and 
political conditions to cluster at the country level might limit the analysis and hinder 
even the explanation of cross-national differences.  
The inclusion of time as a causally relevant dimension in Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis has received some attention in recent years, resulting in the 
development of a distinct form of QCA called temporal QCA (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012: 9). Yet in this thesis I am not interested in time as a causally 
relevant dimension, but rather in the variation that causal conditions display over 
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time and the analytical leverage this variation may bring. For this reason I adopt the 
analytical construct of country-decades rather than using a variant of QCA to 
incorporate the temporal ordering of conditions.  
But why country-decades as opposed to the country-years customary in 
regression analysis, or country-months, or country-five-years or any other such 
analytical construct? In choosing country-decades as cases, I try to account for the 
fact that reforms take time and are not instantaneous responses to changing 
conditions. It takes time for socioeconomic pressures to influence the policy 
preferences of political actors. It takes time to develop policy responses, to move 
from expert commission, to Green Paper, to government bill and parliamentary 
legislation. There are multiple items on the political agenda at any time, and many 
issues compete for the attention of policymakers. In choosing country-decades as 
cases, I have tried to strike a balance between the idea that change in relevant causal 
conditions leads to reform and the idea that reform is not an instant reaction to such 
change.  
In striking this balance, I have drawn on my knowledge of the policy process 
that led up to the reforms of interest. By presenting the often lengthy policy process 
from causal conditions to reform, the case studies in later chapters move the focus 
away from the analytical construct of country-decades towards real countries, and 
go some way towards supporting the choice of country-decades as a suitable unit of 
analysis in the QCA. In addition, I have conducted the QCA using country-five-years 
as cases. The results, which are included in Appendix F, lend further support to the 
choice of country-decades.  
 
4.2 MEASUREMENT AND CALIBRATION OF THE REFORM OUTCOME 
 
The outcome of interest is the presence of universalising reform. For each country-
decade, I calibrate membership in the fuzzy-set ‘reform’ according to how much any 
needs-based or contributory arrangements restrict coverage, in line with the 
understanding of the concept of universalism that I presented in chapter one. To do 
this I draw on my own database of reforms, as well as on a range of government 
reports and secondary sources, and construct a four value fuzzy-set, the coding 
scheme for which is presented in Table 6 on the next page. 
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Table 6. Coding scheme for the reform outcome 
Fuzzy-set score Membership in the set of cases that have experienced significant 
universalising reform 
1 fully in 
0.67 more in than out 
0.33 more out than in 
0 fully out 
 
Such a method of calibration is ‘especially useful in situations where researchers 
have a substantial amount of information about cases, but the nature of the evidence 
is not identical across cases’ (Ragin, 2009: 90). The calibration of the reform 
outcome is explained in detail for each country-decade in Box 1 below. The 
calibrated conditions are then summarised in Table 10. 
 
Box 1: Calibration of the reform outcome ‘reform’ 
 
Australia-1980 (AUS80), Australia-1990 (AUS90) and Australia-2000 (AUS00) 
The state pension in Australia consists solely of the means-tested Age Pension. 
Reforms in 1983 and 1985 tightened the means-testing of the Age Pension, 
decreasing its coverage. The country-decade of AUS80 therefore lies ‘fully out’ of the 
set ‘significant universalising reform’.  
There were no reforms that affected the universalism of the Australian state pension 
in the 1990s. The country-decade of AUS90 therefore lies ‘fully out’ of the set 
‘significant universalising reform’. 
The trend since has been reversed. In 2000 the asset and income taper test rates 
were reduced from 50% to 40%, and the income and asset test ‘free’ areas were 
increased by 2.5%. Though I have not been able to find an impact assessment that 
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directly estimates the impact of this policy on Age Pension coverage, from research 
estimating the impact of a similar policy change it is possible to infer that around 2% 
of seniors would be newly eligible for the Age Pension after this change (Kelly, 2009: 
24). In 2007 the assets test taper rate was halved, and the assets test threshold was 
raised from $343,750 to $529,250. This resulted in an estimated 300,000 extra 
seniors becoming eligible to receive the Age Pension, or 8% of those who were over 
60 at the time of the reform (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009: 40, Nielson and 
Harris, 2010, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Various 
Years). Since in Australia two universalising reforms were introduced in the 2000s 
which together extended coverage significantly, I consider the country-decade AUS00 
to be ‘fully in’ the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
 
Canada-1980 (CAN80), Canada-1990 (CAN90) and Canada-2000 (CAN00) 
The Canadian state pension consists of a) the basic Old Age Security (OAS) pension 
which is based on residence and subject to an income test or ‘claw-back’ operated 
through the tax system, b) the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) which is a 
means-tested supplement to the basic OAS pension, and c) the Canada Pension Plan 
(CPP) which is an earnings-related supplement to the OAS.  
In the three decades under consideration Canada implemented two reforms, both of 
which increased the targeting of the state pension. Canada introduced an affluence 
test in 1989 to ‘claw back’ OAS benefits from high income pensioners, and a change 
to the benefit formula of the earnings-related CPP scaled back contributory benefits 
and in this way constituted a shift towards targeting. The country-decades of CAN80 
and CAN90 and CAN00 therefore all lie ‘fully out’ of the set ‘significant universalising 
reform’. 
 
Denmark-1980 (DEN80), Denmark-1990 (DEN90) and Denmark-2000 (DEN00) 
The Danish state pension consists of a) the basic National Pension (Folkepension), 
which is flat-rate and based on citizenship, b) the working-hours related 
Arbejdsmarkedets Tillaegspension or ATP and income-related Særlige 
Pensionsopsparing or Special Pension (SP), and c) the income-tested Pension 
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Supplement3. 
In 1987 Denmark loosened the income test for the Pension Supplement. By the time 
this change was fully implemented, in 1993, the number of pensioners who received 
the income tested supplement had risen by 15% (the number of pensioners who 
received the full supplement rose from 48% in 1987 to 69% in 1993, whereas the 
number who received the reduced supplement decreased from 18% to 12%) 
(Green-Pedersen, 2000: 75-76). On the basis of this reform, I consider the country-
decade of DEN80 to lie ‘fully in’ the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
The country shifted towards targeting in 1993 when it passed a reform that reduced 
the Basic Pension and increased the Pension Supplement by the same amount. This 
reform had the effect of increasing the relative importance of the Pension 
Supplement relative to the Basic Pension. Over time, as occupational pension 
schemes introduced through collective agreements in 1991 mature, fewer people 
will be entitled to the Pension Supplement. As a result ‘for the system in general the 
change made in 1993 was a step away from universalism’ (Green-Pedersen, 2003: 
12).  
However, in 1996, Denmark passed a reform extending ATP contributions to cover 
those on sickness, maternity, and unemployment benefits for the first time (Green-
Pedersen, 2006: 484- 486). This extension of ATP coverage to these individuals was 
a significant universalising reform. Taking into account the two reforms, and on the 
basis of qualitative assessments of the Danish case (Green-Pedersen, 2003) I 
consider the country-decade DEN90 to lie ‘more out than in’ the set of cases which 
have experienced significant universalising reform. 
In 2003, Denmark introduced the ‘elderly check’, a tightly targeted benefit paid only 
to pensioners with no income aside from the state pension (Green-Pedersen, 2003, 
Green-Pedersen, 2006). On the basis of this reform and in the absence of any 
universalising reforms in this decade, I consider the country-decade of DEN00 to lie 
‘fully out’ of the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
 
                                                             
3 Separate supplementary schemes exist for civil servants and the disabled. 
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Ireland-1980 (IRE80), Ireland-1990 (IRE90) and Ireland-2000 (IRE00) 
The Irish state pension consists of the State Pension (Contributory), which is a flat-
rate pension based on social insurance (PRSI) contributions, and a means-tested 
safety net in the form of the State Pension (Non-Contributory).   
In 1988, Ireland extended the coverage of the contributory state pension 
significantly, by introducing compulsory PRSI for the self-employed for the first 
time. It is on the basis of compulsory PRSI contributions to the Social Insurance 
Fund that contributors become eligible for the contributory state pension. This 
extended coverage by 10-12% of the workforce in the three years immediately 
following the reform. Of these self-employed people who were newly covered, many 
are expected to build up sufficient contributions to make them eligible for the 
contributory state pension (IHRC, 2006: 21) and I therefore consider the country-
decade AUS00 to be ‘fully in’ the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
In 1991 the coverage of the contributory state pension was increased further with 
the inclusion of part-time workers into the Social Insurance Fund. This was a 
significant increase. At the time of the reform, part-time workers in Ireland made up 
around 9% of the total, and a large number of these can be expected to build up 
enough PRSI contributions to be eligible for the contributory state pension. 
Moreover, part-time work has since become more common - ten years after the 
reform, part-time workers in Ireland made up 16% of the total (European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007: 3). In 
1994 the coverage of the contributory state pension was further extended with the 
introduction of the Homemakers’ Scheme. As a result of this reform, up to twenty 
years spent caring for children or incapacitated adults would now be disregarded 
when a person’s social insurance record was averaged for contributory purposes. 
The extension of coverage that resulted from this reform was of smaller magnitude 
to the reforms of 1988 and 1991- a total of 15,034 people registered for the scheme 
between its introduction in 1994 and 2007. Since other qualifying conditions still 
apply, many but not all of those registered for the scheme will build up eligibility for 
a contributory state pension (2007). In 1997, Ireland passed a reform increasing the 
minimum contributions required for eligibility to the Old Age (Contributory) State 
Pension. Although this reform was significant and cannot be ignored, the overall 
trend remains that of an increase in the number of people qualifying for pensions 
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based on their social insurance record rather than through means testing (Cliath, 
2007: 58-59). To reflect this I place the country-decade IRE90 ‘more in than out’ of 
the set of cases which have experienced significant universalising reform. 
In 2006 Ireland moved towards universalism again when it increased the means test 
disregard from EUR 7.60 to EUR 20.00 per week. This reform was estimated to ‘lift 
some 34,000 pensioners onto higher or full pensions’ (2006). This is equivalent to 
extending the coverage of the non-contributory state pension by around 5% of the 
over 60s (own calculation, (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Various Years)). I therefore consider the country-decade IRE00 to lie 
‘more in than out’ of the set of cases which have experienced significant universalising 
reform. 
 
Netherlands-1980 (NET80), Netherlands-1990 (NET90) and Netherlands-2000 
(NET00) 
The Dutch state pension consists solely of the Algemene Ouderdomswet (AOW), 
which is flat-rate and based on residence. In the Netherlands, there were no reforms 
that affected the universalism of the state pension at all in the period under 
consideration. The country-decades of NET80 NET90 and NET00 therefore lie ‘fully 
out’ of the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
 
New Zealand-1980 (NZ80), New Zealand-1990 (NZ90) and New Zealand-2000 
(NZ00) 
The state pension in New Zealand is called New Zealand Superannuation, and is flat-
rate and based on residence. New Zealand moved away from universalism in 1986 
when it introduced the Superannuation Surcharge, an affluence test affecting 23% of 
superannuitants. The country-decade of NZ80 therefore lies ‘fully out’ of the set 
‘significant universalising reform’. 
After a small increase in the affluence test from 20% to 25% in 1990, the 
Superannuation Surcharge was abolished completely in 1997, leaving a universal 
flat-rate state pension conditional only on residence. The country-decade of NZ90 
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therefore lies ‘fully in’ of the set ‘significant universalising reform’ 
Having experienced no reforms that affected the universalism of its pension system 
in the 2000s, the country-decade of NZ80 therefore lies ‘fully out’ of the set ‘significant 
universalising reform’. 
 
Switzerland-1980 (SWI80), Switzerland-1990 (SWI90) and Switzerland-2000 
(SWI00) 
The Swiss state pension consists of a) the Alters- und 
Hinterlassenenversicherung/Assurance Vieillesse et Survivants (AHV/AVS) which is 
earnings-related and based on social insurance contributions, and b) an income-
tested pension supplement called the Ergänzungsleistungen/Prestations 
Complémentaires (EL-PC).  
Switzerland tightened the means test in 1985, lowering complementary benefits for 
pensioners with their own savings. The country-decade of SWI80 therefore lies ‘fully 
out’ of the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
In the 1990s there were no reforms affecting the universalism of the state pension in 
Switzerland.  On this basis, I consider the country-decade SWI90 to lie ‘fully out’ of the 
set of cases which have experienced significant universalising reform.  
Switzerland shifted towards targeting in 2003 when it introduced cutbacks in 
pension indexation.  The country-decade of SWI00 therefore lies ‘fully out’ of the set 
‘significant universalising reform’. 
 
United Kingdom-1980 (UK80), United Kingdom-1990 (UK90) and United 
Kingdom-2000 (UK00) 
The state pension in the UK consists of a) the Basic State Pension, which is flat-rate 
and based on social insurance contributions, a) the State Earnings Related Pension 
(SERPS) or Second State Pension (SSP) which is earnings-related and subject to an 
opt-out clause, and c) an income-tested supplement (Minimum Income Guarantee or 
Pension Credit) 
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The UK shifted away from universalism in the 1980s when it moved from earnings 
to price indexation of the state pension, and again in the 1990s when it increased the 
generosity of the Minimum Income Guarantee. The country-decades UK80 and UK90 
therefore lie ‘fully out’ of the set ‘significant universalising reform’ 
In 2000s, the UK made three significant reforms increasing the universalism of the 
state pension. In 2000, it introduced credits for carers and disabled people with 
broken work records to enable them to build up entitlements to the state pension. 
Then in 2002, it loosened the means test. The Minimum Income Guarantee which 
was withdrawn at a rate of 100% as outside income increased, was replaced by the 
Pension Credit which was to be withdrawn at a rate of 40 % (Emmerson and Disney, 
2005: 75). This inevitably increased the number of individuals who are eligible. 
Moreover, because the Act indexed the Pension Credit to prices while the Basic State 
Pension remained indexed to earnings (temporarily, but with the aspiration to make 
this permanent) eligibility to the Pension Credit was expected to increase more over 
time. Using the IFS tax and benefit model, and detailed information on incomes from 
the 2002-03 Family Resources Survey, Emmerson and Disney estimated that the 
number of individuals in families containing an individual aged 65 or over eligible 
for the Pension Credit would increase in the first instance by around 18.4% (from 
27.4% of individuals to 45.8% of individuals) in 2004-5, and subsequently to 71.1% 
of individuals by 2050-51 (an increase of 43.7%) as a result of the reduction of the 
withdrawal rate to 40% (Emmerson and Disney, 2004: 33). Estimates published by 
the DWP using a similar model but assuming that real earnings growth would only 
average 1½% a year suggested that entitlement will increase by 15%, from 50% in 
2002 to 65% in 2050 (DWP, 2002). On either estimate, this reform increased 
eligibility to state benefits substantially, however it did so by extending eligibility to 
means-tested benefits whilst eligibility to the basic state pension remained 
unaltered. It extended coverage of the state pension, but in doing so it increased the 
role of means tested benefits relative to non means-tested benefits. 
In 2007 the UK re-introduced earnings uprating, and loosened the eligibility 
conditions for receipt of the basic state pension, most notably by reducing the 
number of qualifying years needed for a full basic State Pension to 30 (from 44 for 
men and 39 for women). The immediate effect of this reform (as of its 
implementation in 2010) was to increase the number of women retiring on a full 
basic State Pension by around 20% - from around 70 % of those reaching State 
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Pension age in 2010 instead of around 50 % without reform (DWP, 2006c: 108). In 
the long run, as the effects of earnings uprating kick in, the combined impact of the 
reforms to the structure and coverage of the State Pension will be ‘a considerable 
reduction in the number of people whose entitlements will be means-tested in the 
future’ compared to what would have happened in the absence of reform. The DWP 
estimated that under current policies projected forward, around 70 % of pensioner 
households will be entitled to some Pension Credit by 2050. As a result of the 2007 
reforms, that figure will be reduced to around 30 %, i.e. a 40% decrease (DWP, 
2006c: 122-123). The Pensions Policy Institute agreed that the state pension 
reforms introduced in the Pensions Act 2007 were likely to mean “a large fall in 
future Pension Credit eligibility” compared to what would have happened in the 
absence of reform. The Pensions Policy Institute provided an estimated range of 
possible Pension Credit entitlements in 2050, from 25% to 55%. Under its central 
scenario, eligibility is projected to fall slightly less, to 40% in 2050 (Pensions Policy 
Institute, 2007). As a result of the 2007 reform therefore, these individuals are no 
longer eligible for the Pension Credit, because they are eligible for the basic state 
pension instead. So, in addition to the immediate effects on pension entitlement, the 
Pension Act of 2007 increases pension coverage as a social right substantially in the 
long term compared to what would have happened in the absence of reform, but 
also (if we remember that in 2004-05 around 45.8% individuals were entitled to the 
pension credit (Emmerson and Disney, 2004: 33)) compared to what the situation 
was just prior to the reform. To reflect these reforms, I therefore place the country-
decade UK00 ‘fully in’ the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
 
United States-1980 (US80), United States-1990 (US90) and United States-2000 
(US00) 
In the United States the state pension consists of a) Social Security, which is 
earnings-related and based on social insurance contributions, and b) the 
Supplementary Security Income, a means-tested supplement. 
In the US universalism decreased incrementally throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
There were no universalising reforms in the period under consideration. Instead, 
the means-test was tightened in 1981, and certain categories of people (drug addicts 
and alcoholics) were excluded from the minimum pension in 1993 and 1996. I 
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therefore place the country-decades US80, US90 and US00 ‘fully out’ of the set 
‘significant universalising reform’. 
 
 
4.3 CHOICE, MEMBERSHIP, AND CALIBRATION OF CAUSAL CONDITIONS 
 
The five causal conditions included in this model have been chosen through the 
iterative research process of going back and forth between theory and empirical 
cases. Three conditions can be seen to follow directly from the theoretical 
propositions that I developed in chapter three. The first of these conditions is the 
prevalence of targeting within the pension system, which the literature review 
showed may result in key political actors having an interest in universalising reform.  
In chapter three I put forward two distinct logics through which I expect that 
means testing can lead to universalising reform. The first ‘cost sharing’ logic is 
simply that where a contributory pension system leaves many people uncovered 
and reliant on means-tested benefits, those who pay for both their own pension 
through social insurance contributions as well as the means tested benefits of others 
through general taxation have an interest in reforms to broaden the coverage of the 
contributory system. To capture this logic therefore, the second condition I include in 
the QCA is the presence of social insurance finance rather than general taxation 
finance.  
The second logic behind why means testing may generate an interest in 
universalising reform is particularly relevant in market-heavy pension systems, and 
stems from the mismatch between the prevalence of means testing and private 
savings. In chapter three I called it the ‘private savings’ logic. Where state pensions 
are targeted, those who have saved privately for retirement may find their state 
pension reduced and for this reason also have an interest in universalising reforms. 
In a time of austerity, the literature review suggests that it may be difficult for left-
of-centre governments to respond to this logic. The third condition included in the 
analysis is therefore the presence of a right-of-centre government. 
Two further conditions included in the model have been chosen on a purely 
inductive basis. These are a low rate of national savings and the absence of a 
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significant earnings-related state pension. These two structural conditions turn out 
to be crucial for developing an adequate explanation of why universalising reforms 
happened where and when they did. The fsQCA presented below shows that these 
two conditions are necessary parts of the ‘private savings’ logic of reform. In the 
country cases that follow in chapter six, I show why this is the case, arguing that the 
absence of a significant earnings-related state pension matters because it mobilises 
representatives of the pension industry to put the removal of disincentives to 
private saving on the political agenda, and that low rates of national saving are used 
by governments to legitimize a shift in focus from fiscal restraint to the 
encouragement of private savings. 
With five causal conditions, I keep the number of conditions included in my 
fsQCA at a moderate level. In this way, I ensure that the number of logical 
remainders does not grow to such a level where it leads to problems of limited 
diversity, and I avoid the danger that the solution term becomes too complex, 
capable only of describing individual cases and impossible to interpret in a 
theoretically meaningful manner. The following subsections describe the 
measurement and calibration of these five causal conditions in turn.  
 
A RELIANCE ON TARGETING (HI_TARG) 
 
In the previous section I suggested that the prevalence of means testing may lead to 
key political actors having an interest in universalising reform, stemming either 
from a mismatch between contribution financing and means-testing, or from a 
mismatch between the prevalence of means-testing and private savings. The first 
condition that I include in my analysis therefore aims to capture the reform 
pressures that targeting can generate.  
For each country-decade, I calibrate membership in the crisp-set ‘hi_targ’ 
according to how prevalent means testing is. I draw on a range of government 
reports and secondary sources and collect data on the proportion of elderly either 
receiving means-tested benefits or affected by an affluence test. However, since 
reliance on means-testing is a classic characteristic of ‘Liberal’ welfare regimes 
which are over-represented in my universe of cases, relying on this data alone is 
likely to be a poor guide to defining what constitutes prevalent means testing.  
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I therefore calibrate the condition hi_targ using criteria for set membership 
that are external to this data. In particular, I used OECD data on the ‘percentage of 
over 65s receiving a targeted pension’ and took the mean of 15% as the threshold 
for membership in the set of countries where means-testing is prevalent. Although 
this data is not available in time-series and refers to ‘the most recent year available’ 
in 2011, it suffices to place my cases within the conceptual set of ‘cases where 
means-testing is prevalent’. I create a crisp rather than a fuzzy set, and use the 15% 
threshold to dichotomise my data on means-tested benefit recipiency. As a 
robustness check, I also calibrate the data to create a fuzzy set, using the direct 
method of calibration with 15 as the 0.5 anchor, and the 0 and 1 anchors at 6 and 65 
respectively - guided by prominent gaps in the data. Again, the decision to place the 
UK80 above or below the 0.5 anchor makes no difference to the result, and as 
expected, the solution term remained the same when using the fuzzy set version of 
this condition. The data behind of the condition hi_targ is set out in detail for each 
country-decade in Box 2 below. Both the data and the resulting calibration scores 
are summarized in Table 7. 
 
Box 2: Calibration of the condition hi-targ  
 
Australia-1980 (AUS80), Australia-1990 (AUS90) and Australia-2000 (AUS00) 
The Australian Age Pension starts to be reduced once annual income from other 
sources exceeds a threshold known as the “free area”. The amounts for 2008 were 
AU$132 in the first half and AU$138 in the second half of the year (calculated 
fortnightly). Almost 44 per cent of all pensioners have their benefits reduced by the 
means tests and therefore receive a part-rate Age Pension. Within this group 82 per 
cent are income tested and 18 per cent are assets tested. Just over 56 per cent of 
pensioners receive the maximum Age Pension (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2011).  
According to the Welfare Entitlements Data Set, the proportion of those above 
statutory retirement age in receipt of the state pension in Australia is very high, 
though it has declined a little over the past three decades from 78 per cent in the 
1980s, to 70 per cent in the 1990s, and to 67 percent in the 2000s (Scruggs, 2004). 
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Combining data on Age Pension recipients published by the Australian Department 
of Parliamentary Services with OECD population data tells a similar story, with the 
proportion of Age Pension recipients declining from 84 per cent of the over 65s in 
the 1980s to 73 per cent in the 1990s and 2000s (Daniels, 2011). For comparability 
with my other cases, I use the Australian and OECD data as the basis for my analysis, 
though this choice makes no difference to the results.  
 
Canada-1980 (CAN80), Canada-1990 (CAN90) and Canada-2000 (CAN00) 
In Canada the basic Old Age Security (OAS) is subject to an income test or ‘claw-back’. 
For income above CA$66,733 a year, the basic pension in 2010 was withdrawn at a 
15 per cent rate, and the benefit was phased out completely for incomes over 
CA$108,000. In the two decades since it was introduced 1989, the claw-back has 
affected a steady 5 per cent of OAS recipients (Canadian Department of Finance, 
2010). 
The Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) is Canada’s means tested supplement to 
the basic OAS pension, and is reduced against all income other than the basic OAS 
pension at a 50 percent rate (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2011). The Office of the Chief Actuary in Canada publishes annually an 
Actuarial Report on the Old Age Security System. These reports publish the number of 
GIS beneficiaries, and, in combination with OECD population data (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Various Years) it is therefore possible to 
calculate the proportion of over 65s receiving GIS benefits (Office of the Chief 
Actuary, Various Years). This data shows that the prevalence of GIS benefits has 
declined slightly over the three decades since 1980, averaging 34 per cent of the 
over 65s in the 1980s, 29 per cent in the 90s, and 26 per cent in the 2000s. 
 
Denmark-1980 (DEN80), Denmark-1990 (DEN90) and Denmark-2000 (DEN00) 
In Denmark the Pension Supplement is withdrawn at a rate of 30 per cent for singles 
since the loosening of the income test in 1987 (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2011). By combining data on Pension Supplement 
recipients from Statistics Denmark, and OECD population data, I calculate that the 
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proportion of over 65s in receipt of means tested pension benefits in Denmark has 
risen from 56 per cent in the 1980s, to 73 per cent in the 1990s, to 80 per cent in the 
2000s (Statistics Denmark, 2012). 
 
Ireland-1980 (IRE80), Ireland-1990 (IRE90) and Ireland-2000 (IRE00) 
In Ireland the State Pension (Non-Contributory) is the means-tested safety net. There 
is a small weekly disregard; in 2008 this consisted of thirty Euros disregarded in the 
means test, and an additional two hundred Euros disregarded in the earnings test. 
Otherwise, the benefit is withdrawn at 100 per cent of income. There is also an 
assets test, under which capital sums of more 20,000 Euros are converted to income 
using a standard formula (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2011). 
The Irish government publishes an annual Statistical Report on Social Welfare 
Services (Various Issues: 1998: 24; 2006: 26; 2011: 30) from which it is possible to 
find the number of recipients of the Old Age (Non-Contributory) pension dating back 
to 1989. With the help of OECD population data (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Various Years) I therefore calculate an approximate 
value for the proportion of over 66s receiving means-tested benefits in Ireland. The 
data shows that there has been a decline in the recipients of the State Pension (Non-
Contributory) over the three decades since 1980, from around 23 per cent of the 
over 66s in the 80s, to 19 per cent in the 90s and 14 percent in the 2000s. Although 
the data is not available before 1989, it is safe to say that 23% is a conservative 
estimate of the proportion of elderly receiving means tested benefits in Ireland in 
the 1980s, since the prevalence of means testing has steadily declined since the 
Social Welfare Act of 1988 extended the coverage of the contributory state pension 
(Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012).  
 
Netherlands-1980 (NET80), Netherlands-1990 (NET90) and Netherlands-2000 
(NET00) 
The Netherlands has no means-tested state pension.  
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New Zealand-1980 (NZ80), New Zealand-1990 (NZ90) and New Zealand-2000 
(NZ00) 
In 1986 New Zealand introduced an affluence test in the form of the Superannuation 
Surcharge. In the first year of the surcharge about 10 per cent of superannuitants 
paid the equivalent of their full superannuation back in surcharge payments, and 
about 13 per cent repaid a partial amount. This makes a total of 23 per cent of 
superannuitants affected by the surcharge. In 1990, the surcharge rate was 
increased from 20 to 25 per cent of assessable income and the income exemption 
was lowered, and this was expected to result in more superannuitants being affected 
by the surcharge (Preston, 2001). Subsequent changes in the investment decisions 
of those affected meant that by the time the surcharge was abolished in 1997, it was 
paid by just 14 per cent of superannuitants. However, what is relevant here is those 
affected rather than the amount of revenue the government received, and 
consequently I take 23 per cent to be the best estimate of the proportion of 
superannuitants affected by this affluence test (New Zealand Ministry of Social 
Development, 2003: 4, New Zealand Parliamentary Debate, 1997, July 31).  
 
Switzerland-1980 (SWI80), Switzerland-1990 (SWI90) and Switzerland-2000 
(SWI00) 
By combining data from the Swiss Federal Social Insurance Office on the number of 
recipients of the means-tested Ergänzungsleistungen - Prestations Complémentaires 
(EL-PC) with OECD population data (Office Fédéral des Assurances Sociales - Secteur 
Statistique, 2011), I calculated that the proportion of over 65s receiving means 
tested pensions averaged 11 per cent in the 1980s, 12 per cent in the 1990s, and 13 
percent in the 2000s. 
 
United Kingdom-1980 (UK80), United Kingdom-1990 (UK90) and United 
Kingdom-2000 (UK00) 
In the UK pension system means tested benefits evolved over time, from Income 
Support and the Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG), which was withdrawn at a rate 
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of 100 per cent, to the Pension Credit which replaced the MIG in 2002 was 
withdrawn at a rate of 40 per cent (Emmerson and Disney, 2005: 75). The 
Department for Work and Pensions publishes data on the number of people aged 60 
and over receiving Income Support, the MIG, or the Pension Credit (Office for 
National Statistics, 2009). Unfortunately, data is available only from 1994. By 
combining the available data with OECD population data, I have calculated that the 
average proportion of over 65s in the 1990s receiving income tested benefits is 18 
per cent, and the average for the 2000s is 25 per cent. Since the role of means testing 
in the UK pension system is expected to have increased as a result of the decision to 
index the state pension to prices rather than earnings from 1980, it is safe to assume 
that the prevalence of means testing was lower in the 1980s than it was in the 
1990s. Since how much lower cannot be determined, and the prevalence of means 
testing in the 1990s lies fairly close to the 0.5 anchor of 15 per cent, I run the QCA 
twice, once assigning the case UK80 a hi_targ value of 0 and once assigning it a 
hi_targ value of 1. As expected, due to the effect of other conditions (notably lo_erel) 
the choice has no effect on the solution term.  
 
United States-1980 (US80), United States-1990 (US90) and United States-2000 
(US00) 
In the US, the means tested Supplementary Security Income (SSI) is subject to strict 
income and assets tests. There is a small (US$20 per month) disregard in calculating 
the SSI entitlement, and the benefit is withdrawn at rate of 100 per cent against 
income above this level. Although states can supplement the SSI, in my analysis I 
take into account only the federal benefit. By combining data from the SSI Annual 
Report on the number of Federally Administered SSI Applications for the Aged (from 
SSI Annual Report 2011: 31) with OECD population data, I calculated that on 
average only 1 per cent of the over 65s applied for the SSI in 1980s and 1990s and 
that this proportion fell to below 1 percent in the 2000s (Office for National 
Statistics, 2009). 
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Table 7. Calibration of condition hi_targ 
Case 
Prevalence of 
means test (% 
of over 65s) 
Prevalence of 
affluence test 
(% of over 65s) 
Total 
Prevalence 
of targeting 
Fuzzy-set score 
(robustness 
check) 
Crisp-set 
score 
AUS80 84 0 84 0.98 1 
AUS90 73 0 73 0.97 1 
AUS20 73 0 73 0.97 1 
CAN80 49 0 49 0.88 1 
CAN90 39 5 44 0.85 1 
CAN20 35 5 40 0.82 1 
DEN80 56 n/a 56 0.92 1 
DEN90 73 n/a 73 0.97 1 
DEN20 80 n/a 80 0.98 1 
IRE80 30 n/a 30 0.71 1 
IRE90 26 n/a 26 0.66 1 
IRE20 20 n/a 20 0.57 1 
NET80 n/a n/a 0 0.01 0 
NET90 n/a n/a 0 0.01 0 
NET20 n/a n/a 0 0.01 0 
NZ80 n/a n/a 0 0.01 0 
NZ90 n/a 23 23 0.62 1 
NZ20 n/a n/a 0 0.01 0 
SWI80 11 n/a 11 0.21 0 
SWI90 12 n/a 12 0.27 0 
SWI20 13 n/a 13 0.34 0 
UK80* 18 n/a 18 0.54 1 
UK90 18 n/a 18 0.54 1 
UK20 25 n/a 25 0.65 1 
US80 1 n/a 1 0.01 0 
US90 1 n/a 1 0.01 0 
US20 0 n/a 1 0.01 0 
*Assumed value due to missing data 
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THE ABSENCE OF A SIGNIFICANT EARNINGS-RELATED STATE PENSION (LO_EREL) 
 
The first of two conditions that I include in the model inductively is the absence of a 
significant earnings-related state pension. To capture the existence and significance 
of the state earnings-related alternative I use OECD data on ‘the % contribution of 
public earnings-related pensions to average pension wealth’ to identify those 
market-heavy pension systems with negligible earnings-related state pensions, and 
assign to these countries full membership of the set ‘cases with no significant 
earnings-related state pension’. On this basis Australia, Denmark, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and New Zealand score full set membership.  
For those countries with non-negligible earnings-related state pensions, 
namely Canada, Switzerland, the UK and the US, I record for each decade the 
statutory replacement rate that accrues at average earnings from the earnings-
related pension (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011, 
Office for National Statistics, 2011). The replacement rate data ranges from 10% in 
the UK in the 2000s to 32% in the US, and is presented in Table 9, the summary table 
at the end of this section. I use this data to construct a four-value fuzzy set as shown 
in Table 8 below.  
Table 8. Coding scheme for lo_erel 
Replacement 
rate 
Fuzzy-set 
score 
Membership of the set ‘cases with no significant earnings-
related state pension’ 
x = 0 1 Fully in 
0 < x > 20 0.67 More in than out 
20 ≤ x > 25 0.33 More out than in 
x ≥ 25 0 Fully out 
 
I assign full non-membership of the set ‘cases with no significant earnings-related 
state pension’ if the replacement rate is more than or equal to 25%, as this was the 
replacement rate offered by the archetypical State Earnings Related Pension 
(SERPS) of the UK in the 1980s. On this basis, Canada, the US, and the UK in the 
1980s score zero. The Social Security Act of 1986 reduced the SERPS accrual rate 
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from 25 to 20%. To capture this reduction in the statutory replacement rate, I deem 
the UK in the 1990s to fall short of full non-membership, but to remain ‘more out 
than in’ the set of cases with no significant earnings-related pension. By this logic, I 
assign to it a fuzzy-set score of 0.33. Finally, I deem Switzerland and the UK in the 
2000s to be ‘more in than out’ of the set of cases with no significant earnings-related 
pension and assign to them a fuzzy-set score of 0.67 on the grounds that they have 
an earnings-related pension, but the replacement rate that accrues at average 
earnings is below 20%. 
 
LOW NATIONAL SAVINGS (LO_NATSAV) 
 
The second condition included on an inductive basis is a low rate of national savings. 
I collect annual data from the World Bank on net national savings, as a % of Gross 
National Income (GNI) and average it over country-decades. In order to identify the 
point of maximum ambiguity for the set of ‘cases that have low net national savings’, 
I identify the most prominent gap in the net national savings data, which lies 
between and 5.99 and 7.91 % of GNI. I use this prominent gap to place the point of 
maximum ambiguity at 6.95 % of GNI. The idea that this gap is a suitable anchor for 
the point of maximum ambiguity about membership in the set ‘cases that have low 
net national savings’ is reinforced by data I have collected from the OECD on the 
current account balance - with only two exceptions, all those country-decades with a 
current account surplus have net national savings equal to or above 7.91% of GNI, 
and all those countries with a current account deficit have net national savings 
below 5.99% of GNI. I locate the anchors for full membership and full non-
membership of the set according to the next most prominent gaps in the net national 
savings data. The threshold for full non-membership is at the point where net 
national savings as a percentage of GNI = 14.43993 and the threshold for full 
membership is at 2.267804 % of GNI. 
 
NON-LEFT PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT (NON_LEFT) 
 
To capture the expectation that in a time of austerity it may be difficult for left-of-
centre governments to pass costly universalising reform, I include an indicator of 
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partisanship using data from the Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS) on 
percentage of total cabinet posts held by non-left parties (Armingeon et al., 2011). 
According the CPDS, left parties are those classed as ‘Social Democratic’ or ‘left of 
Social Democratic’, and non-left parties consist of Liberal and Conservative parties, 
as well as centre right parties that favour a ‘moderate social amelioration in a 
location to the left of Conservative or Conservative neo-liberal parties’, in particular 
Christian Democratic or Catholic parties (CPDS codebook: 25).  
Because my cases represent country-decades, a single case may contain 
more than one government and therefore a change in the partisanship indicator. I 
deal with this as follows: where there has been a reform, I use the % of total cabinet 
posts held by non-left parties in the year when the reform was passed (if in a 
particular decade there was more than one universalising reform, I take the average 
over any years when universalising reforms were passed). In decades where there 
was no universalising reform, I take the approach of averaging the % of total cabinet 
posts held by non-left parties over the decade. Following the logic behind the CPDS 
indicator, I calibrate membership in the fuzzy set ‘non-left parties are dominant’ by 
setting 66.6% as the anchor for full set membership, 33.3% as the anchor for full 
non membership, and 49.95% (the midpoint between 33.3 and 66.6) as the point of 
maximum ambiguity regarding set membership. 
 
GENERAL TAXATION FINANCE (BROAD_FIN) 
 
I include an indicator of the financing arrangements of the state pension, intended to 
capture the idea that where a contributory pension system leaves many people 
uncovered and reliant on means-tested benefits, those who pay for both their own 
pension through social insurance contributions as well as the means tested benefits 
of others through general taxation have an interest in reforms to broaden the 
coverage of the contributory system, because in so doing they may broaden the tax 
base and spread their burden. This logic is captured using a simple binary indicator 
of whether or not the state pension is financed by general taxation. 
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Table 9. Summary table of underlying data 
Case Proportion of 
elderly 
receiving 
means-tested 
benefits or 
affected by an 
affluence test 
Replacement rate 
accruing from the 
earnings-related 
state pension, at 
average earnings 
Net national 
savings as a 
percentage of 
Gross National 
Income 
Percentage of total 
cabinet seats held 
by non-left parties 
AUS80 84 0 6 0 
AUS90 73 0 4 38 
AUS20 73 0 6 97 
CAN80 49 25 9 100 
CAN90 44 25 5 100 
CAN20 40 25 9 100 
DEN80 56 0 5 100 
DEN90 73 0 6 25 
DEN20 80 0 8 85 
IRE80 30 0 10 100 
IRE90 26 0 16 81 
IRE20 20 0 14 100 
NET80 0 0 10 96 
NET90 0 0 11 79 
NET20 0 0 11 79 
NZ80 0 0 4 46 
NZ90 23 0 2 100 
NZ20 0 0 4 11 
SWI80 11 16 15 71 
SWI90 12 16 13 71 
SWI20 
UK80 
13 
18 
16 
25 
13 
4 
71 
100 
UK90 
UK20 
18 
25 
20 
10 
3 
4 
73 
0 
US80 1 32 6 100 
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US90 1 32 5 100 
US20 1 32 2 100 
 
Table 10. Summary table of all crisp and fuzzy set scores 
Case reform hi_targ lo_erel lo_natsav non_left broad_fin 
AUS80 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 
AUS90 0 1 1 0.89 0.1 1 
AUS20 1 1 1 0.66 1 1 
CAN80 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 
CAN90 0 1 0 0.82 1 1 
CAN20 0 1 0 0.27 1 1 
DEN80 1 1 1 0.82 1 1 
DEN90 0.33 1 1 0.65 0.01 1 
DEN20 0 1 1 0.4 1 1 
IRE80 1 1 1 0.24 1 0 
IRE90 0.67 1 1 0.02 1 0 
IRE20 0.67 1 1 0.05 1 0 
NET80 0 0 1 0.22 1 0 
NET90 0 0 1 0.18 0.99 0 
NET20 0 0 1 0.15 0.99 0 
NZ80 0 0 1 0.86 0.33 1 
NZ90 1 1 1 0.96 1 1 
NZ20 0 0 1 0.9 0 1 
SWI80 0 0 0.67 0.04 0.98 0 
SWI90 0 0 0.67 0.09 0.98 0 
SWI20 0 0 0.67 0.08 0.98 0 
UK80 0 1 0 0.89 1 0 
UK90 0 1 0.33 0.91 0.98 0 
UK20 1 1 0.67 0.9 0 0 
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US80 0 0 0 0.7 1 0 
US90 0 0 0 0.75 1 0 
US20 0 0 0 0.95 1 0 
 
4.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
I conduct my analysis using the specialist software fsQCA2.5. In this section I present 
and discuss my results. I begin with an analysis of necessary conditions, before 
presenting and discussing the sufficient conditions for both the reform and non-
reform outcomes.  
 
ANALYSIS OF NECESSARY CONDITIONS 
 
Table 11 shows the results of the analysis of necessary conditions for the presence 
of universalising reform. The parameter of consistency measures the degree to 
which the empirical information is in line with the statement of necessity. The closer 
the consistency score is to unity, the more perfect the subset relationship and the 
stronger the evidence supporting the statement of necessity. The consistency scores 
of 1.000000 for hi_targ, and 0.95055 for lo_erel are above the score of 0.9 usually 
recommended (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 143). Referring back to the cases, 
these high scores reflect the fact that high levels of targeting and a low earnings-
related pension were present in all cases of significant universalising reform.  
However, the coverage scores indicate that these necessary conditions do 
not hold much causal relevance. In analysis of necessary conditions, high coverage 
values indicate that the condition is relevant and low values that the condition is 
trivial, either in the sense that it is observed in many cases where the outcome does 
not occur, or in the sense that the outcome and the condition display little empirical 
variation and are close to being constants (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 146). 
Conditions that pass the consistency test as a necessary condition should not be 
reported as relevant necessary conditions unless they also score highly on coverage. 
The coverage scores for lo_erel (0.352027) and for hi_targ (0.416875) are not high. 
Indeed, in research practice values for coverage necessity below 0.5 are relatively 
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rare (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 146). For this reason, I do not interpret any 
of the conditions as being necessary for the introduction of universalising reform to 
the state pension. 
Table 11. Analysis of necessary conditions for the outcome ‘universalising reform’ 
Condition tested Consistency Coverage 
hi_targ 0.100000 0.416875 
lo_erel 0.95055 0.352027 
lo_natsav 0.596702 0.276389 
non_left 0.802099 0.250703 
broad_fin 0.499250 0.277500 
 
ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR THE REFORM CASE 
 
The results of the analysis of sufficient conditions are summarised in Table 12 
below. As is standard QCA practice, the ‘intermediate’ solution forms the centre of 
my discussion. The intermediate solution makes theoretically guided (or 
‘directional’) assumptions about whether logically possible combinations of 
conditions for which there is no corresponding empirical case (so-called ‘logical 
remainders’) would contribute to the outcome if they did exist. It then uses these 
assumptions to inform the logical minimization process, generating solution terms 
that are usually simpler than the ‘conservative’ solution which relies solely on the 
empirical information available and makes no assumptions about logical 
remainders, and more meaningful than the ‘parsimonious’ solution which assumes 
that all logical remainders would contribute to the outcome and includes them in the 
logical minimization process accordingly.  
The directional assumptions used in the analysis directly follow from the 
discussion of conditions so far. I assume that the prevalence of targeting, the 
absence of a significant earnings-related pension, the presence of a non-left 
government, and the presence of a low rate of national saving would all contribute 
to bringing about reform. Since the financing arrangements of a pension system are 
relevant under the first logic of reform but are not expected to be relevant under the 
87 
 
second logic of reform, no directional assumption is made for the condition 
‘broad_fin’. The parsimonious and conservative solutions are included in Appendix 
C, and referred to when necessary. 
The Boolean algebraic solution term at the top of Table 12 reveals three 
combinations of conditions that are sufficient to explain the introduction of 
significant universalising reforms in market-heavy pension systems. Together, these 
three combinations of conditions cover every significant universalising reform in 
market heavy pension systems in the past three decades, and they each do so with a 
high degree of consistency, meaning that there is very little empirical evidence to 
contradict the statement of sufficiency set out in the solution formula. The statement 
of sufficiency is not logically contradicted by any cases. 
Table 12.Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'significant universalising reform', 
intermediate solution 
Model: reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, broad_fin, non_left). Intermediate solution. 
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000 Consistency cutoff: 0.755396. 
Cases in bold are uniquely covered by the relevant solution term. 
Assumptions: non_left (present); lo_natsav (present); lo_erel (present); hi_targ (present) 
 
The first combination of conditions sufficient to bring about significant 
universalising reform in market-heavy systems consists of a non-left government, a 
Solution  
hi_targ*  
lo_erel* 
lo_natsav*  
non_left 
+ 
hi_targ*  
lo_erel* 
~broad_fin*  
non_left 
+ 
hi_targ* 
lo_erel* 
lo_natsav* 
~broad_fin 
→ reform  
Single 
country 
coverage 
DEN80, 
NZ90, AUS00 
 
IRE80, 
IRE90,IRE00 
 
 
UK00 
 
  
 
Consistency 
 
0.768802 
  
0.702703 
  
0.748092 
  
Raw 
Coverage 
 
0.413793 
  
0.350825 
  
0.146927 
  
Unique 
Coverage 
 
0.367316 
  
0.304348  
  
0.100450 
  
 Solution consistency: 0.785612; Solution coverage: 0.818591 
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low rate of national saving, the absence of a significant earnings-related pension, a 
reliance on targeting and general taxation financing. This combination of conditions 
uniquely covers the Danish reform of 1987 which loosened the income test for the 
pension supplement, the abolition of the affluence test in New Zealand in 1997, and 
the Australian reforms of 2000 and 2007 which loosened the means tests for the Age 
pension. No cases logically contradict the statement of sufficiency, and the 
consistency score is fairly high at 0.768802.  
I interpret this combination of conditions to be a manifestation of the 
‘private savings’ logic of reform, in which a mismatch between the prevalence of 
means targeting and the prevalence of private savings means that large parts of the 
electorate are likely to have an interest in universalising reform. In line with the 
expectation that in a time of austerity it will be difficult for left-of-centre 
governments to respond to this logic, the reforms in Denmark, New Zealand and 
Australia all occurred under non-left governments.  
Yet the solution term suggests that the prevalence of targeting and the 
presence of a non-left government are not alone sufficient to explain universalising 
reform in the market-heavy pension systems of Denmark, New Zealand and 
Australia but require the additional presence of a low rate of national saving, as 
well as the absence of a significant earnings-related pension. The country 
cases in chapter six offer an explanation as to why this may be the case. They show 
how the absence of a significant earnings-related state pension can mobilise 
representatives of the pension industry to put the removal of disincentives to 
private saving on the political agenda, and how low rates of national saving can be 
used by governments to legitimize a shift in focus from fiscal restraint to the 
encouragement of private savings. 
The second combination of conditions consists of a non-left government, the 
absence of a significant earnings-related pension, a reliance on targeting, and 
contribution rather than general taxation finance. It uniquely covers the Irish 
reforms that occurred in the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s. Again, no cases 
logically contradict the statement of sufficiency, and the consistency score is 
passable at 0.702703. This ‘Irish path’ to universalising reform reflects the fact that, 
compared to the experiences of other advanced post-industrial countries, Irish 
pension politics since the 1980s stand out as exceptional in a number of ways.  
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First, Irish pension politics are shaped by the country's exceptionally strong centre-
right bias. Around eighty per cent of votes typically go to centre-right parties, and 
the Irish left is historically extremely weak. Second, Irish pension policy since the 
1980s has not been the focus of party competition, has not featured centrally in 
elections, and has received strikingly little press coverage. In this sense Irish 
pension politics are depoliticised, with pension policy influenced to a greater extent 
than it is in other countries by the negotiations of expert commissions made up 
largely of representatives of the ministry, and pension funds, employers and unions. 
Third, Ireland is unique among market-heavy pension systems in that large social 
groups were excluded from the contributory pension system until the early 1990s 
(Schulze and Moran, 2006a).  
By taking a step back from the QCA and looking at the Irish case as a whole, 
the effects of these distinctive features can be understood. The Irish universalising 
reforms seem to reflect both the ‘cost sharing’ logic of reform, and a depoliticised 
version of the ‘private savings’ logic. The ‘cost sharing’ logic was at work in the 
1980s and early 1990s. By this time, the restricted coverage of the contributory 
pension had created a reliance on means-testing that in turn generated an interest 
in universalising reforms among those who paid for both their own pension through 
social insurance contributions as well as the means-tested benefits of others 
through general taxation. This interest was manifested politically in the union-
driven extension of contributory pension coverage first to the self-employed and 
certain public sector workers in 1988, and then to part-time workers in 1991 
(National Pensions Board, 1988, Irish Commission on Social Welfare, 1986, National 
Pensions Board, 1993). These reforms assimilated the largest excluded groups into 
the contributory system. However, there was inevitably a lag between the reforms 
and the actual decline of means testing. At this stage the disincentive effect of 
means-testing on private savings for retirement resulted in a depoliticised loosening 
of the means test in 20064 (National Pensions Board, 1993, Cliath, 2007). 
The third combination of conditions consists of the absence of a significant 
earnings-related pension, a reliance on targeting, contribution rather than general 
taxation finance and a low rate of national saving. It uniquely covers the 
universalising reforms introduced by the UK in the 2000s, with a consistency score 
                                                             
4 The introduction of the Homemaker’s Scheme in 1994 remains unexplained. 
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of 0.748092. Although the UK thus seemingly emerges from the analysis as an 
exceptional case of universalising reform which occurred in the absence of a non-left 
government, the country cases presented in chapter six show that the causal logic 
behind the UK reforms was in fact no different to that which drove the 
universalising reforms in Australia, Denmark and New Zealand.   
 
EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF REFORM 
 
Unlike statistical inference, which works on the assumption that the occurrence and 
non-occurrence of phenomena are both explained by the same equation, Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis does not assume that if we are able to explain positive or high 
values of a dependent variable, we are also able to explain negative or low values of 
that dependent variable. In QCA, causal relationships are not assumed to be 
symmetric. It is possible that the occurrence and non-occurrence of a phenomenon 
constitute two qualitatively different events that warrant separate explanations, 
guided by different theories and hypotheses. This means that in QCA, unlike in 
inferential statistics, a separate analysis is needed to explain negative or low values of 
the outcome of interest (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 81, 113).  
I therefore conduct a separate fsQCA for the non-reform outcome. Since the 
QCA results presented above suggest that the mismatch between the prevalence of 
targeting and the prevalence of private saving has driven the majority of 
universalising reforms that have occurred in market-heavy pension systems, I 
conduct the QCA of the non-reform case using the conditions that are sufficient for 
reforms according to this logic. That is, I include all the conditions in the previous 
model minus the presence of general taxation financing which is relevant to explain 
reforms only in the rare case where restricted coverage of the contributory state 
pension clashes with the prevalence of targeting. The analysis shows a striking 
causal symmetry, and suggests that the prevalence of targeting, the existence of a 
significant earnings-related state pension, the level of national savings, and the 
partisan composition of government explain not only the introduction of 
universalising reforms but also their absence. 
The results of the QCA of the non-reform case are presented in Table 13 
below. Once again, I present the intermediate solution, which has been produced 
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using the same theoretically derived assumptions that were used in the analysis of 
reform. The solution term has a coverage score of 0.843581 and a consistency score 
of 0.928533. In concrete terms this means that all cases of non-reform are covered 
except for that of Denmark in the 2000s, and that there is little evidence to 
contradict the statement of sufficiency contained in the solution formula. The 
solution formula at the top of the table reveals that the presence of a significant 
earnings-related pension, the presence of a left party in government, and the non-
prevalence of targeting in combination with a rate of national savings that is not low 
are each sufficient to explain the absence of reform. These three ‘paths’ are sufficient 
to explain the absence of reform, and complement the previous analysis.  
Table 13. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'no significant universalising reform', 
intermediate solution 
Model: ~reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, non_left). Intermediate solution. 
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000, Consistency cutoff: 0.768965. 
Cases in bold are uniquely covered by the relevant solution term. 
Assumptions: ~non_left (absent);  ~lo_natsav (absent); ~lo_erel (absent) 
 
The first path, with a consistency score of 0.963293, strongly suggests that the 
presence of a significant earnings-related pension is sufficient to explain the absence 
of universalising reforms in Canada and the US since the 1980s, as well as the 
absence of universalising reforms in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s. The case 
narrative of the UK in chapter 6 shows why this may be the case, by tracing the 
Solution   ~lo_erel  + ~ non_left   + 
~hi_targ* 
~lo_natsav 
→~reform  
Single 
country 
coverage 
 
US80  US90  
US00 UK80 
UK90 CAN80 
CAN90 
CAN00 
 
AUS80 
AUS90 
NZ80 NZ00 
DEN90 
UK00 
 
NET80 NET90 
NET00 SWI80 
SWI90 SWI20 
 
Consistency 0.963293 
 
0.766784 
 
1.000000  
Raw 
Coverage 
0.425971  0.213478  0.299065  
Unique 
Coverage 
0.346778 
 
0.196754 
 
0.208067  
 Solution consistency: 0.928533; Solution coverage: 0.843581 
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effect that the decline in the state earnings-related pension scheme had on the policy 
preferences of the pension industry and the Conservative party.  
The second path suggests that the presence of a left party in government 
rather than a non-left party is sufficient to explain why there were no universalising 
reforms in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s, in New Zealand in the 1980s and 
2000s, and in Denmark in the 1990s. The country case of Australian reforms before 
and after the change of government offers a causal narrative to explain this path, 
based on the ‘Nixon goes to China’ logic outlined in chapter three. The consistency 
score of 0.766784 is relatively high, but hides the existence of a logically 
inconsistent case – that of the UK in the 2000s, where reforms occurred despite the 
presence of a left government. The case narrative of the UK in chapter six explains 
why the UK reforms of the 2000s seemingly contradict the statement of sufficiency, 
by highlighting the causal role of the non-left (Conservative) opposition in bringing 
about the reforms.  
The third path revealed by the solution formula is rather more difficult to 
interpret. On the face of it, it suggests that a combination of ‘the non-prevalence of 
targeting’ and ‘a rate of national savings that is not low’ is sufficient to explain the 
absence of universalising reform in Switzerland and the Netherlands over the past 
three decades. However, in interpreting this solution term it is important to note 
that ‘the non-prevalence of targeting’ in both Switzerland and the Netherlands is the 
flip-side of basic state pensions that already approximate the universal ideal. So 
while the absence of universalising reform could technically be attributed to the fact 
that there is no widespread targeting to clash with the prevalence of private 
pensions, the solution term should more simply be interpreted to mean that there 
was no universalising reform in these cases because their basic state pensions were 
largely universal to start with.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Aside from the Irish state pension reforms, which were largely driven by a mismatch 
between targeting on the one hand and a contributory system from which large 
social groups were excluded on the other, the analysis in this chapter suggests that 
recent trends towards more universal state pensions can be explained by a single 
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logic. This logic has at its root a mismatch between private pensions and targeting 
which leads to reform to make the state pension more universal when combined 
with the absence of a significant earnings-related pension, a low rate of national 
savings, and a the presence of a non-left government. Despite the fact that QCA does 
not assume causal symmetry, this logic seems to offer a convincing explanation of 
why universalising reform of the state pension did not occur in most of those cases 
where it was absent.  
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Table 14. 'Five-year' analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'no significant universalising reform', intermediate solution 
 
Model: ~reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, non_left). Intermediate solution. Country-five-years as cases. 
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000. Consistency cutoff: 0.760714. Cases in bold are uniquely covered by the relevant solution term . 
Assumptions:  
~non_left (absent)  ~lo_natsav (absent) ~lo_erel (absent) ~hi_targ (absent)  
Solution  non_left*  ~lo_erel  + ~ non_left* lo_erel   + ~hi_targ → ~reform  
Single 
country 
coverage 
UK80, UK85, UK90, 
CAN80, CAN85, CAN90, 
CAN95, CAN00, CAN05,  
US80, US85, US90, US95, 
US00, US05 
 
AUS85, AUS90, NZ85, 
NZ00, NZ05, DEN80, 
DEN95, UK20, UK25  
 
NET85, NET90, NET95, 
NET00, NET05, SWI80, 
SWI85, SWI90, SWI95, 
SWI00, SWI05, NZ80, 
NZ00, NZ05, US80, US85, 
US90, US95, US00, US05 
  
 
Consistency 
 
1.000000 
  
0.817783 
 
1.000000   
Raw 
Coverage 
 
0.375469 
  
0.164350 
 
0.463269   
Unique 
Coverage 
 
0.192146 
  
0.098390 
 
0.231193   
 Solution consistency: 0.954093; Solution coverage: 0.761085 
95 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
MAPPING THE CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH 
UNIVERSALISING CHANGE IN PRIVATE PENSIONS 
 
In this chapter I map the conditions under which private pensions in market-heavy 
pension systems have been made more universal since the 1980s. Once again, I 
conduct an fsQCA using country-decade cases, and present in turn an analysis of 
universalising change and an analysis of the absence of such change. Before this, I 
discuss the measurement and calibration of the conditions and outcome. 
 
5.1 MEASUREMENT AND CALIBRATION OF THE REFORM OUTCOME 
 
The outcome of interest in this chapter is universalising change within the private 
tier, understood as the extension of occupational pension coverage either through 
collective self-regulation or through top-down government regulation. Although 
top-down government regulation to increase the coverage of occupational pensions 
may take many forms, including mandating that employers simply provide access to 
an occupational pension, or that they enrol employees into an occupational pension 
scheme by default, as explained in chapter two I count as universalising only those 
reforms which also mandate that employers make contributions to the occupational 
pension scheme that their employees are compulsorily or by default enrolled in.   
For each country-decade, I calibrate membership in the fuzzy-set ‘cases 
where private pensions have become significantly more universal’ or ‘univ’ for short. 
To do this I draw again on my own database of reforms, as well as on a range of 
government reports and secondary sources, and construct a four value fuzzy-set, the 
coding scheme for which is summarized in Table 15 below. In the absence of any 
regulation to extend private pension coverage, or where such regulation concerns 
only access and does not mandate an employer contribution, I allocate a fuzzy-set 
score of 0, and deem the case to be ‘fully out’ of the set of cases where private 
pensions have become significantly more universal. Cases where employer 
contributions have been extended to all or almost all of the workforce are counted 
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as ‘fully in’ the set of cases where private pensions have become significantly more 
universal, and allocated a fuzzy-set score of 1, whether this extension results from 
collective agreements or from government regulation. Where access to an employer 
contribution falls significantly short of covering all of the workforce, whether due to 
compliance problems or because the extension of employer contributions is 
targeted to selected groups such as part-time workers or those on low incomes, I 
consider cases to be ‘more in than out’ of the set of cases where private pensions 
have become significantly more universal, and assign to them a fuzzy-set score of 
0.67. Finally, where mandatory employer contributions have been extended only to 
a very small group of people, as in Switzerland in the 1990s, I assign a fuzzy-set 
membership score of 0.33, reflecting membership which is ‘more out than in’ the set 
of cases where private pensions have become significantly more universal. The 
calibration of the outcome ‘univ’ is explained in detail for each country-decade in 
Box 3 below.  
 
Box 3: Calibration of the outcome ‘univ’ 
 
Australia-1980 (AUS80), Australia-1990 (AUS90) and Australia-2000 (AUS00) 
In the 1986 Accord Mark II between the Australian Labor Party and the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions it was agreed that 3% of wages would be paid by employers 
in the form of superannuation contributions to covered workers. In the Australian 
context this meant most workers, as non-union members were also covered by 
union-negotiated collective agreements. However, in light of the compliance 
problems that restricted the access of a significant number of employees to this 
employer contribution, I consider the country-decade AUS80 to fall slightly short of 
full membership, and class it as ‘more in that out’ of the set of cases where private 
pensions have become significantly more universal. 
1992 saw the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee. This made the 
employer contribution mandatory, and introduced a Superannuation Guarantee 
Charge for those employers who failed to comply. The mandatory contribution rate 
was to increase from three to six per cent of qualifying earnings on 1 July 1996, to 
eight per cent on 1 July 2000, and to nine per cent on 1 July 2002. Employees are not 
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obliged to contribute to the Superannuation Guarantee scheme, but from 2003 low 
to middle income workers have been encouraged to do so by means of (capped) 
government co-contributions. The mandatory employer contribution covered all 
employees with the following technical exceptions: those earning less than AUD 450 
per month (AUD 5,400 per year) before tax (around £230 per month or £2,710 per 
year) those under age 18 and working no more than 30 hours per week, those over 
age 70, those paid to do work of a domestic or private nature for 30 hours or less a 
week; non-residents paid for work done outside Australia; certain types of foreign 
executive; and those temporarily working in Australia for an overseas employer and 
covered by a bilateral superannuation agreement (ISSA/IOPS/OECD, 2008). The 
country-decade of AUS90 therefore lies ‘fully in’ of the set ‘cases where private pensions 
have become significantly more universal’. 
After the Superannuation Guarantee, there were no further moves to make private 
pensions more universal through regulation, collective or otherwise, in Australia. 
The country-decade of AUS00 therefore lies ‘fully out’ of the set ‘cases where private 
pensions have become significantly more universal’. 
 
Canada-1980 (CAN80), Canada-1990 (CAN90) and Canada-2000 (CAN00) 
The private pension system in Canada remains voluntary, as there were no moves to 
make private pensions more universal through regulation, collective or otherwise, 
over the past three decades. The country-decades of CAN80 CAN90 and CAN00 
therefore lie ‘fully out’ of the set ‘cases where private pensions have become 
significantly more universal’. 
 
Denmark-1980 (DEN80), Denmark-1990 (DEN90) and Denmark-2000 (DEN00) 
In Denmark, the 1991 collective bargaining round resulted in most trade unions 
introducing occupational pensions. In subsequent bargaining rounds occupational 
pensions became part of all collective agreements, and contributions gradually 
increased to around 9 per cent of qualifying wages. There was no legislation to 
secure occupational pension coverage for those wage earners who are not covered 
by a collective agreement, but the prevalence of collective agreements meant that 
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most workers were covered. The country-decade of DEN90 therefore lies ‘fully in’ the 
set ‘cases where private pensions have become significantly more universal’.  
Since the collective self-regulation initiated in 1991 was the first move to make 
private pensions more universal, and no further moves have been made since, the 
country-decades of DEN80 and DEN00 therefore lie ‘fully out’ of the set ‘cases where 
private pensions have become significantly more universal’. 
 
Ireland-1980 (IRE80), Ireland-1990 (IRE90) and Ireland-2000 (IRE00) 
The private pension system in Ireland remains voluntary, as there were no moves to 
make private pensions more universal through regulation, collective or otherwise, 
over the past three decades. The country-decades of IRE80 IRE90 and IRE00 therefore 
lie ‘fully out’ of the set ‘cases where private pensions have become significantly more 
universal’. 
 
Netherlands-1980 (NET80), Netherlands-1990 (NET90) and Netherlands-2000 
(NET00) 
In the Netherlands, state regulation of the labour market introduced in the 1950s 
required that all benefits negotiated at the bargaining table be extended to non-
union workers. This led very early on to supplementary private pensions that were 
quasi-universal, covering over ninety per cent of the working population, despite 
low union membership (Myles and Pierson, 2001:315). 
No further moves were made to make private pensions more universal until 1994 
when it was made illegal to exclude part-time workers from occupational pension 
schemes. On account of this targeted extension of private pension coverage, the 
country-decade NET90 is considered to lie ‘more in that out’ of the set of cases where 
private pensions have become significantly more universal. 
The absence of change until 1994 means that the country-decade of NET80 lies ‘fully 
out’ of the set ‘cases where regulation has significantly extended private pension 
coverage’ and after the 1994 reform there were no further moves to make private 
pensions more universal through regulation, collective or otherwise. The country-
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decade of NET00 therefore lies ‘fully out’ of the set ‘cases where regulation has 
significantly extended private pension coverage’. 
 
New Zealand-1980 (NZ80), New Zealand-1990 (NZ90) and New Zealand-2000 
(NZ00) 
From 1 July 2007, employers have been legally required to automatically enrol all 
new permanent employees aged between 18 and 65 into a ‘KiwiSaver’ pension 
scheme. When KiwiSaver was first introduced in 2007, employer contributions were 
not mandatory, and employees could select a monthly contribution rate of four per 
cent or eight per cent of their gross earnings. But From 1 April 2008, all employers 
were required to contribute to an employee’s KiwiSaver account, starting with one 
per cent of an employee’s gross earnings in 2008 and increasing one per cent each 
year until the mandatory employer contribution reached four per cent of gross 
earnings by 1 April 2011. On account of the introduction of mandatory employer 
contributions to Kiwisaver schemes in 2008, the country-decade of NZ90 lies ‘fully in’ 
the set ‘cases where private pensions have become significantly more universal’.  
Finally, the voluntary nature of private pension provision until 2008 means the 
country-decades of NZ80 and NZ90 lie ‘fully out’ of the set ‘cases where regulation has 
significantly extended private pension coverage’. 
 
Switzerland-1980 (SWI80), Switzerland-1990 (SWI90) and Switzerland-2000 
(SWI00) 
In 1982 the Bundesgesetz uber die Berufliche Vorsorge introduced mandatory 
employer and employee contributions to occupational pensions. Although the access 
threshold for compulsory contributions excluded many part-time workers, mostly 
women with children, this regulation extended access to occupational pension 
coverage and to an employer contribution in particular dramatically across the 
workforce, and on this basis the country-decade SWI80 lies ‘fully in’ of the set ‘cases 
where private pensions have become significantly more universal’.  
In 1997 the Verordnung uber die obligatorische berufliche Vorsorge von arbeitslosen 
personen made it mandatory for unemployment insurance funds to deduct a 
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contribution from unemployment benefits and make an ‘employer’s contribution’, 
thereby extending occupational pension provision to the unemployed. Since this was 
a minor reform targeting the extension of private pension coverage to a rather small 
group of people, the country-decade SWI90 is considered to lie ‘more out than in’ the 
set of cases where private pensions have become significantly more universal. 
In 2003 the 1st BVG/LPP Revision introduced improved occupational pension 
coverage for low-income earners and part-time employees. On account of this 
targeted extension of private pension coverage, the country-decade SWI00 is 
considered to lie ‘more in than out’ of the set of cases where private pensions have 
become significantly more universal. 
 
United Kingdom-1980 (UK80), United Kingdom-1990 (UK90) and United 
Kingdom-2000 (UK00) 
In the UK private pensions remained voluntary throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
which means the country-decades of UK80 and UK90 lie ‘fully out’ of the set ‘cases 
where private pensions have become significantly more universal’. 
The 2008 Pensions Act introduced mandatory employer contributions of at least 
three per cent of ‘qualifying earnings’ (a band between £5,035 and £33,540 in 2006) 
into a qualifying workplace pension scheme. This covered all employees aged 
between 22 and State Pension age, earning over £5,035 per annum (in 2006/07 
terms) and not already members of a qualifying scheme. Enrolment is automatic, 
and employees can opt out of pension saving if they wish. On account of this 
introduction of mandatory employer contributions into workplace pension schemes, 
the country decade of UK00 lies ‘fully in’ the set of cases where private pensions have 
become significantly more universal. 
 
United States-1980 (US80), United States-1990 (US90) and United States-2000 
(US00) 
The private pension system in The US remains voluntary, as there were no moves to 
make private pensions more universal through regulation, collective or otherwise, 
over the past three decades. The country-decades of US80 US90 and US00 therefore lie 
101 
 
‘fully out’ of the set ‘cases where private pensions have become significantly more 
universal’. 
 
Table 15. Coding scheme for ‘univ’ 
Employer contributions extended to  Fuzzy-set score 
Membership of the set ‘cases where 
private pensions have become 
significantly more universal’ 
All or most of the workforce 1 Fully in 
Selected groups 0.67 More in than out 
Minor selected groups 0.33 More out than in 
No new groups 0 Fully out 
 
5.2 MEASUREMENT AND CALIBRATION OF CAUSAL CONDITIONS 
 
The conditions included in this analysis are guided solely by the theoretical 
propositions developed in chapter three, and no further conditions have been added 
on an inductive basis. They reflect the expectation that unions will push for 
mandatory employer contributions where there is no state earnings-related 
alternative, and that in the absence of institutional capacity for collective self-
regulation, union demands for mandatory employer contributions to occupational 
pensions will produce results either when a strong left government is in power, or 
when a non-left government is in power as part of a 'modernising compromise' in 
which cost-cutting reforms are passed in a fragmented political setting.  
The first conditions to be included are therefore the absence of a significant 
earnings-related pension and left-party control of government, measured and 
calibrated as documented in the previous chapter. To capture the existence of 
institutional capacity for collective self-regulation I include the condition of high 
union density, and, following Häusermann, I capture the extension of coverage 
through modernising compromises through the inclusion of conditions of 
fragmented political power and the presence of cost cutting reforms. The following 
subsections briefly describe the measurement and calibration of these remaining 
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three causal conditions in turn. Tables 16 and 17 summarize the underlying data for 
each condition, and the crisp and fuzzy set scores that result from the calibration of 
this data. 
 
HIGH UNION DENSITY (HI_UD)  
 
To capture the existence of institutional capacity for collective self-regulation I use a 
measure of union density from the Comparative Political Data Set. To calibrate 
membership in the fuzzy-set ‘high union density’ I use prominent gaps in this data to 
set the threshold for the point of maximum ambiguity at 41.25314, the threshold for 
full non-membership at 27.07272, and the threshold for full membership at 
65.94003.  
 
COST-CUTTING PENSION REFORMS (CUTS) 
 
For this condition I refer to my database of reforms described in chapter two. For 
each country-decade, I record full membership in the crisp set ‘cost cutting pension 
reforms’ where there has been one or more such reform. 
 
FRAGMENTATION OF POLITICAL POWER (HI_FRAG) 
 
To measure the fragmentation or concentration of political power, I create a 
composite indicator. For the fragmentation of business and labour interests I use the 
Hicks-Kenworthy indicator of corporatism (Kenworthy, 2003), and I proxy party 
fragmentation per country-decade using an indicator of the 'effective number of 
parties' (effpar_leg) from the Comparative Political Data Set. To create my composite 
measure of political fragmentation, I standardise these indicators and take the 
average. The resulting indicator ranges from 0.3378317 to 2.1629317, as shown in 
Table 6 in the Appendix. 
I use this composite indicator to calibrate membership of the fuzzy-set ‘high 
political fragmentation’. On ordering the data there is a very prominent gap between 
New Zealand in the 1920s and the Netherlands in the 1980s, and I use this to anchor 
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the point of maximum ambiguity for set membership at 1.194. On this basis, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark in all decades are more in than out of the set 
‘high political fragmentation’. Using two further gaps in the data, the anchors for full 
non-membership and full membership are set at 0.587 and 1.975 respectively. 
 
Table 16. Summary table of underlying data 
Case Replacement rate  
accruing from the  
earnings-related  
state pension, at  
average earnings 
Percentage of total 
cabinet seats held 
by left parties 
Union Density Composite 
indicator of 
political 
fragmentation 
AUS80 0 100 45 0.674637 
AUS90 0 100 33 0.669824 
AUS20 0 20 21 0.674086 
CAN80 25 0 35 0.401059 
CAN90 25 0 34 0.466894 
CAN20 25 0 30 0.522023 
DEN80 0 26 78 2.162932 
DEN90 0 51 76 2.031595 
DEN20 0 14 72 2.103760 
IRE80 0 11 60 0.528301 
IRE90 0 19 52 0.619149 
IRE20 0 3 38 0.612483 
NET80 0 3 29 1.677232 
NET90 0 44 25 1.919338 
NET20 0 20 21 1.882844 
NZ80 0 54 59 0.562025 
NZ90 0 8 31 0.659246 
NZ20 0 100 21 0.710255 
SWI80 16 28 25 1.818799 
SWI90 
SWI20 
16 
16 
28 
28 
23 
19 
1.895931 
1.800307 
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UK80 25 0 46 0.506270 
UK90 20 26 35 0.517256 
UK20 10 100 29 0.556262 
US80 32 0 18 0.337832 
US90 32 0 14 0.343406 
US20 32 0 12 0.346254 
 
 
Table 17. Summary table of crisp and fuzzy set scores 
Case Univ lo_erel hi_left hi_ud cuts hi_frag 
AUS80 0.67 1 0.96 0.62 1 0.07 
AUS90 1 1 1 0.16 1 0.07 
AUS20 0 1 0.01 0.01 0 0.07 
CAN80 0 0 0 0.21 1 0.02 
CAN90 0 0 0 0.18 1 0.03 
CAN20 0 0 0 0.09 0 0.03 
DEN80 0 1 0.02 0.99 0 0.98 
DEN90 1 1 0.56 0.99 1 0.96 
DEN20 0 1 0 0.98 1 0.97 
IRE80 0 1 0 0.91 0 0.04 
IRE90 0 1 0 0.79 1 0.06 
IRE20 
NET80 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0.32 
0.07 
0 
0 
0.05 
0.86 
NET90 0.67 1 0.29 0.03 1 0.94 
NET20 0 1 0.01 0.01 0 0.93 
NZ80 0 1 0.69 0.89 1 0.04 
NZ90 0 1 0 0.10 1 0.07 
NZ20 1 1 1 0.01 0 0.08 
SWI80 1 0.67 0.02 0.03 1 0.92 
SWI90 0.33 0.67 0.02 0.02 1 0.94 
SWI20 0.67 0.67 0.02 0.01 1 0.91 
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5.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Once again, I conduct my analysis using the fsQCA2.5 software. In this section I 
present and discuss my results, beginning with an analysis of necessary conditions 
before presenting and discussing the sufficient conditions for both the reform and 
non-reform outcomes.  
 
ANALYSIS OF NECESSARY CONDITIONS 
 
 
Table 18 shows the results of the analysis of necessary conditions for the extension 
of private pension coverage. As explained in the previous chapter, the parameter of 
consistency measures the degree to which the empirical information is in line with 
the statement of necessity. The closer the consistency score is to unity, the more 
perfect the subset relationship and the stronger the evidence supporting the 
statement of necessity. The consistency scores for all conditions are significantly 
lower than the threshold of 0.9 usually recommended to support a statement of 
necessity (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 143).  For this reason, I do not interpret 
any of the conditions as necessary for the extension of private pension coverage. 
 
 
 
UK80 
UK90 
0 
0 
0 
0.33 
0 
0.01 
0.65 
0.20 
1 
1 
0.03 
0.03 
UK20 1 0.67 1 0.07 1 0.04 
US80 0 0 0 0.01 1 0.01 
US90 0 0 0 0.00 1 0.01 
US20 0 0 0 0.00 0 0.01 
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Table 18. Analysis of necessary conditions for the outcome ‘extension of private pension 
coverage’ 
Condition tested Consistency Coverage 
lo_erel 0.609868 0.665741 
hi_left 0.071211 0.247788 
hi_ud 0.345880 0.814371 
cuts 0.593082 0.647778 
hi_frag 0.286877 0.615049 
 
ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR PRIVATE PENSION UNIVERSALISM 
 
As in the previous chapter, my discussion centres around the ‘intermediate’ solution, 
which is based on directional assumptions about logical remainders. Once again, the 
directional assumptions follow directly from the discussion of conditions above. I 
assume that the absence of a significant earnings-related pension contributes to 
bringing about universalising change, but I make no directional assumptions for the 
other four conditions since their contribution to the outcome is expected to vary 
with the presence or absence of other conditions. As in Chapter four, the 
‘parsimonious’ and ‘conservative’ solutions are included in Appendix C. 
The results of the analysis of sufficient conditions are summarised in Table 
19. The analysis reveals three paths to the extension of private pension coverage in 
market-heavy pension systems. The first path uniquely covers the Australian 
Superannuation Guarantee Act of 1992, the KiwiSaver Act of 2007 of New Zealand, 
and the UK Pensions Act of 2008. No cases logically contradict the statement of 
sufficiency, and the consistency score of 0.951456 for this path thus provides strong 
support for the claim that the combination of a low earnings-related state pension, a 
left government, the absence of high union density and the absence of high political 
fragmentation is sufficient for the extension of private pension coverage in market-
heavy systems. In light of the theoretical discussion in chapter three, I interpret this 
as evidence that in the absence of high union density, coherent demands for the 
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extension of private pension coverage as the best alternative to an earnings related 
state pension can be met by a strong left government. I substantiate this 
interpretation in the next chapter with a narrative of the UK reform process.  
 
Table 19. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘extension of private pension 
coverage’, intermediate solution 
Frequency cut-off: 1.000000; Consistency cut-off: 0.796610. 
Assumptions: lo_erel (present) 
 
The second path to private pension universalism uniquely covers the three Swiss 
reforms of 1982, 1997 and 2003, and the Dutch reform of 1994. Again, no cases 
logically contradict the statement of sufficiency, and the consistency score of 
0.796610 thus provides strong empirical support for the claim that the combination 
of a low earnings-related pension, high political fragmentation, cost-cutting reforms, 
a non-left government and the absence of high union density is sufficient for the 
extension of private pension coverage. In light of the theoretical discussion in 
chapter three, I tentatively interpret this as support for the proposition that in the 
absence of high union density and a strong left government, demands for the 
extension of private pension coverage as the best alternative to an earnings-related 
state pension can be met as part of modernizing compromises in a fragmented 
political system.   
Solution lo_erel* hi_left* 
~hi_ud* ~hi_frag    
+ 
lo_erel* cuts* 
hi_frag* ~hi_left*  
~hi_ud   + 
lo_erel* cuts* 
hi_frag* hi_left* 
hi_ud 
→univ  
Single 
country 
coverage  
AUS90, 
NZ00,UK00  
SWI80, SWI90, 
SWI00, NET90  
DEN90    
Consistency  0.951456  0.796610  0.942529    
Raw 
Coverage  
0.400545  0.320163  0.111717    
Unique 
Coverage  
0.358311  0.320452  0.074932    
Solution consistency: 0.890796; Solution coverage: 0.777929  
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The Danish extension of occupational pensions through collective agreements in 
1991 is uniquely covered by a third path, where union density is high. In this case, 
although conditions did not rule out the top-down introduction of mandatory 
employer contributions by the left government, both the government and employers 
insisted that union demands for the extension of coverage must be met voluntarily 
through collective self-regulation, because it was feared that otherwise 
contributions would not be viewed by wage earners as part of normal wage 
increases and mage moderation would be compromised (Nielsen, 1996: 251).  
The extension of private pension coverage through the Australian Accord of 
1985 is the only case of private pension universalism to remain uncovered by the 
solution formula. In this case too, union density was high, and the extension of 
private pension coverage was therefore approached through collective self-
regulation. The exclusion of this Australian case from the Danish path is due to the 
absence of political fragmentation, which meant that collective self-regulation 
proceeded via an Accord between Unions and the Labor party rather than via 
decentralized collective bargaining, a nuance which does not alter the substantive 
argument of this thesis. 
 
EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF PRIVATE PENSION UNIVERSALISM 
 
Table 20 presents the results of the analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 
‘no extension of private pension coverage’. The first path, which uniquely covers 
Canada, the UK and the US in the 1980s and 1990s, Ireland in the 1990s, and New 
Zealand in the 1990s, has a consistency score of 0.991071. It strongly suggests that 
the lack of any universalising extension of private pension coverage in these cases is 
due to the combined absence of both a strong left government and the political 
fragmentation required to facilitate modernizing compromises.  
Although Australia in the 2000s, Canada in the 2000s, Ireland in the 1980s 
and the 2000s, and the US in the 2000s are not uniquely covered by this term (since 
they are also members of the second solution term) they too are well explained by 
this logic. Indeed, their simultaneous membership in the second path simply shows 
that they lack not only a left government and the political fragmentation required 
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for modernizing compromises, but also the cost-cutting reforms that indicate such a 
compromise may have taken place.  
The second path is less informative. It uniquely covers the case of Denmark 
in the 1980s and the cases of the Netherlands in the 1980s and the 2000s, and 
consists of the absence of a left government combined with the absence of cost-
cutting reforms. In this way it too, like the first path, indicates that universalising 
change was absent because it could not have arisen either from a strong left 
government or from a non-left government pursuing modernizing compromises. 
However, this explanation is not entirely satisfactory. While it is possible that this 
combination of conditions may explain the absence of modernising compromises in 
the Netherlands in the 1980s and 2000s, it does not adequately explain the absence 
of universalising change in Denmark in the 1980s, where high union density allowed 
for the possibility of universalising change through collective self-regulation.  
 
Table 20. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘no extension of private pension 
coverage’, intermediate solution 
Frequency cut-off: 1.000000; Consistency cut-off: 0.951872. 
Assumptions: lo_erel (present) 
 
 
 
 
Solution ~hi_left* ~hi_frag      + ~hi_left*~cuts → univ  
Single 
country 
coverage  
AUS00, CAN80, CAN90, 
CAN00, IRE80, IRE90, 
IRE00, NZ90, UK80, 
UK90, US80, US90,  US00 
AUS00, CAN00, DEN80, IRE80, 
IRE00, NET80, NET00, US00 
 
Consistency  0.991071  1.000000   
Raw 
Coverage  
0.677518  0.404883   
Unique 
Coverage  
0.421668  0.149034   
Solution consistency: 0.992669; Solution coverage: 0.826551  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The results presented in this chapter offer clear support for the idea that the 
absence of a significant earnings-related state pension is important in explaining 
regulatory reforms that make private pensions more universal. In particular, I found 
that in the absence of high union density, the absence of a significant earnings-
related pension leads to universalising reforms through the regulatory extension of 
private pensions either when there is a strong left government, or when they are 
introduced by a non-left government alongside cost-cutting reforms in a fragmented 
political system. 
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Table 21. Country-five-year analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘no extension of private pension coverage’, intermediate solution 
Frequency cut-off: 1.000000; Consistency cut-off: 0.825758 
Assumptions: ~lo_erel (absent) 
Solution ~hi_left* ~hi_frag* 
~hi_ud   + 
~hi_frag* ~hi_left* 
cuts   + 
hi_frag* hi_ud* ~cuts   + ~hi_frag* ~hi_ud* 
cuts* ~lo_erel 
 → 
univ 
 
Single 
country 
coverage  
AUS95, AUS00, 
AUS05,CAN80, CAN85, 
CAN90, CAN95, CAN00, 
CAN05, IRE00, IRE05,  
NZ90, NZ95,UK90, US80, 
US85, US90, US95, US00, 
US05 
AUS80, AUS95, 
CAN80, CAN90, 
CAN95, IRE95, NZ90, 
NZ95, UK80, UK85, 
US80, US90, US95  
DEN80, DEN85, DEN90, 
DEN95, DEN00 
CAN80, CAN90, 
CAN95, UK95  
 
Consistency  0.996585  1.000000  0.873070 1.000000   
Raw 
Coverage  
0.434773  0.277506  0.108321 0.083848   
Unique 
Coverage  
0.208129  0.067887  0,091296 0.006810   
 Solution consistency: 0.973784; Solution coverage: 0.600766  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
DEVELOPING THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT WITH THREE 
COUNTRY CASES 
 
In this chapter I substantiate the preceding Qualitative Comparative Analyses with 
three case outlines. These case outlines shift the focus of analysis, from the causal 
conditions and outcomes that constitute the analytical construct of country-decades, 
to reform processes in real countries in all their complexity. The aim is to shed some 
light on the causal mechanisms that lie behind universalising reforms. To this end I 
create explanatory narratives linking the institutional conditions identified in 
previous chapters to the reforms that have occurred, via the policy preferences of 
key political actors.  
For each case outline I developed an in depth understanding of the reform 
context by drawing on a range of primary and secondary sources, including the 
Factiva database which provided me with access to rich press coverage of the 
reform process over the entire time period considered. I then systematically 
examined the policy preferences of the major political parties, as well as of the main 
representatives of employers, employees, and the pension industry. For this I used 
party documents, parliamentary debates, conference minutes, press releases, 
consultation responses and official statements, as well as a small number of expert 
interviews that I conducted with key policy actors5. My case selection was guided by 
the results of the QCA and is set out in the remainder of this introduction. 
I begin by looking at Australia to illustrate how a mismatch between 
prevalent private pensions and a reliance on targeting generates political dynamics 
that can lead to universalising reforms to the state pension. According to the 
statement of sufficiency summarized in Table 12, the mismatch between targeting 
and private pensions leads to universalising reforms only when in combination with 
a non-left government, the absence of a significant earnings-related state pension, 
                                                             
5 The most substantial of these were one-hour interviews with senior pension experts from the NAPF 
(interview 1) the TUC (interview 2) and ASFA (interview 3).  
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and low national savings. The country-decade case of AUS00 is ‘typical’ in the sense 
that it is both in line with this statement of sufficiency, and a good empirical instance 
of both the outcome and the causal path (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012:312). In 
addition, as Table 13 shows, the country-decade cases of AUS80 and AUS90 are 
typical cases of non-reform due to the absence of a left-government. As such, the 
three country-decade cases are well suited to unravel the causal mechanisms that 
link the conditions to the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012:312). 
Taken as a whole therefore, the case of Australia between 1980 and 2009 is 
ideally suited to illustrate how the mismatch between private pensions and 
targeting contributes to bringing about universalising reform, as well as the Nixon-
goes-to-China logic behind the importance of a non-left government. Although the 
Australian country-decades are not most typical cases (fuzzy-set membership scores 
in the causal conditions are higher in Denmark and New Zealand) Australia is 
chosen because it illustrates particularly clearly the role of low national savings – a 
condition which was included in the QCA on a purely inductive basis and is therefore 
in need of some discussion. 
I then turn to look at how the UK state pension became more universal. From 
the Qualitative Comparative Analyses in chapter four, the country-decade case of 
UK00 seems to stand out as exceptional. As Table 12 shows, it is the only case of 
universalising reform to occur under a left government. In the analysis of non-
reform too, the country-decade case of UK00 the case stands out. It can be described 
as a ‘deviant’ case from the second causal ‘path’ (~left) in the sense that 
universalising reform occurred despite full membership in a solution term which in 
all other cases was associated with an absence of universalising reform (Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2012). As such, the universalising reforms to the UK state pension 
that occurred in the past decade require some explanation. 
In addition, an examination of reforms to the UK state pension is well-suited 
to show why it is that the prevalence of targeting and the absence of a significant 
earnings-related pension are of importance in explaining both the presence and the 
absence of universalising state pension reforms (Table 12 and Table 13). This is 
because the erosion of the state earnings-related pension and the growth of means-
testing since the 1980s make it possible to unravel the causal mechanisms that link 
these particular conditions to the reform outcome, while keeping much else 
relatively constant. By tracing the policy preferences of political actors across time 
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within a single unit and showing how they changed in response to the changing 
structure of the pension system, an examination of the UK is comparative yet keeps 
to a minimum unconvincing assumptions about the comparability of countries that 
differ greatly in their political institutions and policy history case (Gerring, 2004).  
Finally, in a third case outline the UK is used once again, this time with a 
focus on reforms that made private pensions more universal. In particular, the case is 
used to substantiate the claim (summarised in Table 19) that in the absence of high 
union density and where there is also an absence of a significant state earnings-
related pension, there will be coherent union demands for the extension of private 
pension coverage which will be met under a strong left government. In the 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis in chapter five, the country-decade of UK00 
emerges as a typical case of this logic, as it is in line with the statement of sufficiency 
and a good empirical instance of both the outcome and the causal path (Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2012:307). Although again it is not the most typical case of the path 
(fuzzy-set membership scores in the causal conditions are higher in the other 
countries) the UK is chosen for two reasons. First, the erosion of the state earnings-
related pension since the 1980s once more allows for a valuable within-case 
comparison (Gerring, 2004). Second, it will be seen below that the UK also 
constitutes a ‘least likely’ case for the argument that unions drive policy.  
 
6.1 THE AUSTRALIAN AGE PENSION: A TYPICAL CASE OF UNIVERSALISING 
REFORM 
 
The Australian welfare state has some peculiar features, which prevent an easy 
identification with Esping-Andersen's ‘Liberal’ ideal despite its reliance on voluntary 
market-provided welfare and means-tested benefits. Of particular relevance here is 
the system of compulsory wage arbitration that characterised the Australian labour 
market from 1907 and throughout the formative years of welfare state 
development. Under this system, wages were set at a level sufficient to provide a 
‘civilised life’ for the wage earner, his wife, and three children, and wage dispersion 
was low. This was social welfare via regulation of the wage relationship, and 
Australia was a ‘wage earner’s welfare state’ (Castles, 1985).  
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As a result of this rather unique context, the principle of targeting welfare 
benefits enjoys support across the political spectrum. The Australian Labour Party 
(ALP) has historically maintained an ideological commitment to means testing, and 
has generally supported the selectivity of Australian welfare state programs 
(Weatherley, 1994: 154-155). After all ‘if wages were fair and reasonable, it would 
only be the improvident and those unusually circumstanced who would require 
help’ (Castles, 1985: 99). Even today, support for targeted vis-a-vis universal benefit 
arrangements does not vary systematically with political party preferences of the 
electorate (Evans and Kelley, 2003: 53-54). It is the scope and tightness of targeted 
welfare arrangements that have been up for debate in Australia, rather than their 
existence.  
The flat-rate, general taxation financed Age Pension was tightly means tested 
at its inception in 1908, but eligibility conditions have since been successively 
loosened. In 1912 the family home was exempted from the means test, and 1946 
and 1954 saw increases in income and assets limits. Targeting was further loosened 
through the introduction of the 'merged means test' in 1960 under which income 
and property became interchangeable, and through its replacement by the ‘tapered 
means test’ in 1969 which halved the withdrawal rate from 100 percent to 50 
percent.  
The Whitlam Labour government completely removed the means test for 
those aged over seventy in 1975, and the Fraser coalition government continued the 
trend in 1976 when it replaced the income and assets tests with a test on income 
only (Commonwealth Treasury of Australia, 2001: 70). By this point, the Age 
Pension had been transformed from a benefit tightly targeted on the poor to an 
almost universal benefit covering over 80 per cent of the population and excluding 
only the well-off middle classes and the rich (Castles and Mitchell, 1993, Scruggs, 
2004, Daniels, 2011). In the 1980s however the trend towards ever more universal 
pension arrangements came abruptly to a halt. 
 
THE ALP’S FISCAL IMPERATIVE 
 
In 1982 the Hawke Labour government came to power in the midst of a recession. 
Determined to avoid the early defeat of the Whitlam government, the Hawke 
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government set about gaining the support of business, and proving its fiscal 
reliability. It departed from the policies of the Whitlam government in a 
programmatic shift that has been deemed by some as a betrayal of the Labor 
tradition (Jaensch, 1989, Maddox, 1989) and by others as an Australian antecedent 
of the Third Way that foreshadowed the policies of New Labour in the UK over a 
decade later (Pierson and Castles, 2002: 698).  
This programmatic renewal involved a major restructuring of the welfare 
state, marked by increased means-testing and selectivity (Weatherley, 1994: 157, 
Castles, 2001a: 8). Pensions were among the first benefits to be more tightly 
targeted. In 1983 the Hawke government tightened the income test for those over 
seventy, and in 1984 reintroduced the assets test, such that either the income or the 
assets test was now to be applied, depending on which test gave the lower pension 
level. For the ALP, these changes were a necessary response to a changing internal 
and external environment (Keating, in Pierson and Castles, 2002: 686). ‘We didn’t 
call what we were doing the Third Way. For Australia, we saw it as the only way’ 
(Keating, 1999).  
Individually, these reforms were electorally unpopular. In the 1984 federal 
election, the opposition gained popularity by promising to abolish the ‘iniquitous’ 
assets test (Power, 1988). However, the ALP’s display of fiscal rectitude ultimately 
paid off at the ballot box, and very soon opposition pressure to abolish the assets 
test dissipated. For one thing, the tightening of Age Pension eligibility conditions 
was popular with representatives of Australian business - the Business Council of 
Australia (BCA) ‘proposed not only retention of the assets test, but a major 
tightening up of the assets test’ (Business Council of Australia, 1988: 1618). For 
another, the opposition’s offer to abolish the assets test sat awkwardly with its own 
emphasis on budgetary surplus and their very public calls for further tightening of 
eligibility criteria for social security on the grounds of reducing government 
spending. Their position on the assets test was watered down from abolition, to 
retention with liberalisation (The Australian Financial Review, 1989a, Power, 1988).  
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THE SUPERANNUATION GUARANTEE 
 
At the same time as the Hawke government was making the state pension more 
tightly targeted, it was also working to make the system of voluntary private 
pensions more universal. Representatives of labour had, since the 1970s, expressed 
dissatisfaction with the fact that private pensions covered little over 32 per cent of 
wage and salary earners, and were confined mostly to the public sector, to middle 
and senior management and administrators, and to employees in the banking and 
insurance industries (Commonwealth Treasury of Australia, 2001: 74). Following 
successive failed proposals to introduce a state earnings-related pension scheme in 
1928, 1938 and 1976, prominent union leaders began to demand the extension of 
private superannuation to all employees, including casual and part-time workers, 
through the inclusion of superannuation in negotiated industrial conditions.  
The Hawke government expressed support for the idea of building an 
employer superannuation contribution into a national centralised wage decision. 
For the ALP, this seemed to offer the chance to significantly increase rewards to 
labour whilst simultaneously containing aggregate demand and dealing with the 
problem of low national savings which had been building up until the mid-1970s 
and had not improved despite the government savings of the second half of the 
1980s (Pierson and Castles, 2002: 689, Stutchbury, 1991).  
As early as 1983 the ALP initiated discussions between the treasurer Paul 
Keating and the Secretary of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) Bill 
Kelty. The idea came to fruition in 1986, with the agreement of the Accord Mark II. 
Employees were to receive a 6 per cent increase in compensation in line with 
inflation, but half of the increase would accrue in the form of a 3 per cent employer 
superannuation contribution to be paid into an individual account in an industry 
fund.  
Despite the rapid growth in superannuation coverage that resulted from the 
1986 Accord, by 1991 nearly one-third of private sector employees remained 
uncovered, mainly due to a number of compliance problems. When these 
compliance problems were cited by the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
(now the Industrial Relations Commission) as the reason to reject demands by the 
ACTU and the Labor government for a further 3 per cent superannuation increment, 
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the government moved to introduce a mandatory superannuation system in the 
form of the 'Superannuation Guarantee'. The move was announced in John Kerrin's 
1991 budget. From 1st July 1992, employers would be required to make 
superannuation contributions on behalf of their employees, and would be liable to 
pay a Superannuation Guarantee Charge if they failed to comply (Commonwealth 
Treasury of Australia, 2001).  
By the end of the first year of Superannuation Guarantee operation, 80 per 
cent of public and private employees were covered. By 1991 this had risen to 91 per 
cent. The Superannuation Guarantee became the Hawke government's flagship 
policy. In addition to addressing the issue of earnings replacement in old age, it was 
a high profile way of addressing the low national savings rate, which had become a 
media obsession and a policy priority by the late 1980s (1989b, Cavalier, 1989, 
Dodson, 1989). With the Superannuation Guarantee, private savings could be 
increased substantially without relying on increased spending on tax incentives, and 
as a result public spending could remain tight, and be further reduced over time. 
Building on the ALP's previous tightening of the means test, the Superannuation 
Guarantee meant that the Age Pension would become increasingly residual as more 
people built up private superannuation and became ineligible for benefits. National 
savings would improve through a combination of public and private savings.  
Yet Australia's low level of national saving was not solved by super moves, 
and in fact worsened as a result of the economic recession of 1990 (McKeage, 1995). 
The national savings issue therefore carried on right through the 1990s. The 
government commissioned an independent report on national savings, which was 
published in 1993 and widely discussed in the media (Dodson, 1993, The Australian 
Financial Review, 1993, Hoyle, 1993). The thrust of this report was that the 
government was going in the right direction with the policy approach of improving 
national savings by increasing the role of private retirement income and making the 
Age Pension a more targeted safety net for the poor and long-term unemployed. The 
Fitzgerald report suggested the government continue with the scheduled increases 
in compulsory contributions, and also that it incentivise private by retaining tax 
concessions on the Superannuation Guarantee and considering tax incentives for 
voluntary contributions (Fitzgerald, 1993).  
Legitimated by the Fitzgerald report, and having proved its fiscal rectitude 
with a Treasurer ‘bent on deficit reduction’ (Piggott, 1993) the ALP, now under the 
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leadership of its former Treasurer, went on to loosen the purse strings a little. The 
ALP promised a government ‘co-contribution’ of 3 per cent of wages to be paid into 
industry superannuation funds alongside 3 percent from workers, and 9 percent 
from employers. This promise formed the centrepiece of Labor’s 1995 Budget. The 
15 per cent of wages which would in total be saved as superannuation was to ‘take a 
worker on average earnings… almost completely off the taxpayer teat by 2042’ (The 
Australian, 2002). In short, the measures announced in the ALP’s budget reinforced 
their previous tightening of Age Pension eligibility condition, and were to make the 
Age Pension less universal over time. 
 
A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT 
 
The ALP lost the 1996 election to a coalition of the Australian Liberal and National 
Parties led by John Howard, for reasons largely unrelated to national savings, 
superannuation or the Age Pension (Goot and Watson, 2007, McAllister, 1996). Once 
in power, the Coalition began to pursue a retirement policy broadly similar to that of 
the ALP. The Superannuation Guarantee (and compulsion to save for retirement 
more generally) had been a Labor project opposed by Howard, and the Coalition 
remained suspicious of the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) 
the peak lobby group which was headed by former Labour minister Susan Ryan. 
Nevertheless, the Coalition government accepted that that the Superannuation 
Guarantee was here to stay. Aware that the Superannuation Guarantee enjoyed 
broad cross-party voter support (Fenech, 2997, Evans and Kelley, 2003), the 
Coalition reasoned that it had inherited 'both Labor's proposal and the expectation 
that has gone with it' (Liberal Party of Australia and National Party of Australia, 
1996b: 6) 'Australians now own $230 billion in superannuation assets. Doing away 
with the system now would generate uncertainty and insecurity amongst 
contributors thereby undermining people's confidence in superannuation as a 
desirable savings vehicle' (Liberal Party of Australia and National Party of Australia, 
1996b: unpaginated introduction). The Coalition committed to the 'retention of the 
Superannuation Guarantee Charge which will increase to 9 per cent in accordance 
with the time frame enshrined in legislation' (Liberal Party of Australia and National 
Party of Australia, 1996a: 3).  
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With compulsory savings set to pick up a greater share of retirement income 
financing, the Age Pension was to become more tightly targeted as the ALP had 
envisaged. Moreover in 1996, the Coalition planned to tighten the means test for 
people aged between 55 and the pension age in such a way as to catch the assets 
held in superannuation funds. In line with the policy logic of the previous 
government, this was legitimised by the need to increase national savings, which the 
Coalition pointed out had 'crashed under Labor' (Liberal Party of Australia and 
National Party of Australia, 1996a: 1). To this end, again in line with ALP policy, 
deficit reduction was the key. As Coalition Leader John Howard announced, 'the 
most effective way to raise national savings is by generating substantial structural 
budget surpluses over the medium term' (Howard, 1996). But the Coalition’s 
commitment to a more tightly targeted Age Pension was not to last long. 
 
THE NATIONAL SAVINGS SOAP OPERA  
 
The tightening of the means test was not popular with the superannuation industry, 
which had grown significantly as a result of ALP policies. In 1996 the Australian 
reported that Susan Ryan, the executive director of ASFA was 'fired up over social 
security tests', and had responded fiercely to the new government's plan to tighten 
the means test for people aged between 55 and the pension age. Instead, ASFA 
wanted a higher financial asset threshold (Kavanagh, 1996).  
The superannuation industry in fact had a number of reasons to be 
frustrated with the Coalition government. Despite the Coalition’s commitment to 
maintaining the Superannuation Guarantee, Howard 'saw Super as an important, but 
not favoured, element of a wider savings smorgasbord', and seemed to be promoting 
'the agenda of making super less attractive' (Megalogenis, 2006). The Coalition had 
introduced policies to increase competition within the retirement savings industry; 
banks were allowed to set up ‘Retirement Savings Accounts’ in direct competition 
with the industry superannuation funds (Megalogenis, 2006) and the Coalition soon 
scrapped the government co-contribution, replacing it with tax incentives for a 
variety of voluntary savings vehicles such as ‘Employee Share Ownership Schemes’ 
(Megalogenis, 1997). Even worse, the 1996 Budget announced the introduction of a 
'Superannuation Surcharge' a tax on the superannuation savings of high-income 
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earners (Costello, 1996: 10). When the superannuation industry complained, 
Howard accused the funds of 'talking out of their own pockets' (Megalogenis, 1997). 
Mindful of such criticism, the superannuation industry began to campaign 
against the Coalition's policies by appealing to the national savings debate. They 
stepped up their longstanding campaign to bring national savings to the forefront of 
media attention, but crucially, they emphasised private rather than public savings. 
They noted that household savings had shrunk to a near historical low, and made 
public statements insisting that 'we need to now focus on private savings if we are to 
fix the current account deficit (Smith, 1998). The emphasis began to shift from 
government saving to private saving, and the battle to make people save became 'the 
nation's prime economic soap opera' (Megalogenis, 1999). 
The superannuation industry demanded increases in compulsory 
superannuation contributions, tax incentives for voluntary employee contributions, 
and tax simplification. But they also insisted that 'the interaction between private 
retirement income and the Age Pension must be fair and effective' (Smith, 1998). 
For some industry actors, like the Institute of Actuaries and parts of the insurance 
industry, this meant adopting a fully universal Age Pension and a virtual elimination 
of any means tests (Dunstan, 1993, Blue, 1996). The majority of the financial and 
banking industry however did not have the appetite for such full-on reform, and 
simply demanded a loosening of the means tests (Interview 3). 
 
SANTA ON STEROIDS 
 
It was not long before the Coalition government began to realise that a focus on 
private savings could be used to justify a shift in policy emphasis from fiscal 
rectitude to expansionary loosening of the means tests. In the run up to the 1998 
election, the Coalition government announced its intention to implement ‘the 
biggest single remake of the Australian taxation system since Federation’ if re-
elected (National Archives of Australia). The new tax system would be 'fairer' and 
would provide ‘stronger incentives to work and save’ (Costello, 1998). The tax 
reform would introduce a controversial Goods and Services Tax. At the same time, it 
would introduce popular compensatory measures. There would be a 2.5 per cent 
increase in the income test ‘free’ areas applied to the Age Pension and to various 
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other income support payments, and the income test for pensions would be 
loosened by reducing the taper rate from 50 per cent to 40 per cent. These hand 
outs were to be included on the grounds that they would ‘improve incentives to save 
for retirement by increasing the returns from such saving at the time that people 
retire’ (Costello, 1998).  
The Coalition government was re-elected and introduced the changes to the 
means test in 2000 and 2001 as set out in their pre-election schedule (Costello, 
1998). The loosening of targeting did not end there. In addition, the Coalition 
exempted people between 55 and pension age from the social security means tests, 
in a reversal of the means test tightening which had so infuriated ASFA in 1996 
(Costello, 2000).  
In doing so, the Coalition pushed aside calls from business representatives to 
address national savings through tightening government spending. In their 
submission to the Budget process of 2001, the Business Council of Australia (BCA) 
had drawn attention to the continued 'national savings issue'. Though the BCA’s 
submission noted that national savings could be improved through both 
government and private saving, it suggested 'building upon the existing mandatory 
program of superannuation savings' and removing 'remaining biases against saving 
in the tax system' rather than increasing government spending on tax incentives or 
looser Age Pension eligibility conditions to encourage private saving. Overall, the 
BCA had called for 'tighter targeting of transfers to those in greatest need' (Business 
Council of Australia, 2001: 11). 
At root, the universalising reforms implemented by the Coalition 
government in 2000 and 2001 were driven neither by Business nor by 
superannuation industry concerns. Although legitimated and justified with 
reference to improving private savings as part of the broader national savings 
debate, the reforms were to be the first in a series of popular yet financially costly 
measures, intended to change the Howard government’s image ‘from mean and 
tricky to caring and sharing’ (Frith, 2001). In this sense the reforms were a 
calculated gamble.  In loosening the purse strings the government would put at risk 
its major 'asset' – its claim to responsible economic management. The gamble paid 
off. The 2001 Budget was picked up by commentators as an attempt to buy votes 
(Steketee, 2001, Kelly, 2001), but although it was deemed bribery by the ALP, the 
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opposition leader Kim Beazley was ‘not about to suggest that a Labour government 
would take away these handouts' (Frith, 2001). 
The superannuation friendly nature of the Coalition government’s new 
policies were noticed by the media (Megalogenis, 1999, Hayes, 2002, Megalogenis, 
2006), but the industry itself was not satisfied (Richardson, 2001) and continued its 
campaign to draw attention to low private savings. In 2003 the Investment and 
Financial Services Association  (IFSA) identified a possible 'retirement savings gap' 
of $600 billion in a high profile, well publicised report, and recommended better 
integration of super, social security, and tax systems (Wilson, 2003). Private savings 
were still very much in the public eye. 
In 2005, the Coalition abolished the Superannuation Surcharge, to the great 
satisfaction of the superannuation industry, on the grounds that ‘this government 
believes in incentives’ and amidst a flurry of press releases pointing out that this 
would encourage saving (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005). In the Budget the 
following year, the Treasurer announced ‘the most significant change to Australia’s 
superannuation system in decades’ (Costello, 2006).  
He promised to simplify superannuation, and streamline its taxation. This 
budget, deemed the 'Santa Claus budget' (Tanner, 2006) was Costello’s most 
generous to date. The most expensive part of the government's planned reforms was 
a more generous assets test for the Age pension. The assets test taper rate was to be 
halved, and the assets test threshold raised from $343,750 to $529,250 (Negline, 
2007, Parliament of Australia, 2006). Once again, the justification for this loosening 
of targeting was that it constituted a ‘large disincentive to save for retirement’ 
(Costello, 2006). The justification echoed the submissions of the superannuation 
industry, who had 'lobbied hard' for the reforms (Small Independent 
Superannuation Funds Association, 2006, Parliament of Australia, 2006, Australian 
Business Association, 2006: 15, Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, 
2006: 30), and now, alongside senior union representatives (House of 
Representatives, 2006), commended the Coalition government (Ryan, 2006) 
pronouncing that the Liberal Party 'now the official party of Superannuation' (House 
of Representatives, 2006). 
The announced changes were implemented with the Tax Laws Amendment 
(Simplified Superannuation) Bill of 2007. The package received cross-party support, 
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including from the ALP, whose proposed second reading amendment was merely to 
add: 
‘that Labor governments laid the foundation for Australia’s modern 
superannuation system by introducing compulsory superannuation 
contributions’ (House of Representatives, 2006). 
Soon after the reforms, the Treasury's Retirement and Income Modelling Unit 
released a paper claiming that the Superannuation savings shortfall identified by the 
IFSA was a 'myth'. The Treasury criticised a number of the IFSA's assumptions, 
including, most prominently, its 'contention that the government Age Pension 
should be regarded as peripheral to consideration of retirement incomes rather than 
as an integral and important part of those incomes'  (Fenech, 2007a, Fenech, 2007b). 
The Coalition had not only introduced significant universalising pension reforms. In 
promoting the generous Budgets of a Treasurer that had been likened to 'Santa on 
steroids' (Saunders, 2007), it had also moved away from the ALP's stated vision of 
an Age Pension of ever more residual coverage. 
 
UNIVERSALISING REFORM IN A TARGETED AND MARKET-HEAVY SYSTEM (1) 
 
Australia was chosen as typical of the combination of conditions that I suggested in 
chapter four characterise the ‘private savings’ logic of reform. These conditions were 
prevalent targeting, the absence of a significant earnings-related pension, low 
national savings, and a non-left government. As well as covering universalising 
reforms in Denmark, the UK and New Zealand, the QCA in chapter four suggested 
that this logic also explains why universalising reform of the state pension did not 
occur in most of those cases where it was absent.  
At the root of the ‘private savings’ logic lies a mismatch between the 
prevalence of means-testing and the prevalence of private savings. I suggested that 
this generates an interest among significant parts of the electorate in universalising 
reforms that do not exclude them from receipt of a state pension. Drawing on the 
Nixon-goes-to-China logic that reputation matters, I suggested that non-left 
governments would be best placed to act on this mismatch because of their 
reputation for fiscal rectitude.  
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The loosening of Age Pension eligibility conditions under the Coalition 
government reflects the ‘private savings’ logic rather well. The narrative shows an 
ALP eager to prove its fiscal rectitude to business and the electorate, embarking on 
successive tightening of the Age Pension eligibility conditions. Moreover, the ALP’s 
expansion of private saving was explicitly intended to make the Age Pension 
increasingly residual over time. By contrast, the narrative shows how the Coalition 
had the reputational leeway to introduce a series of expansionary budgets that 
included popular reforms easing the mismatch between targeting and private 
pensions that was affecting increasing numbers of people.  
The narrative shows however that even for the Coalition, the decision to 
loosen the means test was not an obvious one. When it came to power in 1996, the 
Coalition initially continued to emphasise deficit reduction and the tightening of 
targeting. It was only after representatives of the superannuation industry started to 
publicly emphasise low private savings as part of their critique of government policy 
that the Coalition began to loosen the means tests. Although loosening the means 
tests entailed popular benefit increases for those whose private savings would 
otherwise reduce their entitlement to a state pension, the Coalition had played a 
large part in the construction of the fiscal imperative during its time in opposition. It 
justified its expansionary pension policies by highlighting how they would reduce 
disincentives to save and in doing so improve the country’s low national savings.  
The Australian case suggests therefore that low national savings should be 
interpreted as facilitating rather than driving universalising state pension reforms. 
After all, a variety of policy responses were offered for the same national savings 
problem. When low national savings were first identified as a primary policy 
concern in the 1980s, the ALP responded by targeting the Age Pension more tightly 
to increase state saving, whilst at the same time introducing the Superannuation 
Guarantee to expand private saving. In its first term in government, the Coalition 
framed the problem of low national savings as business representatives had done, as 
one of fiscal profligacy to be tackled primarily by increasing state saving. By its 
second term, the Coalition had taken the superannuation industry’s lead and 
reframed the problem of low national savings to emphasise deficient national 
saving. The Australian case thus shows that the ‘private savings’ logic of 
universalising reform is not a ‘functional’ response to low national savings. Rather, 
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as expected, the ‘private savings’ logic is eminently political, driven by the potential 
electoral popularity of universalising reforms. 
In the next section, I turn to look at the UK which seemingly emerges from 
the QCA as a deviant case of universalising reform to the state pension which is 
driven by a left-of-centre government. In so doing, I end up offering further support 
for the idea that reputational politics are involved in universalising reform. In 
addition, I further clarify the political nature of the ‘private savings’ logic of 
universalising reform, and I offer a suggestion for why the absence of an earnings-
related pension emerged from the QCA as part of this reform logic. 
 
6.2 THE UK’S STATE PENSIONS: A DEVIANT CASE OF UNIVERSALISING REFORM? 
 
CONTESTED PENSION POLITICS IN THE 1980S 
 
In the 1980s, pension politics in the UK were contested in a rather straightforward 
way. The Conservative government, in line with a broad commitment to 
privatisation and fiscal austerity, wanted to shift responsibility for pension 
provision from the state to the market. The role of the state was to be confined to 
poverty relief through targeted means-tested benefits, and earnings replacement 
was to be provided by private pensions (Hills, 1998). To this end, in their second 
term the Conservatives tried to abolish the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme 
(SERPS) that supplemented the flat-rate contributory Basic State Pension. The 
abolition of the SERPS did not succeed, as has been widely documented (Oude-
Nijhuis, 2009, Pemberton, 2010, Schulze and Moran, 2006b). The Social Security Act 
of 1986 fell short of the desired abolition of the SERPS but it did expand the market 
for private pensions. The Act responded to calls from employers and the pension 
industry for a less costly SERPS by extending incentives to opt-out in favour of 
private schemes, and introducing an additional rebate of National Insurance 
contributions for new occupational and personal pension plans (Schulze and Moran, 
2006b: 73).  
More significantly for this narrative, six years earlier the Conservative 
government had passed a less high profile reform of pension indexation. State 
pensions were no longer to be uprated by the better of earnings or prices but by 
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prices only. The result, given prevailing trends in the growth in wages and prices, 
was to erode the value of the state pension dramatically and to push people into 
means-tested benefits who otherwise would have received those benefits as a 
matter of contributory right. This shift towards means-tested pensions was no side-
effect of indexation. Rather, increased targeting was characteristic of the 
Conservative government’s broader welfare policy. Welfare reforms passed under 
the Conservatives moved total cash benefits a long way in the direction of means-
testing and targeting. In 1979-80 means-tested benefits constituted only 9 per cent 
of total cash benefits. By 1995-96 they constituted 22 per cent (Hills, 1998).  
By contrast, throughout the 1980s the Labour party was strongly committed 
to contributory rather than means-tested benefits (Hills, 1998). Like its Social 
Democratic counterparts in the Nordic countries, the Labour party response to 
widening income distribution and a growing middle class in the 1950s had been to 
introduce an earnings-related state pension to replace accustomed income in 
retirement. It had taken the Labour Party over twenty years to introduce the SERPS 
in 1975 in the face of mainly Conservative opposition, and the party was now 
fighting fiercely to retain the scheme and to restore the link between pension 
benefits and earnings. In its 1983 Manifesto, Labour not only promised to restore 
the earnings link but also promised to reverse the decline in the value of the basic 
state pension that had occurred since de-indexation. This commitment was repeated 
in the 1987 Manifesto,6 and Labour went to the 1992 general election promising to 
raise the top rate of tax and middle income national insurance contributions (Hills, 
1998). A report commissioned by the Labour party in December 1992 was publicly 
critical of the growth in the number claiming means-tested benefits, and argued that 
the social security system should be based upon the foundation of social insurance 
(Driver, 2002). The Labour party's commitment to the contributory principle and its 
condemnation of means-testing continued even as it came under increased strain in 
a succession of electoral defeats.  
 
 
                                                             
6 Although this time the Manifesto did not promise to reverse the decline in the value of the basic state 
pension that had occurred since 1983. 
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NEW LABOUR’S NEW PENSION POLICY 
 
The Tories labelled the 1992 shadow budget ‘Labour’s tax bombshell’ and Labour 
lost the election. Although subsequent analyses of voting behaviour found little 
evidence Labour had been defeated on the basis of its plans for taxation, the 
message drawn by the new leadership under Tony Blair was that Labour had to lose 
its tax and spend image (Hills, 1998: 22). The Labour party conference in 1996 was a 
turning point in this direction. The party abandoned its commitment both to 
earnings uprating and to restoring the SERPS. By the time New Labour came to 
power in 1997 promising not to raise income tax and to stick to spending limits set 
by the Conservatives for the first two years in government, it was no longer 
redistribution between classes but rather poverty relief that was the party goal 
(Driver, 2002). 
In line with this change in objectives, New Labour opted to increase the 
generosity of the means test rather than the basic state pension. Its first pension 
reform, the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act of 1999, reformed the means-tested 
pension. The new ‘Minimum Income Guarantee’ was to be substantially more 
generous than its predecessor, at twenty per cent of average earnings. Moreover, it 
would ‘hold its position against average earnings while the value of the basic state 
pension, linked only to prices, continues to shrink’ (Timmins, 1998). One year later, 
the Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act replaced SERPS with the Second 
State Pension (S2P), moving the state gradually but definitively out of the business 
of earnings replacement and marking the unambiguous end of the Labour party's 
commitment to social insurance.   
New Labour's change in policy orientation did not occur without an internal 
struggle. Traditionalists within the party fought to preserve the SERPS and avoid 
any move towards a more residual state pension (Castle and Townsend, 1996). New 
Labour's emphasis on poverty relief and targeted benefits was also opposed by 
party modernisers, on a rationale that chimed with Conservative critiques of welfare 
dependency. Frank Field, who was appointed as a Special Minister for Welfare 
Reform in 1997, was prominent amongst such voices. For Field, the problem with 
means-tested benefits was not only that they locked individuals into a poverty trap, 
but also that they had a morally damaging impact on behaviour.  
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‘Means tests penalise all those human attributes- such as hard work, work being 
adequately rewarded, savings, honesty - which underpin a free, let alone civilised 
society’ (Field, 1995 in Driver, 2002: 95). 
Field supported radical reform to reduce the role of means testing. All 
attempts to shift the policy emphasis away from poverty relief were however in the 
end blocked by the Treasury, on the grounds of cost (Hills, 1998: 20). Instead the 
Labour government tried to mitigate the disincentive effects of targeted benefits by 
introducing palliative measures. The Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 
introduced for the first time an additional pension for carers and disabled people 
with broken work records, making it easier for these people to keep off the means 
test. In 2002, the State Pension Credit Act replaced the Minimum Income Guarantee 
with the Pension Credit, which offset some of the disincentive effects of the means-
tested Minimum Income Guarantee by rewarding people over 65 for their savings.  
 
INDUSTRY COMPLAINTS LEAD TO A NEW CONSENSUS 
 
Neither the Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act nor the State Pension 
Credit Act reassured pension industry representatives increasingly concerned about 
stagnating retirement savings. Pensions industry representatives were critical of 
disincentives to save, and began to lobby against means-testing in favour of a more 
universal state pension receipt of which would be less affected by private retirement 
savings. The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) was the first 
organisation to propose reforms in this direction. The proposed reforms were 
radical. The NAPF wanted:  
‘the various state pension strands combined to create a universal, non-
contributory citizen’s pension, with eligibility based on a residency test’ 
(Skypala, 2002).  
The Labour government rejected the NAPF's proposal outright, insisting that the 
S2P would not be scrapped (Timmins and Eaglesham, 2002). The opposition’s 
response however was much more accommodating. The shadow Work and Pensions 
secretary and spokesman David Willets responded to the NAPF's proposal by 
announcing that the Conservatives could be willing to back proposals for a single 
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state pension sufficiently generous to take people off means tested benefits. 
Crucially, the opposition stated that they would back such a proposal  
‘if we were confident it commanded support from the occupational pension 
fund movement and employers’ (Willets, 2002). 
Support from pension industry representatives was consolidated in early 2003 
when the Association of British Insurers (ABI) 'joined the chorus of providers and 
analysts demanding changes to the state pension system to rescue the ailing private 
pension system’ (Timmins, 2003). According to the ABI the Pension Credit, which 
was to come into effect that year, would go to fifty-five per cent of the population 
and would 'leave many wondering why they should save’. To get rid of systemic 
disincentives to save, the ABI aligned with the NAPF in calling for 'a simpler, less 
means-tested system' (Timmins, 2003). 
Three months after the ABI's statement, the Conservatives began to publicly 
advocate a more generous state pension less reliant on means-testing. The FT 
reported that David Willets had 'expressed strong interest in the calls from pension 
providers and others for the basic state pension to be rebuilt' in order to restore 
private saving (Financial Financial Times, 2003). The Conservative party’s pension 
spokesman was clear:  
‘My position is that means testing has increased, is increasing, and ought to be 
diminished. We are committed to reform of the state system so that pensioners 
are less dependent on means-tested benefits' (Financial Financial Times, 
2003).  
The Conservatives proposed scrapping the S2P and providing in its place a Basic 
State Pension which would be 'much higher' than the Basic State Pension at the time, 
and ‘arguably higher’ than the means-tested pension (Timmins and Turner, 2003). 
To this end, the Conservatives proposed to restore the link between the Basic State 
Pension and average earnings that was broken by Thatcher in 1980 (Timmins and 
Newman, 2003). Over fourteen years, the Conservatives argued, the restoration of 
the earnings link would mean that 'the Basic State Pension would catch up with the 
means-tested Pension Credit, effectively eliminating it’ (Timmins and Turner, 2003). 
The Conservative party's new policy stance was a clear move away from Thatcherite 
attempts to residualise the state pension under which means testing had grown 
dramatically. In formulating the new policy stance, the Conservatives pushed aside 
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reservations from traditionalists within the party who opposed the idea of 
expanding the Basic State Pension on the grounds of cost (Timmins and Newman, 
2003).  
Equally significantly, the reservations of employers were also side-lined. 
Employer representatives had responded to talk of increasing the generosity of the 
Basic State Pension positively but with some caution. In 2004 the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI) took the ‘unusual step’ of calling for an increase in state 
spending on pensions to be paid for by tax increases and by raising the state 
retirement age to seventy (Hall, 2004). However, the CBI was stalling for time. 
Although the Conservative pension spokesman welcomed ‘the CBI’s conversion to 
the idea that the Basic State Pension needed to be strengthened’ he disagreed with 
the CBI’s recommendation that this should not start to happen until 2020. Speaking 
to the press, Willets pushed aside the CBI's concerns, insisting: ‘we need to start 
increasing the Basic State Pension as soon as possible to begin to get people off 
means-tested benefits’ (Timmins, 2004b).   
The Conservative's pledge to reduce the need for means-testing by restoring 
the earnings link to the Basic State Pension and raising it to the level of the Pension 
Credit ensured that pension saving was 'set to be a main issue in the general 
election' (Hall, 2004). Faced with the Conservative's pledge to expand the state 
pension, the Labour party began to rethink its policy stance. In September 2004, the 
Financial Times reported that: 
 ‘after three years of denying that the strategy is creating barriers to saving – 
chiefly through the Pension Credit, which is leading to greater reliance on 
means-testing – the government is acknowledging that its critics have a point’ 
(Timmins, 2004a).  
In particular: 
‘in his conference speech, the Prime Minister announced that in a third term 
Labour would redesign the state system, putting more money into pensions 
while ensuring that the non means-tested basic pension was ‘at the core’ of 
the redesign’ (Timmins, 2004a).  
Whilst the Treasury remained sceptical on grounds of cost, it was clear that 'outside 
the Treasury' there was 'a consensus building that the move to means-testing has 
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damaged incentives to save’ (Giles, 2004). This consensus acquired policy substance 
through the work of the Pension Commission. Although the remit of the Pensions 
Commission had initially been ‘to keep under review the regime for UK private 
pensions’ (Pensions Commission, 2004: ix) the Commission soon decided that ‘the 
current system of private funded pensions combined with the current state system 
will deliver increasingly inadequate and unequal results’ and by the time of the 
publication of its first report, the Commission had extended its own remit to cover 
also the state pension system. In 2005, the Pensions Commission followed the 
publication of their first report with an extensive consultation of government, 
industry and individuals. Nearly 250 written submissions were received. The 
consultation found that: 
‘The large majority of respondents say that they would prefer to see a system 
which had significantly less or no means-testing. Indeed the clearest 
consensus was around the need to prevent the further spread of means-testing 
in the pensions system’ (Pensions Commission, 2005a: 26).  
Support for a universal Basic State Pension came most notably from the ABI and the 
NAPF. The ABI suggested that the Basic State Pension be reformed to have: 
‘less stringent eligibility requirements. For example eligibility might be based 
on residency or on a shorter working life, perhaps twenty years instead of 
forty years. Alternatively, the Government could reward periods of caring as if 
they were paid employment’ (Association of British Insurers, 2005a: 6). 
And the NAPF proposed:  
'A single universal state pension paid at the current Guarantee Credit level, 
linked to earnings with eligibility based on citizenship, not the contributory 
principle: a Citizen’s Pension' (Pensions Commission, 2005a:29).  
The consultation formed the basis of the Commission’s second report, which 
recommended reforms to make the state system less means-tested and closer to 
universal (Pensions Commission, 2005b). In 2006 the Government published its 
own proposals in a White Paper which closely followed the proposals of the 
Pensions Commission. The White Paper proposed to uprate the Basic State Pension 
to average earnings and loosen eligibility conditions for both the Basic State Pension 
and the S2P. The S2P would gradually become flat-rate, and it would be retained as a 
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separate component from which individuals would still be able to opt-out into 
private schemes (DWP, 2006d). When the proposals were brought before 
parliament in the form of the 2007 Pension Act, they received cross-party support 
(HC Deb, 16 January 2007, c680).  
 
UNIVERSALISING REFORM IN A TARGETED AND MARKET-HEAVY SYSTEM (2) 
 
Although the UK had not fully turned its back on the contributory principle, it had 
taken the biggest step towards universalism in over thirty years. The reforms were 
introduced by Labour and for this reason the UK emerges from the QCA in chapter 
four as a deviant case of reform under left government. However, the preceding 
narrative shows that it was not the political left but rather the political right that 
played the crucial role in the introduction of universalising reforms to the UK state 
pension. It was the dramatic shift in policy stance of the Conservative opposition 
from Thatcher-era promotion of means-testing towards the promotion of a more 
universal pension that forced New Labour to rethink the strategy of targeting that it 
had adopted less than a decade previously.  
As in the Australian case, the narrative shows the importance of pension 
industry representatives in the development of the Conservative’s new policy 
stance. Citing concern about the negative effect that increased means-testing was 
having on incentives to save privately for retirement, both the ABI and the NAPF 
pushed decisively for a more universal state pension. Despite employer 
ambivalence, the Conservatives responded by adopting the language of ‘incentives 
to save’ to justify their first universalising policy proposal in living memory. The 
Labour party had been promoting targeted benefits as part of a show of fiscal 
rectitude, and was initially reluctant to change policy stance. It did so only after the 
idea was legitimised as a consensus through the expert work of the Pensions 
Commission.   
What caused pension industry representatives to react when they did? By 
the 2000s, means-testing had increased as a result of both Conservative and Labour 
policies, and was set to increase further if no changes were made. Yet it is not 
possible to say with certainty whether this increase in means-testing was alone the 
reason that the NAPF and the ABI began to call for a more universal, less targeted 
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state pension. Though the role of means-testing had increased, it had always been 
prevalent in the UK pension system. As the comparative data in chapter four shows, 
the prevalence of means-testing was above the OECD average not only in the 2000s, 
but also in the 1990s and the 1980s.  
Why then were pension industry representatives not interested in the 
creation of a more universal state pension until the early 2000s? Bridgen and Meyer 
(2012) suggest that both the ABI and the NAPF began to push for a more generous 
state pension to avoid further regulation of the private sphere. They point out that 
industry calls for a rise in the state pension came shortly after voluntarism in private 
pension provision was called into question for the first time, with the establishment 
of a Pension Commission tasked with assessing the system’s continued feasibility. 
This explanation centres around the threat of compulsion and further regulation 
rather than disincentives to save. 
Though the threat of compulsion to save certainly loomed large, the ABI at 
least was ambivalent as to whether this would be such a bad thing - as I show in the 
next narrative, and as Bridgen and Meyer themselves point out (2012: 397). Yet the 
disincentive to save was a very real problem for both the NAPF and the ABI. For the 
ABI and those pension industry bodies affiliated with the NAPF, disincentives to 
save would erode the customer base of their members. For employer members of 
the NAPF providing workplace pension schemes, disincentives to save erode the 
value of the occupational benefits they offer to their employees. 
My explanation for the timing of the ABI’s and NAPF’s calls for a more 
universal state pension is therefore somewhat different, and centres around how the 
earnings-related state pension affects the salience of means-testing. The preceding 
narrative shows that in addition to increasing the prevalence of means-testing, 
successive Conservative and Labour policies since the 1980s also eroded the SERPS. 
Before the SERPS was eroded, pension industry representatives were focused on 
minimizing the crowding-out of private saving by protecting and extending National 
Insurance rebates and the ‘opt-out’. As SERPS declined, their attention shifted to 
how means-testing was creating disincentives to save.  
Although there is insufficient variation in the UK case to ‘isolate’ the effects 
of the increase in means-testing and the declining significance of the earnings-
related pension, the idea that means-testing becomes salient for pension industry 
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representatives only in the absence of an earnings-related pension that crowds-out 
private saving is supported by the results of my QCA. In the QCA of chapter four, the 
absence of a significant earnings-related pension is associated without exception 
with universalising state pension reform, while the presence of a significant 
earnings-related pension is associated without exception with the absence of such 
reform. 
 
6.3 THE UK'S PRIVATE PENSIONS: A LEAST LIKELY CASE OF UNIVERSALISING 
REFORM 
 
In this section, I examine the UK case once again, this time with a focus on explaining 
the reforms that made private pensions more universal. The case is chosen as a 
typical case of the extension of private pensions under a strong left government. At 
the same time, the UK is chosen as it constitutes a least likely case for the argument 
that unions drive policy. Concentrated executive power without veto points makes it 
possible for the governing party to push through its preferred reforms, but also 
limits the scope for blame avoidance and increases the risk of being held electorally 
accountable for unpopular reforms (Weaver and Rockman, 1993). Policy proposals 
are thus shaped within the executive through extensive consultation and bargaining 
with affected interests, but whilst some interests are incorporated into 
policymaking others are marginalised (Schulze and Moran: 56). Since the 1980s, this 
has been the case for unions, and even the electoral victory of New Labour in 1997 
did not restore their influence in policy making (Ludlam and Taylor, 2003, Simoni, 
2007).  
Meanwhile the political influence of other organised interests has increased. 
Employers as a group have been empowered by increasing economic openness and 
by the increased emphasis on economic competitiveness since the 1980s, and the 
pensions industry has been strengthened by a series of UK policies encouraging the 
growth of private pensions. Although sometimes internally divided, it is considered 
able to exert significant influence of pension policy (Schulze and Moran: 59). The 
narrative over the following pages shows how, even in this least likely context, union 
preferences were crucial in shaping New Labour’s policy agenda and made possible 
universalising reform. 
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1950-1992: OLD LABOUR’S BATTLE FOR A STATE EARNINGS-RELATED PENSION 
 
In the mid-1950s the British Labour Party and affiliated unions developed a 
commitment to the idea of a state-earnings related pension that was to characterise 
pension politics for the next forty years. The flat-rate Basic State Pension set up in 
1946 did not secure accustomed standards of living in old age, and as such it fuelled 
a rapid expansion of earnings-related occupational schemes confined largely to 
public sector and white-collar employees. The Labour Party made repeated attempts 
to bridge the growing divide between a ‘privileged minority’ lucky enough to benefit 
from generous occupational pension schemes and the ‘unprivileged majority’ who 
were dependent on the basic Beveridge pension by introducing a state pension 
comparable to the generous benefits offered by occupational schemes (Pemberton, 
2010, Labour Labour Party, 1957). These attempts finally came to fruition in 1974 
with the introduction of the SERPS on top of the flat-rate basic pension, amounting 
to 25% of income for all those insured. SERPS benefits were calculated on the basis 
of the average earnings of the best of twenty years, and were indexed to inflation.  
The Labour movement’s commitment to a state solution to earnings 
replacement in old age was most apparent in its fierce opposition to the Social 
Security Act of 1986. As discussed in the previous narrative, this Act passed by the 
Conservative party did not succeed in abolishing the SERPS but did seriously 
undermine it. The Act not only cut SERPS benefits by extending the reference period 
from twenty years to life-time career and reducing the replacement rate from 25% 
to 20%, but also created incentives for further privatization of supplementary 
pensions by extending the contracting-out rebate to DC schemes where previously 
only defined benefit schemes were allowed to contract-out. For Labour, this reform 
represented ‘yet another attempt to undermine the whole labour movement by 
weakening their ability to withdraw their labour since to do so will place pension 
rights in jeopardy’ (Labour Labour Party, 1985: 111). When the Green Paper was 
briefly debated in the House of Commons on 3rd June 1985, the Labour opposition 
attacked the government for being the ‘pension snatcher’ and for ‘dismantling the 
welfare state’ (Schulze and Moran, 2006b: 72).  
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The Annual Labour Party Conference of 1985 also documents multiple requests 
from unions that the next Labour government should commit to restoring the SERPS 
(Trades Union Congress, 1985, Trades Union Congress, 1986). For the TUC, the best 
twenty years rule made SERPS attractive for women and all those with irregular 
working careers (Schulze and Moran, 2006b). Its abolition would ‘adversely affect 
millions of women who will lose any future possibility of attaining pension 
entitlement approximating that of men’ (Labour Labour Party, 1985: 108). 
Moreover, according to the TUC, personal pension schemes – even if extended 
through compulsion to all as the Conservatives had initially proposed – were 
‘inferior’ to a state solution. They ‘would undermine the concept of collective 
insurance against risks such as death or incapacity’ (Labour Labour Party, 1985: 
108) and dependence on the rate of return from investment was insecure (Schulze 
and Moran, 2006b). The Labour movement’s position was unanimous, and was 
summed up by Roy Grantham of the Association of Professional Executive Clerical 
and Computer staff when he moved at the Labour Party annual conference to 
condemn the plans to abolish SERPS. Personal pension schemes were bad news, and 
were being promoted solely because ‘Mrs Thatcher is committed to helping her 
friends in the City to make more money out of personal pensions’ (Labour Labour 
Party, 1985: 109). 
The Labour Party’s commitment to the SERPS and categorical rejection of 
private solutions was slow to change. Although Labour Manifestos for the 1979, 
1983, 1987 and 1992 elections show a gradual shift towards more centrist positions 
(Simoni, 2007) at the 1992 general election Labour was still firmly committed to 
reversing the decline of the state earnings-related pension. A combination of 
increases in National Insurance contributions and the upper rate of income tax 
would enable SERPS to be ‘revamped to provide the benefits it originally offered, 
before the present Government reduced its value’ and if elected, a Labour 
government would ‘seek to re-establish SERPS and good final salary schemes as the 
twin pillars of UK pension provision’ and to ‘stall the drive towards personal 
pensions’ (Harrison, 1992).  
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NEW LABOUR’S NEW POLICY STANCE 
 
However, after a fourth consecutive electoral defeat, the Labour party became 
determined not to raise taxes (Blitz and Smith, 1996). Behind the scenes, the party 
faced an internal struggle. According to the Financial Times, reporting in 1996, 
Labour was ‘struggling to find social policies which please its traditional wing and 
are fiscally responsible’ (Suzman, 1996). Regarding retirement policy, the internal 
struggle came to a head with the National Executive Committee (NEC) statement on 
pensions. This statement, drafted by an NEC which was still dominated by union 
votes (Ludlam and Taylor, 2003) deemed the restoration of the SERPS unaffordable 
and set out a commitment to developing an alternative approach.  
This did not go down well with the ‘traditional wing’ which included policy 
veterans like Peter Townsend and Barbara Castle who had been architects of SERPS 
in the early 1970s, and members of the left-leaning Constituency Labour Party 
(CLP). The traditional wing insisted that the cuts made by the Tories to the SERPS 
should be restored (Castle and Townsend, 1996) and at the 1996 Labour party 
conference they moved against the NEC statement on pensions. In her speech to the 
party Baroness Castle noted the ‘profound differences’ between her position and 
those who supported the NEC statement on pensions, who were mounting a 
‘dangerous attack on the principles of the welfare state’. She called for ‘the 
restoration of SERPS to its original role as the standard-setter for all private 
schemes’ and insisted that the restoration of SERPS had been fully costed and was 
affordable (Labour Labour Party, 1996: 143). 
Baroness Castle received prolonged applause, having voiced the feeling 
among the traditional wing that ‘it is about priorities and political will. We should 
not just accept what the Tories have done’ (Dave Lawrence, Poplar and Canning 
Town CLP. Labour Labour Party, 1996: 142). Yet Baroness Castle’s spirited defence 
of the SERPS was defeated at the vote. The biggest unions were united in turning 
their backs on the idea of restoring the SERPS. The public sector union UNISON, the 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), the Amalgamated Engineering 
Electrical Union, the Communication Workers Union and the Distributive and Allied 
Workers Union all moved to support the NEC statement on pensions. The union 
speeches had a pragmatic tone:  
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‘The people of this country know what our ideals are, they support these 
ideals, but they know what is realistically possible. That is why Labour now 
promises only what it can deliver’ (Distributive and Allied Worker Union) 
(Labour Labour Party, 1996: 145). 
Harriet Harman, shadow secretary of state for social security, summed up the 
rationale behind the NEC statement on pensions:  
‘as we found out, and as the country found out to its cost in 1983, 1987 and 
1992, all the promises in the world will be worth nothing if we threaten our 
own chances at the election’ (Labour Labour Party, 1996: 152).  
In this way, the traditional Social Democratic approach of a compulsory state 
earnings-related pension was decisively defeated at the 1996 Labour Party 
Conference (Taylor-Gooby and Larsen, 2004). By the time Labour came to power in 
the next general election, it had completely abandoned its commitment to restoring 
the state earnings related pension scheme. A Green Paper issued in December 1998 
stated the party’s intention to replace the SERPS by the Second State Pension (S2P) - 
a flat rate benefit to be built up by means of earnings related contributions. The S2P 
would increase benefits for low income earners while the majority of people would 
be motivated to contract-out into private pension schemes. 
Unions had played a vital internal role in side-lining those members of the 
Labour party still committed to the pension policy promises of the 1980s, and they 
were aware both of their strategic influence in this matter, and of the radical break 
from the past that their policy u-turn represented. In the words of John Monks, the 
TUC General Secretary at the time, unions were ‘vital in their traditional role of 
counter-balancing the increasingly vocal left-wing within the party’ (Ludlam and 
Taylor, 2003). In fact, the policy stance displayed by the major unions at the Labour 
party conference in 1996 was part and parcel of a formal ‘re-launch’ initiated by 
John Monks two years earlier to modernise the trade union movement. As part of 
this re-launch, union leaders had reassessed their insistence that the state provide 
replacement of accustomed earnings on retirement.  
Crucial for this reassessment was that they began to believe that there was 
‘little chance of any drastic improvement in the value of the Basic State Pension or 
the existing State Earnings Related Pension’ (Taylor, 1997). Occupational pension 
schemes were the best alternative way to provide for supplementary pensions 
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(Schulze and Moran, 2006b) and ‘most employees would be better off building up 
their own pension pot rather than relying on the future vagaries of state pension 
benefits’ (Pemberton, 2010). The concerns that had been voiced so forcefully in the 
1980s about private pensions were pushed aside by the emerging belief that the 
state alternative no longer offered greater de-commodification and that political 
promises were no less risky than financial returns. The shift in policy emphasis from 
extending the SERPS to the extension of private occupational benefits was dubbed a 
‘revolution in welfare provision and modern trade union thinking’ by Ken Jackson, 
the Secretary General of the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union 
(Halligan and Martinson, 1998). 
 
THE ISSUE OF COMPULSION 
 
The TUC believed that if occupational pensions were to take on the role of the 
SERPS, they would have to be compulsory, with compulsory employer contributions 
(Trades Union Congress, 1998). The issue of compulsion was also raised by several 
other organisations during the same period. The Anson Inquiry, set up by the 
National Association of Pension Funds, recommended that SERPS should be phased 
out and that higher paid employees and their employers should be compelled to 
contribute to an occupational or personal pension, or to a new ‘National Pension 
Scheme’ (Cohen, 1996). Soon afterwards, the Institute of Directors (IoD) issued a 
report calling for ‘compulsory pension saving’ because ‘inadequate private sector 
provision could eventually force the state to take on a greater burden than it 
currently plans’ producing higher spending and taxes (Timmins, 1997). Finally, just 
before electoral defeat in 1997 the Conservative Social Security Secretary Peter 
Lilley proposed the privatisation of both the Basic State Pension and the SERPS. 
National Insurance contributions by employers and employees would remain at the 
same level, with a flat-rate rebate of £9 per week plus 5 per cent of eligible earnings 
paid from these into a nominated pension fund.  
In calling for compulsory savings however, these organisations did ‘not see 
the need for greater mandatory coverage’. The goal of the IoD was not to 
supplement the state pension, but to privatise it, a goal which was to be best 
achieved by letting it “wither on the vine” (Timmins, 1997). The Conservative party 
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also adamantly opposed calls for any additional compulsory pension savings, on the 
ideological grounds that ‘it does not think the state should tell people what is best 
for them’ (Cohen, 1996), and the NAPF’s proposal was aimed only at higher income 
earners and so actually entailed a reduction of mandatory coverage. In this way they 
differed crucially from the type of compulsion desired by the TUC, which required 
additional pension contributions rather than the privatisation of existing 
contributions to the state pension. Moreover, the TUC proposal was a call to increase 
employer responsibility in pension provision rather than increasing only individual 
savings. 
Determined to shake off its image as the party of ‘tax and spend’, the Labour 
Party was reluctant to pursue such a policy. It feared that a compulsory levy 
imposed on top of National Insurance contributions would be presented by the 
Tories as an additional tax (Blitz and Smith, 1996). Reporting after the Labour Party 
Conference in 1996 Chris Smith, the shadow Social Security Secretary, said the party 
accepted the need for alternative second tier pensions, but that it had taken the 
“firm decision” not to make such schemes compulsory (Suzman, 1996). One year 
later, the Welfare Reform Green Paper was a ‘clear signal’ that although compulsion 
was the government’s favoured option, Downing Street remained concerned that 
compulsory contributions could be portrayed as increases in taxation’ (Martinson, 
1998).  
 
LABOUR INTRODUCES STAKEHOLDER PENSIONS AND PRESSURE FOR COMPULSION 
INTENSIFIES 
 
As expected, the government stopped short of introducing mandatory employer 
contributions as part of their first pension reform. The Welfare Reform and Pensions 
Act of 1999 compelled those employers who did not offer an occupational scheme to 
offer a ‘stakeholder’ pension, but did not compel them to contribute. But stakeholder 
pensions did not restore levels of private saving and TUC pressure for compulsion 
mounted. By 2002 the TUC was pressing for employers to be compelled to 
contribute 10 per cent of salary to pension schemes, with workers compelled to join 
as a condition of employment (Timmins, 2002). In a memorandum submitted that 
year, the TUC summed up its argument: 
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‘If the state is not going to pay for pensions from general taxation and 
individuals cannot save enough for themselves then employers will have to 
bear their share of the burden of retirement provision. The case for 
compulsory employer contributions to occupational pensions is compelling. It 
is the TUC’s view that a statutory obligation should be imposed on employers 
to contribute to their worker’s pensions- whether final salary, defined 
contribution or stakeholder’ (2002: S3.6-S3.8) 
The issue was salient. For the TGWU, pensions were 'the number one issue…the 
biggest item on the bargaining agenda' while according to engineering union Amicus 
'the main battleground for the future in terms of industrial relations is not going to 
be pay any more but pensions' (Guha, 2002). As the government prepared for a 
reform of the regulatory regime for occupational pensions with no mention of the 
compulsory employer contributions that unions wanted, major unions like the 
General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trade Union (GMB), Amicus, and the 
TGWU warned that they would support strike action to stop companies from closing 
their final salary schemes (Guha, 2002). 
In response to the increasing pressure, in 2002 the government set up a 
number of reviews, most notably the independent Pensions Commission whose 
remit it was ‘to keep under review the regime for UK private pensions and long-term 
savings, and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions on whether there is a case for moving beyond the current voluntarist 
approach’ (Pensions Commission, 2004: ix). However despite the mounting pressure 
and multiple inquiries, the government was still reluctant to embrace compulsion. 
Speaking at a conference organised by the CBI, the Work and Pensions secretary 
Andrew Smith called employer compulsion a policy of 'last resort'. He told the 
conference that there was already a fair degree of compulsory pension saving in the 
British system. Voluntary private pension provision, he insisted, was 'a strength of 
the British system' that he would 'very much like to build on' (Timmins, 2002).  
Employers were relieved. John Cridland, the CBI’s deputy director-general, 
announced that he was encouraged that Mr Smith was talking about ‘refreshing the 
pensions partnership without raising the issue of compulsory employer 
contributions'. He added: 'Compulsory contributions are all about punishment. We 
need to encourage pension volunteers rather than conscript people to take part' 
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(Timmins, 2002). But insurers were starting to lose patience with the voluntarist 
status quo.  
During the development of Labour’s pension policies, both the ABI and the 
NAPF had expressed concern about levels of private pension saving and urged the 
government to act. By way of solutions, neither organisation had been in favour of 
increased compulsion but rather each had favoured polices that aimed to increase 
savings through reducing tax disincentives, simplifying private pension regulation, 
raising financial awareness of the need to save, and, as discussed in the previous 
narrative, reforming the state pension. However, the perceived failure of 
Stakeholder pensions to reverse the trends in private pension saving led to 
exasperation within the industry at the way the government was tinkering with the 
voluntarist framework and making it worse. For the ABI, compulsion emerged as a 
possible option. In its response to the Pensions Green Paper the ABI said: ‘This is the 
last chance for voluntarism. We recommend that the Government introduces a 
package of employer-focused fiscal incentives to raise levels of pension saving. If it 
does not, compulsion must follow in short order’ (Association of British Insurers, 
2003). The NAPF, whose membership consists not only of pension industry actors 
but also of employer providers of occupational schemes, remained silent on the 
issue.  
Meanwhile the TUC continued its campaign. Following the Pensions 
Commission’s first report on the problems facing the UK pension system and the 
additional pension saving that was required on a national level (Pensions 
Commission, 2004), TUC General Secretary Brendan Barber wrote a letter to the 
Financial Times in which he stated: ‘The Trades Union Congress believes it is 
extremely unlikely that further incentives would restore employer contribution 
levels to where they should have been, let alone help expand pensions saving to the 
level the Commission says is required’ (Barber, 2004). Demands for mandatory 
employer contributions were made increasingly forcefully, in line with a more 
general tension which characterised the union-party relationship during Labour’s 
second term (Ludlam and Taylor, 2003). As Brendan Barber put it ‘employers will 
complain but all this says is that those who employ half of the workforce without a 
decent pension should catch up with the other half who do’ (Hall, 2004).  
Employers did complain. Although some employers who already provided 
occupational pensions would have welcomed compulsion on their competitors to do 
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the same (Timmins, 2005b), employer representatives put on a fairly united front. 
The press reported that compulsory contributions were 'fiercely resisted by 
employers' who continued to insist that companies should contribute only if they 
can afford it (Brown, 2004). However, despite the employer opposition, increasing 
party-union tension prompted a significant change in the position of the 
government.  
In 2004, a meeting in Warwick between affiliated unions and the Labour 
party helped form Labour’s 2005 election manifesto. Alongside the more widely 
publicised promises on public sector pensions that were made to unions in this 
'Warwick agreement’, Labour also promised to legislate ‘if necessary’ to move 
beyond the voluntary occupational pension system (Adams and Turner, 2005). 
Publicly, the government warned that 'employers will be forced to contribute to 
occupational pension schemes unless many more companies start making voluntary 
payments on employees behalf' (Brown, 2004) and compulsion hung over 
employers as an imminent threat. 
By 2005 compulsion to save for a pension was 'the greatest unanswered 
question behind Labour’s pension policy for a third term' (Timmins, 2005b). Neither 
the Conservatives nor the Liberal Democrats favoured compulsion (Timmins, 
2005b), and despite having announced the ‘last chance for voluntarism’ in 2003, 
even pension insurers were ‘cool on the idea’ (Timmins, 2005b). The ABI joined the 
NAPF in focusing on promoting ideas other than compulsion, such as the reduction 
of means-testing discussed in the previous narrative. The ABI was once again 
advocating a ‘virtuous circle of voluntarism’ and the message was clear – the 
emphasis should be on incentives and ‘compulsion should only be considered as a 
last resort’ (Association of British Insurers, 2005a: 3, Association of British Insurers, 
2005b). 
But union calls for compulsory employer contributions were given increased 
legitimacy when the Pensions Commission reported its findings in 2005. The private 
pension system, far from growing to fill the gaps left by the state, had actually been 
doing less. Voluntary private pension provision was in ‘serious and probably 
irreversible decline’ (Pensions Commission, 2005b), and ‘incremental measures to 
encourage voluntary provision’ were not sufficient to prevent the UK pension 
system from delivering ‘increasingly inadequate and unequal results’. The Pension 
Commission recommended the creation of a low-cost, national funded pension 
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savings scheme into which individuals would be automatically enrolled with the 
right to opt out, combined with a modest level of compulsory matching employer 
contributions. The report recognised that this would impose additional costs on 
employers but it considered employer compulsion ‘an essential part of its reform 
package’ (Pensions Commission, 2005b). 
In 2006 the Government published its reform proposals in the form of two 
White Papers (DWP, 2006a, DWP, 2006b). These White Papers closely followed the 
proposals of the Pensions Commission, proposing automatic enrolment into either 
an employer scheme or a new personal account. Unless the employee actively opted-
out, the employer would be required to make a contribution. A breakdown of 
consultation responses to the two White Papers shows most employers remained 
strongly against the idea of mandatory employer contributions until the end. 
Although some employer groups, including the Engineering Employers Federation 
(EEF), declared themselves supportive of the concept (Timmins, 2005a), most did 
not. Amongst those who continued to state their reluctance regarding the proposed 
mandatory employer contributions were the British Chamber of Commerce and the 
CBI. The CBI stated that it had: 
‘Consulted widely with members on whether to accept the Pensions 
Commission’s recommendation that employers be compelled to contribute to 
pensions where an employee chooses not to opt-out of the new national 
savings scheme. Many CBI members, including the vast majority of smaller 
firms, continue to oppose the proposal, but we accept that the Government is 
committed to taking forward this policy.’ (DWP, 2006d: 37). 
 The Federation of Small Businesses was even more vocal in its opposition:  
‘The administrative impact on small employers cannot be emphasised 
enough… the most significant burden for a small employer will be the time 
needed to learn about personal accounts and how it will impact on his or her 
business specifically… while we accept the political reality of compulsion, we 
still do not support compulsory employer contributions. However, given the 
current debate our main focus is to ensure that the implementation is as 
simple as possible (Work and Pensions Committee, Personal Accounts, 21 
March 2007, HC 200-II, 2006-07, Ev 100).  
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Representatives of the pension industry however had accepted mandatory employer 
contributions (DWP, 2007: 8). Indeed, following the publication of the Pensions 
Commission report, several rival options to the low cost national funding saving 
scheme had emerged, amongst which were alternatives proposed by the NAPF and 
the ABI featuring compulsory employer contributions (Association of British 
Insurers, 2006). The eventual endorsement of employer compulsion by pension 
industry representatives was enough to get the Conservative party to support the 
proposals when they were brought before parliament in the form of the 2008 
Pensions Act, despite the employer opposition. The shadow Work and Pensions 
Secretary Philip Hammond said that ‘after thinking long and hard’ the Conservatives 
had taken the decision to support the proposals to automatically enrol employees 
into the scheme and the compulsory employer contribution (HC Deb, 16 January 
2007, c671). Debate was confined to concerns of implementation (HC Deb, 16 
January 2007, c680). The TUC was jubilant:  
‘Every employer will now have to make pensions contributions. This remains a 
historic advance for union campaigning – a minimum pension to go alongside 
the minimum wage’ (TUC ‘Good and Bad in Pensions Review’ 27th Oct 2010). 
 
UNIVERSALISING REFORM IN THE ABSENCE OF A SIGNIFICANT EARNINGS-RELATED 
PENSION 
 
The regulatory extension of private pension coverage in the UK emerged from the 
QCA as typical of universalising reforms introduced by strong left governments. The 
preceding narrative shows how a left-of-centre party came to expand the coverage 
of private pensions through the introduction of mandatory employer contributions. 
Although union influence in policymaking is usually considered limited in modern 
British pension politics, the narrative shows that unions shaped the development of 
private pension universalism at two critical stages.  
First, in 1996 unions played a vital role in side-lining traditionalists within 
the Labour Party still committed to a state solution for earnings-replacement in old 
age. In this way they helped shape the New Labour consensus that earnings 
replacement should be provided through private means. Second, as the one big 
group firmly in favour of mandatory employer contributions, unions singlehandedly 
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put employer compulsion on the political agenda, and their continued pressure 
made possible the increase in private pension universalism in 2008.  
The narrative also shows the importance of pension structure in explaining 
the reforms. In particular, it shows the importance of the absence of an earnings-
related state pension in bringing about the regulatory extension of private pension 
coverage. As expected, trade unions in the UK began to push for broader private 
pension coverage in response to the decline of the earnings-related state pension, 
and only when they no longer perceived a reversal of this decline to be politically 
feasible.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The three case outlines in this chapter were carefully chosen to uncover the causal 
logic behind patterns identified in the Qualitative Comparative Analysis, and create a 
substantial explanation of why universalising reforms happened when and where 
they did.  
Australia was chosen as a typical case of universalising reform to the state 
pension, to shed light on why the prevalence of targeting and the absence of a left 
government are associated with reform. The second narrative focused on the UK, 
which had emerged from the QCA as a deviant case of universalising reforms to the 
state pension introduced by a left government. It reinforced the importance of non-
left party preferences for the introduction of universalising reform to the state 
pension, and indicated how key policy preferences might change in response to the 
declining significance of the earnings-related state pension. The final narrative 
focused on the UK’s private pensions, as a typical case of how the absence of a 
significant earnings-related state pension can lead to the extension of private 
pension coverage under a strong left government. In light of the theoretical 
expectation that union preferences are the causal link between the absence of a 
significant earnings-related pension and regulatory reform, the UK can also be seen 
as a least-likely case, since union influence in policymaking is usually understood to 
be limited.  
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The country cases make explicit how the institutional conditions identified 
in the Qualitative Comparative Analyses affect the policy preferences of key interest 
groups. The prevalence of means testing affects the policy preferences of pension 
industry representatives. In both Australia and the UK the prevalence of mean-
testing meant that representatives of the pension industry, who felt first-hand the 
disincentive effect such arrangements had on private savings, developed a keen 
interest in universalising reforms to the state pension. The presence of a significant 
earnings-related state pension seems to be relevant in explaining both industry and 
union preferences. The narratives suggest that as a result of the erosion of the 
earnings-related state pension in the UK, the regulatory extension of private pension 
coverage became salient for trade unions, and, more tentatively, the disincentive 
effect of means-testing became salient for representatives of the pension industry.  
In turn, my country cases suggest that the policy preferences of interest 
groups are important because they shape the policy preferences of political parties. 
In both Australia and the UK, the pension industry representatives influenced right-
of-centre parties to pursue universalising reform of the state pension, while trade 
unions influenced left-of-centre parties to introduce regulation extending private 
pension coverage. Yet the narratives presented do not suggest that party 
preferences were a simple response to the lobbying of the interest groups that they 
were close to or trying to court. ‘Hard’ union influence in policymaking was low in 
the UK during the years in question, and while the British Conservative party 
historically had a very close relationship with the pension industry, in Australia the 
superannuation industry was much more closely tied with the Labour party. In both 
countries, employer ambivalence regarding universalising reform of the state 
pension was side-lined by right-of-centre governments, and employer opposition to 
compulsory private pension contributions in the UK was ignored by a Labour party 
otherwise keen to gain business group support. 
In both Australia and the UK therefore it was not the preferences of narrow 
interest groups that were catered for by the introduction of universalising reforms, 
but rather the preferences of the broader electorate. In both countries, the 
narratives show that left-of-centre governments were primarily concerned with 
proving their fiscal rectitude to the electorate. They targeted state benefits more 
tightly on the needy, and supplemented targeted state provision with the regulatory 
extension of private pensions. By contrast, right-of-centre governments in both 
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countries had built up sufficiently strong reputations for economic management to 
be able to propose fiscally costly universalising reforms that benefited those who 
had saved privately for retirement and whose state pension entitlements were 
reduced as a result.  
The country cases suggest that the role of interest groups in bringing about 
universalising reform lies in how they shaped the electoral strategies of political 
parties. As such, both unions and pension industry representatives played a subtle 
and far-reaching causal role. In 1996, when unions side-lined traditionalists within 
the Labour Party, they side-lined the idea that earnings-replacement in old age 
needed to be publicly provided, and helped create the New Labour consensus that 
earnings replacement should be provided through private means. This was a very 
significant shift in the Labour Party’s pension policy. What the unions had drawn 
attention to in the defining Labour Party conference of 1996 was the importance of 
proving to the electorate in the upcoming general elections that Labour would 
exercise fiscal restraint, starting in a very public way with their flagship pensions 
policy.  
Similarly, representatives of the pension industry shaped the policy 
preferences of right-of-centre parties in Australia and the UK by drawing public 
attention to the detrimental effects of means-testing in incentives to save. While in 
the UK the industry’s discourse focused on the irrationality of a system that 
penalised people for saving, In Australia it focused on the issue of low national 
savings. In both cases, right-of-centre parties were able to promote popular 
universalising policies whilst emphasising a discourse which, although though 
familiar to them, had until then been in the shadow of the discourse of low state 
spending. 
The account that emerges from my analysis is thus a rather interest based 
one. In a nutshell, my analysis suggests that at the root of universalising reforms lie 
the office-seeking interests of political parties. These interests are indirectly shaped 
by the policy preferences of organised interest groups, which in turn reflect the 
institutional structure of the pension system. In particular, unions and 
representatives of the pension industry influence the electoral strategies of political 
parties by using their expertise to identify develop and communicate policy 
proposals that are then adopted by parties as being in their electoral interest.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The starting point of this research was the observation that while some market-
heavy pension systems remain dualised in the post-industrial context, others have 
become more universal, either through changes to the structure of the state pension 
or through regulation to extend the coverage of private pensions. This observation, 
which was substantiated using the database of reforms I constructed in chapter two, 
was rather unexpected. Market-heavy pension systems, in which low or moderate 
state benefits are topped up by private welfare arrangements, have long been 
expected not only to create dualisms, but also to fuel patterns of politics that 
perpetuate and increase such dualisms over time. 
I therefore set out to explain the introduction of universalising reform in 
some market-heavy systems, as well as the absence of such reform in others. A 
synthesis of insights from the diverse literature presented in chapter three provided 
an initial set of theoretical propositions. Taken together, these propositions pointed 
towards an explanation that was causally rather complex. To verify and develop this 
explanation I modelled my empirical analysis in terms of set-relations using fuzzy-
set QCA which is capable of dealing with both equifinality and conjunctural 
causation. Since I expected that universalising reform through the extension of state 
pensions and universalising reform through the extension of private pensions would 
mobilize political actors in different ways, I conducted two separate analyses, 
mapping the combinations of conditions under which public and private pensions 
have become more universal since the 1980s in turn. I complemented these 
Qualitative Comparative Analyses with country cases linking institutional conditions 
to the reform outcomes via the policy preferences of key political actors. The case 
narratives provide a causal logic that substantiates and reinforces the results of the 
fsQCA.  
In this final chapter I summarize the explanation I have developed, referring 
back to the propositions that formed the starting point of the Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis in chapters four and five. I also discuss the theoretical 
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contributions of this research under three headings; the role of institutions, the role 
of political parties, and the role of organized interests. I finish with some reflections 
on the main limitations of the thesis and future directions for research. 
 
7.1 SUMMARISING THE THESIS 
 
The first proposition presented in chapter three concerned the introduction of 
regulatory change to make private pensions more universal. It stated that: 
 
‘Regulatory change to make private pensions more universal is the result of union 
demands for the extension of private pension coverage in the absence of a significant 
earnings-related state pension. Where there is no institutional capacity for collective 
self-regulation, union demands for more universal private pensions are addressed 
when either a) a strong left government is in power, or b) a non-left government seeks 
to pass cost-cutting reforms in a fragmented political system.’ 
 
I find strong empirical support for this initial proposition. The Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis in chapter five shows three ‘paths’ to the extension of private 
pension coverage, each characterised by the absence of a significant earnings-
related pension. Of the two paths where the institutional capacity for collective self-
regulation is weak, the first is additionally characterised by a strong left 
government, and the second by a non-left government, political fragmentation and 
the presence of cost-cutting reforms. The narrative of the UK, as a typical case of the 
first path, links the absence of a significant earnings-related state pension to union 
preferences for more universal private pensions.  In addition, it links union 
preferences to the policy outcome, in a context where union influence on 
policymaking is weak. 
 
The second proposition concerned the introduction of reforms that make public 
pensions more universal. It stated that:  
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‘Reforms that make the public pension more universal stem from the prevalence of 
means-testing. They occur under right-of-centre governments as a result of either a) a 
mismatch between means testing and a contributory system with restricted coverage 
(because those insured under the status quo could benefit from universalising reform) 
or b) a mismatch between the prevalence of means-testing and the prevalence of 
private pensions (because those who save privately for retirement and find their 
eligibility for state benefits reduced under the status quo could benefit from 
universalising reform).’  
 
I find strong empirical support for this proposition too. Ireland emerges from the 
QCA in chapter four as exceptional for being characterised by a mismatch between 
targeting and a contributory system with restricted coverage. Outside Ireland, every 
reform that made the state pension more universal had at its root a mismatch 
between a reliance on private pensions and a reliance on targeting. And in all cases 
except the UK, this mismatch led to reform only in the presence of a non-left 
government. Yet the QCA also shows that the proposition is incomplete. The 
mismatch between private pensions and targeting only led to universalising reform 
when combined with the absence of a significant earnings-related pension and a low 
rate of national savings.  
The narratives of Australia and the UK, as typical and deviant cases 
respectively, link these conditions to the reform outcomes. The UK case links the 
absence of a significant earnings-related state pension to pension industry 
preferences for a more universal state pension, and shows how these preferences 
affected the reform outcome via their effect on the policy preferences of the 
Conservative party. The Australian case links the national savings rate to the policy 
preferences of the Coalition government, showing how it was used to justify the 
Coalition government’s shift away from the fiscal imperative.  
In sum therefore, the empirical analysis has supported the initial 
propositions that I formulated by synthesising the insights of a rich and disparate 
literature. It has also gone further, indicating that additional conditions are relevant 
in explaining public pension reform and elaborating on the causal logics at work. In 
the next section, I zoom in on striking elements of these causal logics, referring back 
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to the comparative social policy literature to spell out the contributions of this 
research to ongoing theoretical debates. 
 
7.2 CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
My research has shown that in certain circumstances, the very institutional features 
usually expected to lead to further dualisation, namely a reliance on market-based 
arrangements, prevalent targeting, and limited earnings replacement, contribute 
instead to bringing about universalising reforms. This finding is a small but 
significant contribution to current institutionalist understandings of path-
dependent welfare state change. In particular, it speaks to two established 
institutionalist arguments, the first concerning the path of the 'latecomers' and the 
second concerning the 'paradox of redistribution'.  
 
Rethinking the path of the' latecomers' 
The presence or absence of a significant earnings-related state pension is a matter 
which has received quite some attention in comparative pension politics. According 
to the comparative literature, it was the failure of the so-called ‘latecomers’ to build 
a significant earnings-related pension either during the ‘first critical juncture’ of 
pension evolution around the time of the First World War, or during the ‘second 
critical juncture’ after the Second World War and until 1980 that explains much of 
their subsequent development. In these ‘latecomers’, the market is crowded in, 
leading to the classic and self-perpetuating dualism of retirement income between 
those with access to private provision and those who rely solely on the state pension 
(Ebbinghaus, 48-50; Myles and Pierson, 315-318).  
Yet my research suggests that the absence of a significant earnings-related 
state pension contributes to bringing about universalising change. First, the results 
of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis in chapter four show that the absence of a 
significant earnings-related pension is associated with universalising reform to the 
state pension. Second, the results of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis in chapter 
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five show that the absence of a significant earnings-related pension is also 
associated with the extension of private pension coverage. I therefore draw 
attention to how the absence of a significant earnings-related state pension 
continues to shape the development of the latecomers, shedding light on a 
‘distinctive political dynamic’ that has on the whole been insufficiently understood 
to date (Myles and Pierson: 317). 
 
Rethinking the 'paradox of redistribution' 
The reliance of a pension system on the market for the provision of retirement 
income, and the prevalence of targeted welfare arrangements, have also long been 
associated with dualisation rather than universalising change. By leaving the middle 
classes to safeguard their accustomed standards of living in old age through private 
insurance, public pensions in market-heavy systems tend to become a concern 
primarily for those on low incomes, and are not expected to generate the cross-class 
coalitions necessary for their preservation, let alone their extension. This is the 
classic explanation for the evolution of 'basic social security' pensions which provide 
a low level of entitlements without a significant earnings-related state tier (Korpi 
and Palme, 1998). The expectation of pension dualism is even more pronounced for 
‘targeted’ pension systems where eligibility to a low level of benefits is based on 
need, due to the additional effect of Rothstein’s ‘moral logic’ (Rothstein, 1998). It is 
the paradox of redistribution that such benefit arrangements are likely to facilitate 
retrenchment over time (Korpi and Palme, 1998).  
My research shows that the combination of prevalent targeting and a 
reliance on private pensions can generate pressure for reforms that make the state 
pension more universal. Indeed, my analysis suggests that with the partial exception 
of Ireland, every universalising reform of the state pension had at its root the 
mismatch between a reliance on private pensions and a reliance on targeting. By 
spelling out the conditions under which this mismatch leads to universalising 
reform, I develop a more nuanced understanding of how the increasingly prevalent 
institutional patterns of targeting and private provision interact and shape pension 
politics. As such, this research adds weight to recent work questioning the continued 
relevance of the ‘paradox of redistribution’ (Kenworthy, 2011, Marx et al., 2013). 
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THE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS 
 
The institutional conditions of prevalent means testing, market reliance and the 
absence of a significant earnings-related state pension are important for explaining 
universalising reforms because they structure the policy preferences of key political 
actors. My country cases suggest that two types of interest group are of importance 
for explaining universalising reforms in market-heavy pension systems, namely 
trade unions and representatives of the pension industry.  
Unions are central to bringing about universalising change to private 
pensions through regulatory means. Taking the UK as a typical case of the extension 
of private pension coverage, I show how the absence of a significant earnings-
related state pension can lead to union demands for more universal private 
pensions. As the discussion of the literature makes clear, the idea that unions have 
second-order preferences for regulated private welfare is not new (Hacker, 2002, 
Meyer and Bridgen, 2012: 390, Bonoli, 2006). My contribution lies in showing that 
these preferences matter, even in the absence of the institutional capacity for 
collective self-regulation and even where union influence in policymaking is 
generally weak. The narrative of the process leading up to the 2008 Pensions Act 
shows how unions in the UK shaped the New Labour consensus that earnings 
replacement should be provided through private means, and put employer 
compulsion on the political agenda.  
Pension industry representatives emerge from the cases of both UK and 
Australia as key actors in bringing about reforms that make public pensions more 
universal. In both countries, the prevalence of means-testing meant that 
representatives of the pension industry developed an interest in universalising 
reforms that could reduce disincentives to save for retirement. The idea that 
pension insurers might care about savings disincentives caused by means-testing is 
not altogether new (Meyer and Bridgen, 2012). It was however by no means obvious 
that concerns about means-testing would be so widespread among pension industry 
representatives, nor that these concerns would play such a key role in bringing 
about universalising reforms.  
By contrast, I found employers to be at best reluctant consenters to 
universalising change. They were in favour neither of the mandatory employer 
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contributions suggested by trade unions, nor of the universalising expansion of state 
pensions to the extent suggested by pension industry representatives. These policy 
preferences are not unexpected (Korpi, 2006: 183, 202). Even among those who 
challenge the assumption of employer hostility to welfare state expansion, there is 
no expectation that employers should support the development of citizenship or 
residence based benefits which de-commodify labour and erode employer control 
(Mares, 2001, Estevez-Abe et al., 2001).  
What is striking is not so much the reluctance of employer representatives 
regarding universalising reform in the cases under study, but rather their lack of 
influence. In both Australia and the UK, employer ambivalence regarding 
universalising reform of the state pension was side-lined by right-of-centre 
governments, and in the UK employer opposition to compulsory private pension 
contributions was ignored by a Labour party that was otherwise keen to gain 
business group support. The scant relevance of employers in explaining patterns of 
universalising reform is rather unexpected in light of employer-centred accounts of 
the development of social policy (Swenson, 1991, Mares, 2001, Estevez-Abe et al., 
2001, Hall and Soskice, 2001) and the oft-cited employer bias in the policymaking 
process of many market-heavy pension systems (Immergut et al., 2006). 
The influence of each of these three key interest groups in bringing about or 
halting universalising reform can be understood in light of the causal explanations 
that I develop in chapter six. The country cases show that universalising changes 
were introduced primarily with the preferences of the electorate rather that the 
preferences of narrow interest groups in mind. In both Australia and the UK, unions 
and representatives of the pension industry did not succeed in the introduction of 
universalising reforms by lobbying. Rather they achieved their aims because they 
influenced the electoral strategies of political parties, using their expertise to 
identify, develop and communicate policies that were then adopted by parties as 
being in their electoral interest. In this way, interest groups played a more subtle yet 
far-reaching causal role than is usually acknowledged by the welfare state literature, 
which  has richly theorised interest group preferences but paid much less attention 
to how these preferences affect the  policymaking process.   
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THE ROLE OF PARTIES 
 
The findings of this research call into question the diminished attention that has 
been paid to the role of political parties as social policy actors in recent years on the 
basis that globalization, deindustrialisation and the maturing of existing welfare 
arrangements have increasingly narrowed partisan differences (Pierson, 2001, 
Castles, 2001b, Huber and Stephens, 2001). My analysis reveals systematic 
relationships between political parties and universalising reforms in market-heavy 
pension systems. Yet, these relationships stand in stark contrast to the core 
messages of Power Resource Theory, (Korpi, 1983, Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
Stephens, 1979) according to which universalism through the expansion of the state 
pension has been driven historically by the political left while the political right is 
associated with means-testing and the dualising expansion of voluntary private 
arrangements.  
My research shows that union demands for the extension of private pensions 
as a second-best alternative to a significant earnings-related state pension may be 
met by a strong left government, as well as by a non-left government seeking to pass 
cost-cutting reform as part of a modernizing compromise in a fragmented political 
setting. As regards universalising reforms to the state pension, I found that they are 
driven by non-left governments. Thus on the whole, the universalising expansion of 
private pensions has often been driven by left-or-centre parties, while the 
universalising expansion of state pensions has been driven by non-left parties. 
This pattern can be explained by the ‘Nixon goes to China’ logic that 
reputation matters. In chapter three I indicated how this logic could be expected to 
apply not only to situations of retrenchment, but also to instances of expansion. My 
analysis lends support to this proposition. In both Australia and the UK, left-of-
centre parties were primarily concerned with proving their fiscal rectitude to the 
electorate. They targeted state benefits more tightly on the needy, and 
supplemented targeted state provision with the regulatory extension of private 
pensions. By contrast, right-of-centre parties in both countries had built up strong 
reputations for macro-economic management. This means they were able to 
propose fiscally costly yet electorally popular universalising reforms that benefited 
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those who had saved privately for retirement and whose eligibility to state pension 
entitlements were to be reduced as a result.  
 
7.3 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
One of the contributions of this research is the data that I have collected. My 
research question was based on a detailed database of reforms introduced in 
market-heavy pension systems between 1980 and 2009, which I created by drawing 
on a plethora of primary and secondary sources. This dataset enabled me to identify 
universalising reforms, assess their significance, and place them within broader 
national reform contexts. During my empirical analysis, I synthesised a variety of 
indicators from existing data sets, and drew on a large number of primary sources to 
create in-depth narratives of my selected country cases. I also systematically 
collected a large amount of primary data during the course of my Qualitative 
Comparative Analyses, notably on the prevalence of means-testing and the 
significance of earnings-related state pensions. These institutional features have 
long been identified by the literature as important for the development of pension 
systems, yet to my knowledge this is the first time anyone has systematically 
collected data about them.  
The collection of detailed data enabled me to capture reform trends and to 
develop explanations for them, and will hopefully prove useful for further 
comparative research in the future. However, the data available from primary 
sources at the country level was sometimes not uniformly available, and often not 
directly comparable. Moreover, although using the QCA approach I gained a great 
deal of familiarity with all of my cases, inevitably some countries, notably Australia 
and the UK, were explored at a finer level of granularity than others. This is a 
limitation of which I have been aware throughout the research process. The 
construction of better quality data would require time and financial resources that 
are not pragmatically possible within the constraints of a PhD. 
A further limitation of my research relates to my case selection. In this thesis 
I have presented country cases to substantiate two of the causal ‘logics’ that are 
identified in my Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The first causal logic refers to the 
way that a mismatch between prevalent private pensions and targeting generates 
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political dynamics can lead to universalising reforms to the state pension. As 
explained above, my analysis suggests that this logic offers a comprehensive 
explanation of the observed reform patterns in the state pensions of market heavy 
systems, with the sole exception of the Irish case. The second causal logic refers to 
how, in the absence of high union density, union demands for the extension of 
private pension coverage can be met under a strong left government. My analysis 
suggests that this logic explains the regulatory reforms that made private pensions 
more universal in the UK, New Zealand, and Australia. 
However, the QCA shows that the top-down regulatory reforms that 
occurred in Switzerland in 1982, 1997 and 2003, and in the Netherlands in 1994 
were the result of a different causal path, characterised by the combination of a low 
earnings-related pension, high political fragmentation, cost-cutting reforms, a non-
left government and the absence of high union density. In light of the theoretical 
discussion in chapter three, I interpreted this combination of conditions as evidence 
that union demands for the extension of private pension coverage may also be met 
in the absence of a strong left government, as part of modernizing compromises in a 
fragmented political system.   
I did not present a case narrative to further explore this third causal path. 
There are a number of reasons for this. First and foremost, it was a matter of time. 
Given the limited timeframe of the PhD, I chose to focus on substantiating the reform 
path that covers the UK, New Zealand, and Australia because these countries 
constitute some of the most unlikely contexts for reforms away from employer 
voluntarism, because they have received the least academic attention, and because 
of pragmatic language considerations. Nevertheless, it is a limitation of this thesis 
that substantiating the causal path of ‘modernising compromises’ with a case outline 
remains a matter for further research. 
I would like to end on what I consider to be a promising avenue for further 
research. The explanation developed in this thesis cannot be directly generalised to 
other policy areas. It is part of the epistemology behind the QCA approach that 
causal explanations are context-specific. They can be generalised only with care, and 
to contexts that are similar in causally relevant ways. The institutional context of the 
reforms examined in this thesis is largely specific to market-heavy pension systems. 
Nevertheless, my research has shown that political parties, interest groups and 
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welfare state institutions can influence the development of social policy in 
unexpected ways.  
It might therefore be fruitful for further research to examine the extent to 
which other policy areas such as healthcare, family policy and unemployment 
benefits have become more dualised or more universal over time, and the extent to 
which they have been affected by logics of change similar to those identified here. In 
particular, at a time when the private provision and targeting of social benefits are 
prominent in both academic and policy discourse, it would be interesting to ask the 
following two questions. First, to what extent does the prevalence of targeting in 
other policy areas have disincentive effects that generate political demands for more 
universal benefits, and second, whether the regulatory extension of private benefits 
in other policy areas is driven by political dynamics that are similar to those 
identified in this thesis. 
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APPENDIX A: PENSION EXPENDITURE  
 
Table 22. Public and Private expenditure on pensions, as a % of GDP, all OECD countries 
OECD Pensions at a Glance 2013 OECD Factbook 2013 
Country 2005 Country 2009 Country 2005 Country 2009 
  
Iceland 2.13 Iceland 1.70 Iceland 3.76 
Iceland 1.42 Netherlands 1.10 Australia 1.12 Australia 1.31 
Netherlands 1.06 Switzerland 0.92 Switzerland 0.78 Netherlands 0.76 
Canada 1.03 Canada 0.81 Netherlands 0.70 Denmark 0.70 
Switzerland 0.89 United Kingdom 0.74 Denmark 0.63 Canada 0.60 
United Kingdom 0.86 Australia 0.59 United Kingdom 0.54 Korea 0.52 
United States 0.63 United States 0.57 Korea 0.53 United Kingdom 0.52 
Australia 0.56 Denmark 0.40 Canada 0.49 United States 0.43 
Denmark 0.41 Chile 0.38 United States 0.48 New Zealand 0.40 
Sweden 0.28 Japan 0.30 Israel 0.33 Chile 0.37 
Ireland 0.25 Sweden 0.30 New Zealand 0.30 Israel 0.34 
Chile 0.22 Ireland 0.21 Norway 0.29 Belgium 0.33 
OECD 0.21 OECD 0.21 OECD 0.24 OECD 0.28 
Belgium 0.17 Belgium 0.14 Belgium 0.14 Mexico 0.23 
Norway 0.12 Norway 0.12 Sweden 0.13 Sweden 0.16 
Italy 0.10 Italy 0.10 Portugal 0.09 Portugal 0.08 
Luxembourg 0.08 Germany 0.08 Mexico 0.08 Finland 0.07 
Germany 0.07 Luxembourg 0.07 Spain 0.06 Spain 0.06 
Slovak Republic 0.07 Czech Republic 0.06 Hungary 0.02 Czech Republic 0.05 
Portugal 0.06 Austria 0.05 Austria 0.02 France 0.03 
Austria 0.04 Portugal 0.04 Italy 0.01 Germany 0.03 
Greece 0.04 Slovak Republic 0.04 Luxembourg 0.01 Hungary 0.02 
Czech Republic 0.04 Greece 0.03 Germany 0.01 Austria 0.01 
Finland 0.03 Finland 0.03 Poland 0.00 Turkey 0.01 
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Missing data: OECD Factbook 2013 has missing data for Chile 2005; Czech Republic 2005; Estonia 2005; 
Finland 2005; France 2005; Greece 2005; Ireland 2005, 2009; Japan 2005, 2009; Norway 2009; Slovak 
Republic 2005, 2009; Slovenia 2005; Switzerland 2009. OECD Pensions at a Glance 2013 has missing 
data for Estonia 2005, 2009; Hungary 2005, 2009; Israel 2005, 2009; Japan 2005; Mexico 2005, 2009; 
New Zealand 2005, 2009; Poland 2005, 2009; Slovenia 2005, 2009; Spain 2005, 2009; Turkey 2005, 
2009. 
  
France 0.03 France 0.02 Turkey 0.00 Italy 0.01 
Korea 0.00 Korea 0.00 
  
Luxembourg 0.01 
      
Estonia 0.00 
      
Greece 0.00 
      
Poland 0.00 
      
Slovenia 0.00 
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APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK 
 
BEN_GEN 
These are reforms that alter the generosity of the state pension by altering the 
benefit calculation formula. Reforms that increase the pension benefit received for a 
given contribution history are coded 1. Reforms that decrease the pension benefit 
received for a given contribution history are coded -1. 
 
BEN_FLAT 
These are reforms that alter the actuarialism of the state pension by altering the 
benefit calculation formula. Reforms that make benefits correspond more closely to 
individual contributions or employment-history are coded -1. Reforms that loosen 
the relationship between contributions and benefits are coded 1.  
 
BEN_INDEX 
Changes to the indexation of state pension benefits. A full move from price to wage 
indexation is coded 2. Changes to indexation arrangements that are expected to 
increase the value of benefits but fall short of a full move from price to wage 
indexation are coded 1. A full move from wage to price indexation is coded -2. 
Changes to indexation arrangements that are expected to decrease the value of 
benefits but fall short of a full move from wage to price indexation are coded -1.  
 
BEN_CONT 
Reforms that alter the contributions required for receipt of a state pension. These 
include both contributions required for eligibility to the full state pension, and 
contributions required for eligibility to a minimum state pension. Reforms that 
increase the contributions required are coded -1. Reforms that decrease the 
contributions required are coded 1.   
 
BEN_CRED 
These are reforms that allow individuals to build up state pension entitlements 
during periods out of the labour market. Reforms that offer credits for periods out of 
the labour market are coded 1.   
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BEN_COV 
Reforms that extend the coverage of the state pension to individuals previously 
uncovered are coded 1. Reforms that take away state pension eligibility from 
previously covered people are coded -1. 
 
MEANS_GEN 
These are reforms that increase the generosity of means tested pension benefits. 
Reforms that increase the generosity of these benefits are coded 1. Reforms that 
decrease the generosity of these benefits are coded -1. 
 
MEANS_ELIG 
These are reforms that alter eligibility to means-tested pension benefits. Reforms 
that tighten the means test such that benefits are withdrawn at a lower income or 
asset threshold, or are withdrawn at an increased rate, are coded -1. Reforms that 
loosen the means test such that benefits are withdrawn at a higher income or asset 
threshold, or are withdrawn at a lower rate, are coded 1. 
 
MEANS_COV 
These are reforms that set the coverage of the means test. Reforms that exclude 
certain categories of people from claiming means tested benefits are coded -1. 
Reforms that extend the means test to categories of people hitherto uncovered are 
coded 1.  
 
RET_AGE 
Reforms that increase the statutory retirement age are coded 1. Reforms that 
decrease the statutory retirement age are coded -1. 
 
RET_INCENT 
Reforms that encourage later retirement are coded 1.  
 
ACTIVATION 
Reforms to encourage work by those above official retirement age are coded 1. 
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REG_COV 
These are regulatory reforms to increase the coverage of private pensions. Reforms 
that aim to increase coverage of private pensions by getting rid of regulatory 
barriers are coded -1. Reforms that aim to increase coverage of private pensions by 
mandating that employers provide access to an occupational pension, introducing 
auto-enrolment whereby employees are enrolled by default into an occupational 
pension scheme until they actively opt-out, or mandating that employers and/or 
employees make contributions to an occupational pension scheme are coded 1. 
 
REG_DB 
Reforms that incentivise DB plans are coded 1, reforms that incentivise other plans, 
or disincentivise DB plans, are coded -1. 
 
REG_SEC 
Regulatory reforms that increase the security of private pensions are coded 1.  
Reforms that decrease the security of private pensions are coded -1.  
 
REG_BEN 
These are legislative changes to the calculation of private pension benefits which 
alter the level of benefits. Reforms that reduce these benefits are coded -1. Reforms 
that increase these benefits are coded 1. 
 
TAX_SUB 
These are reforms to spending on regressive tax subsidies for private pensions. An 
increase spending on regressive tax subsidies for private pensions is coded 1. A 
decrease is coded -1. 
 
TAX_INCENT 
These are reforms to increase the incentive to save for retirement that are fiscally 
neutral. Reforms that increase the incentive to cave are coded 1. Reforms that 
decrease the incentive to save are coded -1. 
 
TARGET_SUB 
These are reforms to spending on targeted tax subsidies for private pensions. An 
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increase spending on targeted tax subsidies for private pensions is coded 1. A 
decrease is coded -1. 
 
TARGET_INCENT 
These are targeted reforms to increase the incentive to save for retirement that are 
fiscally neutral. Targeted reforms that increase the incentive to cave are coded 1. 
Reforms that decrease the incentive to save are coded -1. 
 
TAX_AFFLUENCE 
Reforms that introduce any affluence test or claw-back of pension benefits are coded 
1. Thereafter any reforms that increase or decrease the scope of the affluence test or 
claw-back are coded 1 or -1 respectively.   
 
FIN_FUND 
Reforms that establish a funded element to the PAYG state pension are coded 1.  
 
FIN_CONT 
Reforms that increase the contribution rate are coded 1. Reforms that decrease the 
contribution rate are coded -1.  
 
PUB_FRAG 
Reforms that increase the number of occupationally distinct public pension schemes 
are coded 1. Reforms that reduce the number of occupationally distinct pension 
schemes are coded -1. 
 
PUB_SPEND 
Reforms that increase expenditure on pensions to government employees as a 
percentage of GDP are coded 1, reforms that decrease expenditure on pensions to 
government employees as a percentage of GDP are coded -1. 
 
GEND_EQU 
Reforms that move towards the equal treatment of men and women are coded 1.  
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APPENDIX C: MAJOR PENSION REFORMS 
IN MARKET-HEAVY PENSION SYSTEMS 
SINCE 1980  
 
AUSTRALIA 
Date Reform   Changes introduced Coding of changes 
1983 
 
Social Security and 
Repatriation 
Legislation 
Amendment Act 1983 
no. 36  
 
Reduced the tax advantage of lump 
sum superannuation payments  
Tightened income testing of pensions 
for those aged 70 years and over 
TAX_SUB (-1) 
TAX_INCENT (-1) 
MEANS_ELIG (-1) 
 
1984 Social Security and 
Repatriation (Budget 
Measures and Assets 
Test) Act 1984 no. 93  
 
Assets test re-introduced and either 
income or assets test to be applied 
depending on which test gives lower 
pension level 
MEANS_ELIG (-1) 
1988 May 1988 Economic 
statement: Reform of 
the Taxation of 
Superannuation 
 Superannuation tax arrangements 
restructured to bring forward the 
receipt of tax revenue  
  
 Taxes on lump sums reduced, except 
when taken prior to retirement 
  
 Introduced an annuity rebate of 15% 
  
 Introduced a 15% tax on 
superannuation fund earnings, which  
had previously been exempt 
TAX_SUB (-1) 
TAX_INCENT (+1) 
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     
1992 Superannuation 
Guarantee 
(Administration) Act 
 Introduced the Superannuation 
Guarantee 
REG_COV (+1) 
1992 Taxation Laws 
Amendment 
(Superannuation) Act 
1992 
 Tax concessions for contributions 
made by employees replaced by an 
income-tested rebate of ten per cent 
for the first A$1000 of contributions 
for low-income earners 
TARGET_INCENT 
(+1) 
1994 Social Security 
Legislation 
Amendment Act 1994 
no. 109  
 
 Raised pension age for women to 65 RET_AGE (+1) 
1997 Taxation Laws 
Amendment Act 1997 
 Introduced the Superannuation 
Surcharge, a temporary tax on the 
superannuation of higher income 
earners 
TAX_SUB (-1) 
1998 Social Security And 
Veterans Affairs 
Legislation 
Amendment (Pension 
Bonus Scheme) Act 
1998 
 Introduced the Pension Bonus 
Scheme 
 
RET_INCENT (+1) 
2000 Budget  Reduced the asset and income taper 
test rates from 50% to 40%. 
Increased the income and asset test 
‘free’ areas by 2.5% 
 Increased the Age Pension by 4% 
MEANS_ELIG (+1) 
2003 Superannuation 
(Government co-
contribution for Low 
Income Earners) Act 
 Further extended superannuation co-
contributions for low-income 
employees to incentivise them to 
make personal superannuation  
TARGET_SUB (+1) 
TARGET_INCENT 
(+1) 
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   contributions 
 Government to provide A$1.50 for 
each dollar invested into a 
superannuation fund by low-income 
individuals 
 
2005 Superannuation Laws 
Amendment 
(Abolition of 
Surcharge) Act 2005 
 Superannuation surcharge abolished TAX_SUB (+1) 
2007 Tax Laws Amendment 
(Simplified 
Superannuation) Act 
2007 
 Halved the assets test taper rate  
 Raised the assets test threshold from 
$343,750 to $529,250 
MEANS_ELIG (+1) 
 
CANADA 
Date Reform Changes introduced Coding of changes 
1987  Contribution rates to the CPP to be 
increased annually by 0.1% of covered 
earnings from 1987-1991 
FIN_CONT (+1) 
1989 Budget Introduced the OAS ‘clawback’ from 
high income pensioners 
TAX_AFFLUENCE 
(+1) 
1991 Bill C-52 An Act to 
Amend the Income 
Tax Act and Related 
Acts 
Equalized tax advantages for RPPs 
RRSPs and DPSPs (this put DB 
schemes on equal footing with other 
types of plan which were previously 
disadvantaged) 
TAX_SUB (+1) 
TAX_INCENT (+1) 
REG_DB (-1) 
1992  Contribution rates to the CPP to be 
increased annually by 0.1% of covered 
earnings from 1992-1996 
FIN_CONT (+1) 
1996 Budget Limit on benefits from DB plans for 
which tax assistance applies frozen 
until 2004 
TAX_SUB (-1) 
TAX_INCENT (-1) 
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REG_DB (-1) 
1997  Increased contributions rates to the 
CPP from 5.6% to 9.9% by 2003, 
thereafter contributions to remain 
steady 
Pensions to be calculated on the 5-
year average of the Year’s Maximum 
Pensionable Earnings instead of the 3-
year average. 
The Year’s Basic Exemption (the first 
3,500CAD of earnings in any year on 
which no contributions are paid) was 
frozen - no longer indexed to growth 
in the CPI  
BEN_GEN (-1) 
BEN_FLAT (-1) 
FIN_CONT (+1) 
2005 Budget 
Implementation Bill 
(Bill C-43) 
Increased the maximum monthly GIS 
benefits by CAD36 for single 
pensioners (above standard 
indexation increases).  
Increased the maximum contribution 
limits for RPPs and RRSPs (as 
contributions are tax-deductible this 
incentivises savings).  
MEANS_GEN (+1) 
TAX_SUB (+1) 
TAX_INCENT (+1) 
 
DENMARK 
Date Reform Changes introduced Coding of changes 
1982  Introduced a tax on the interest 
income of private pension savings  
Introduced an earnings test for 
pensioners aged 67 to 69 
TAX_SUB (-1) 
TAX_INCENT (-1) 
ACTIVATION (-1) 
 
1987 Lettelese af Loosened the income test for the MEANS_ELIG (+1) 
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Samspilsproblemer Pension Supplement. More people 
entitled to the full means-tested 
benefit.  
1987 Forhojelse af 
pensionstilaegget 
Increased the Pension Supplement  MEANS_GEN (+1) 
1988 Budget law Significantly increased Old Age 
pensions 
BEN_GEN (+1) 
1990 Lov om 
satsreguleringsproc
enter 
Indexation changed from prices to 
real wages 
BEN_INDEX (+1) 
1991  Introduction of occupational pensions 
through collective agreements 
 
1993 Konsekvenser af 
skattereform 
Reduction of basic pension and 
increase in Pension Supplement by 
equal amount 
MEANS_GEN (+1) 
BEN_GEN (-1) 
1996 Dobbelt ATP for folk 
pa overforselsind-
komster 
Recipients of sickness, maternity and 
unemployment benefits received 
twice the normal ATP contribution  
BEN_CRED (1+) 
1998 Special Pension 
Scheme (SP) 
Special Pension scheme introduced 
and made permanent. Benefits and 
contributions increased. A 1% 
increase in contribution rate is levied 
on all income from work and social 
transfers for funding supplementary 
pensions on a long-term basis. 
 
1998 Whitsuntide 
package 
(Pinsepakken) 
Tax reform reducing the generosity of 
tax rebates for private pension saving 
TAX_SUB (-1)  
TAX_INCENT (-1) 
1999  Normal retirement age reduced from 
67 to 65  
Incentives introduced to discourage 
early retirement 
RET_AGE (-1) 
RET_INCENT (+1) 
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2003 Budget Introduction of the ‘elderly check’, a 
tightly targeted benefit paid only to 
pensioners with no income aside from 
the state pension 
MEANS_ELIG (+) 
2006  Retirement age increased from 65 to 
67 
RET_AGE (+1) 
IRELAND 
Date Reform Changes introduced Coding of changes 
1988 Social Welfare Act Introduced compulsory PRSI for 
farmers and the self-employed 
BEN_COV (+1) 
1990 Pensions Act, 1990 Tightened regulation of occupational 
pensions, defined the responsibilities 
of scheme trustees 
Introduced rules for adequate funding 
and administration of occupational 
pension schemes 
Vesting of occupational pension 
entitlements after 5 years 
Established a Pensions Board 
Established equal treatment of men 
and women in occupational pensions 
REG_SEC (+1) 
GEND_EQU (+1) 
1991  Introduced compulsory PRSI for the 
part-time workers 
BEN_COV (+1) 
1994 Homemakers’ 
Scheme 
Up to twenty years spent caring for 
children or incapacitated adults to be 
disregarded when averaging the social 
insurance record 
BEN_CRED (+1) 
1997 Social Welfare Act, 
1997 
Introduced the Widower's (Non 
Contributory) Pension  
BEN_CONT (-1) 
GEND_EQU (+1) 
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Increased the minimum contributions 
required for eligibility to the Old Age 
(Contributory) State pension 
2000 National Pensions 
Reserve Fund Act, 
2000 
Established the National Pensions 
Reserve Fun, into which quarterly 
instalments of one per cent of Gross 
National Product would be paid 
FIN_FUND (+1) 
2002 Pensions 
(Amendment) Act, 
2002 
Changed the regulatory framework of 
private pension schemes: 
Employers not sponsoring an 
occupational pension scheme for their 
employees to be obliged to provide 
access to a PRSA, although employer 
contributions are not mandatory 
Establishment of the Pensions 
Ombudsman 
Expansion of the role of the Pensions 
Board 
Improvements to the security and 
quality of pension entitlements under 
occupational pension plans 
REG_SEC (+1) 
REG_COV (+1) 
2002 Finance Act, 2002 Increased tax relief for occupational 
pensions  
 
TAX_SUB (+1) 
TAX_INCENT (+1) 
2004  Implemented recommendations made 
in the Report of the Commission on 
Public Sector Pensions: 
Minimum pension age increased to 65 
for new entrants to the public sector 
Compulsory retirement age of 65 
removed for new entrants 
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Introduced actuarially reduced 
benefits for cost neutral early 
retirement of public servants 
Altered pension calculation formula to 
enhance income of lower paid public 
servants 
 
2006 Social Welfare Law 
Reform and 
Pensions Act 2006 
 
Increased the means test disregard 
from EUR 7.60 per week to EUR 20.00  
Introduced a new earnings allowance 
of EUR100 a week to allow work 
earnings up to EUR 5,200 a year 
without affecting pension 
entitlements 
MEANS_ELIG (+1) 
ACTIVATION (+1) 
NETHERLANDS  
Date Reform Changes introduced Coding of changes 
1980s  Ad hoc suspension of indexation of 
AOW, on several occasions 
BEN_INDEX (-1) 
1985  AOW for spouses individualised GEND_EQU (+1) 
1987  Introduced rules protecting 
accumulated benefits in occupational 
pensions. Enhanced portability. 
REG_SEC (+1) 
1992 Conditional 
Indexing 
Adjustment Act 
(WKA) 
Wage indexation made conditional on 
wage increases and employment  
BEN_INDEX (-1) 
1994  Made illegal to exclude part-time 
workers from occupational pension 
schemes 
REG_COV (+1) 
1997 AOW Reserve 
Fund 
Establishment of the AOW Reserve 
Fund 
Upper limit on AOW contribution 
FIN_FUND (+1) 
2002-  Premium increases and shift to  
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2004 average-salary in occupational 
pensions 
NEW ZEALAND 
Date Reform Changes introduced Coding of changes 
1985  Introduced the Taxation Surcharge TAX_AFFLUENCE (+1) 
1989 Income Tax 
Amendment Act 
1989 
Superannuation 
Schemes Act, 1989 
Suspended the 80% link of 
superannuation to wages 
Indexation to the lower of price and 
wage movement, intended to move 
within a band between 65% and 
72.7% of net wages 
Contributions to savings plans now 
paid from after-tax income. Income 
accruing as fund earnings is also 
taxed at the rate of 33%, and 
withdrawals from the fund are 
exempt. Thus NZ makes transition 
from EET to TTE regime  
BEN_INDEX (-1) 
TAX_SUB (-1) 
TAX_INCENT (-1) 
1990-
1991 
 Indexation by prices alone rather 
than the lower of wages or prices 
Retirement age raised from 60 to 65 
by 2000 
Taxation surcharge rate increased 
from 20-25% 
RET_AGE (+1) 
TAX_AFFLUENCE (+1) 
1997 Taxation 
(Superannuitant 
Surcharge 
Abolition) Act  
Surcharge abolished entirely, 
leaving universal pension with no 
form of targeting 
TAX_AFFLUENCE (-1) 
1998  Removed ‘65% of net wages’ 
indexation floor. Replaced with 60% 
BEN_INDEX (-1) 
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floor 
1999 Social welfare 
(Transitional 
Provisions) 
Amendment Bill 
Restoration of the 65% floor BEN_INDEX (+1) 
2001 New Zealand 
Superannuation 
Act, 2001 
Established the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund 
FIN_FUND (+1) 
2005 2005 Budget  Announced Kiwisaver along with a 
flat $1000 ‘sweetener’ and an annual 
fees subsidy 
TARGET_SUB (+1) 
TARGET_INCENT (+1) 
2006 Kiwisaver Act, 
2006 
Established mandatory access and 
auto-enrolment into a Kiwisaver 
scheme. Minimum contribution rate 
of 4% of salary, but no mandatory 
employer contribution 
REG_COV (+1) 
2006 Taxation (Annual 
Rates, Savings 
Investment, and 
Miscellaneous 
provisions) Bill 
Employer contributions and 
matched employee contributions of 
up to 4% of gross income to be 
exempt from the withholding tax 
TAX_SUB (+1) 
TAX_INCENT (+1) 
2007 Taxation 
(KiwiSaver) Act 
2007, formerly 
Taxation (Annual 
Rates, Business 
Taxation, 
KiwiSaver and 
Remedial Matters) 
Bill 
Introduced mandatory employer 
contributions to Kiwisaver schemes 
REG_COV (+1) 
2007 May Budget Tax subsidies extended so that the 
first $30 a week of individual 
contribution attracts a $20 tax credit 
TAX_SUB (+1) 
TAX_INCENT (+1) 
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Employer costs offset by a matching 
$20 tax credit 
SWITZERLAND 
Date Reform Changes introduced Coding of changes 
1982 Introduction of the 
law on the 
occupational 
pension scheme 
1982 (Bundesgesetz 
uber die berufliche 
Vorsorge BVG; BBI 
1976 I: I49ff) 
Introduced mandatory occupational 
pensions. Coordination of basic and 
occupational pension: earnings 
insured by the basic pension 
exempted from occupational pension 
coverage 
REG_COV (+1) 
1985 Second reform of 
the means-tested 
supplementary 
pension scheme 
1985 (zweite 
Revision des 
Bundesgesetzes 
uber 
Erganzungsleistung
en zur AHV/IV; BBI 
1985 I: 98ff) 
Increase of means tested 
complementary pension benefits 
Increased complementary benefits 
for long-term-care patients 
Lowering of complementary benefits 
for pensioners with own savings 
Increase of individual financial 
responsibility in case of sickness  
MEANS_GEN (+1) 
MEANS_ELIG (-1) 
1994 Reform of labour 
market mobility in 
the occupational 
pension scheme 
1994 (Bundesgesetz 
uber die 
Freizugigkeit in der 
beruflichen 
Vorsorge; BBI 1992 
II: 533ff) 
Guarantee of individual pension 
savings in case of labour market 
mobility 
Harmonisation of occupational 
second-pillar pension programs 
No dissolution of pension savings for 
women in case of marriage 
Splitting of second pillar savings for 
women in case of divorce 
REG_SEC (+1) 
GEND_EQU (+1) 
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1995 10th Reform of the 
basic pension 
scheme 1995 (10. 
Revision der Alters-
und 
Hinterbliebenenver
sicherung AHV;BBI 
1990 II: Iff) 
Introduced contribution sharing and 
pension benefit sharing (gender 
equality) 
Introduced contribution credits for 
informal carers 
Increased the female retirement age 
from 62 to 64 
BEN_CRED (+1) 
RET_AGE (+1) 
GEND_EQU (+1) 
1997 Verordnung uber 
die obligatorische 
berufliche Vorsorge 
von arbeitslosen 
personen 
Unemployment insurance funds to 
deduct a contribution from 
unemployment benefits and make an 
‘employer’s contribution’, thereby 
extending occupational pension 
provision to the unemployed 
REG_COV (+1) 
2003  Reduced the guaranteed interest rate 
for occupational plans from 4% to 
3.25% 
REG_SEC (-1) 
2003 11th reform of the 
basic pension 
scheme 2003 (11. 
Revision der Alters-
und 
Hinterbliebenenver
sicherung AHV; BBI 
2000 II: 1865ff)11th 
AHV/AVS revision 
VAT increase for additional financing 
of basic pension 
Increased female retirement age to 
65 
Flexible retirement age without 
public subsidies for lower income 
pensioners 
Cutbacks in pension indexation 
Increase in contribution levels for 
self-employed 
RET_AGE (+1) 
BEN_CONT (-1) 
BEN_INDEX (-1) 
2003 Ist reform of the 
occupational 
pension scheme 
2003 (1.Revision 
des Bundesgesetzes 
uber die berufliche 
Vorsorge BVG; BBI 
Reduced the conversion rate from 
7.2% to 6.8% (lowered private 
pension benefits through regulation 
of occupational scheme benefit 
calculations) 
Access threshold for compulsory 
REG_BEN (-1) 
REG_COV (+1) 
RET_AGE (1) 
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2000 III: 2675ff)  pensions lowered 
Cutbacks in occupational pension 
levels 
Increase of the retirement age for 
women to 65 
Improved occupational pension 
coverage for low-income earners 
Improved occupational pension 
coverage for part-time employees 
2004  Further reduced the guaranteed 
interest rate for occupational plans 
from 3.25% to 2% 
REG_SEC (-1) 
2007  Allowed delay of receipt of third 
pillar retirement benefits for a 
maximum of five years to encourage 
older workers to remain in the 
labour market 
ACTIVATION (+1) 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Date Reform Changes introduced Coding of changes 
1980 Social Security Act 
1980 
Pensions no longer uprated by the 
better of earnings or prices, but by 
prices only 
BEN_INDEX (-1) 
1986 Social Security Act 
1986 
Allowed for subsidized contracting-
out of private pension plans. 
Contracting-out rebate extended to DC 
schemes. 
Reference period for SERPS benefits 
extended from 20 years to life-time 
career. SERPS replacement rate 
reduced from 25% to 20%. 
TAX_SUB (+1) 
TAX_INCENT (+1) 
BEN_GEN (-1) 
REG_DB (-1) 
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1989 1988 and 1989 
Budgets 
Curtails tax relief: a price-indexed 
limit is placed on pensions paid from 
tax-approved schemes, restricting the 
level of contributions. The annual 
contribution limit is increased in line 
with earnings, and subject to an 
overall cash limit  
TAX_SUB (-1) 
TAX_INCENT (-1) 
1995 Pensions Act Increased the State Pension Age for 
women from 60 to 65 over a period of 
10 years from 2010 
Introduced rules to protect 
occupational pensions against fraud 
and mismanagement 
Regulated the vesting of pension 
entitlements 
Abolished the Guaranteed Minimum 
Pension for occupational schemes 
RET_AGE (+1) 
REG_SEC (-1) (+1) 
1997 Budget Reduction of the ACT rebate - reduced 
the tax favoured position of pensions 
compared with their treatment prior 
to 1997 
TAX_SUB (-1) 
TAX_INCENT (-1) 
1999 Welfare Reform and 
Pensions Act 
Introduced Stakeholder Pensions 
Renamed the main means-tested 
pension ‘Minimum Income Guarantee’. 
Increased its generosity substantially 
and temporarily indexed it to earnings 
rather than prices 
REG_COV (+1) 
MEANS_GEN (+1) 
MEANS_ELIG (+1) 
2000 Child Support, 
Pensions and Social 
Security Act 
Replaced SERPS with the Second State 
Pension (S2P) 
Introduced for the first time an 
additional pension for carers and 
disabled people with broken work 
records 
BEN_FLAT (+1) 
BEN_CRED (+1) 
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2002 State Pension Credit 
Act 
Replaced the Minimum Income 
Guarantee with the Pension Credit 
MEANS_ELIG (+1) 
2004 Finance Act 
Pensions Act 
Established the Pension Protection 
Fund, an insurance arrangement to 
protect members of Defined Benefit 
occupational pension schemes in the 
event of employer insolvency or 
underfunding 
Loosened indexation requirements for 
occupational pension schemes 
Introduced further incentives for 
delayed retirement 
Further change to the regulation of 
vesting periods 
Pension tax simplification, to be 
introduced in April 2006  
REG_SEC (+1) (-1) 
RET_INCENT (+1) 
TAX_SUB (-1) 
TAX_INCENT (-1) 
2007 Pensions Act Increased the State Pension Age 
Loosened eligibility conditions for 
receipt of the Basic State Pension 
Re-introduced earnings uprating 
Introduced the gradual flat-rating of 
the S2P 
BEN_FLAT (+1) 
BEN_INDEX (+1) 
BEN_CONT (+1) 
RET_AGE (+1) 
2008 Pensions Act Established NEST 
Introduced mandatory employer 
contributions 
REG_COV (+1) 
UNITED STATES 
Date Reform Changes introduced Coding of changes 
1981 Public Law 97-35 Tightened means testing- instead of 
the first $60 of earned or unearned 
MEANS_ELIG (-1) 
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income being excluded, now the first 
$20 were excluded, and instead of the 
next $195 of the remainder of 
quarterly earned income being 
excluded, now the next $65 was 
excluded 
1982 TEFRA n97 Lowered the annual benefit payable 
form a defined benefit plan. Lowered 
the annual contribution limits for 
participants in DC plans 
TAX_SUB (-1) 
TAX_INCENT (-1) 
1986 Tax Reform Act 
(TRA) n101 
Restricted tax deductions for IRA 
contributions 
Set a cap on compensation that a plan 
may consider in determining the level 
of accrued benefits or share of 
employer contributions to the plan 
TAX_SUB (-1) 
TAX_INCENT (-1) 
1987 OBRA n103 Reduced significantly the amount of 
the employer’s deduction for 
contributions to a defined benefit plan 
TAX_SUB (-1) 
TAX_INCENT (-1) 
1990 Omnibus Budget 
and Reconciliation 
Act, 1990 
Raised employer contributions to the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
Reduced the cap on compensation for 
insured DB plans from $235,840 to 
$150,000 
REG_SEC (+1) 
TAX_SUB (-1) 
TAX_INCENT (-1) 
1993
/96 
The 1993 and 1996 
SSA Amendment 
Acts 
Placed restrictions on DI and SSI 
benefits to Drug Addicts and 
Alcoholics 
MEANS_COV (-1) 
1996 Small Business Jobs 
Protection Act n138 
 
Created financial incentives, 
particularly for small employers, to 
offer workers retirement plans 
Special incentives for employers with 
100 or fewer employees were 
introduced through ‘SIMPLE plans’ 
TARGET_SUB (+1) 
TARGET_INCENT 
(+1) 
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1996 Contract with 
America 
Advancement Act, 
1996 
Increased the earnings limit for the 
retirement income test 
ACTIVATION (+1) 
 Taxpayer Relief Act 
of 1997, no.145 
Introduced the Roth IRA, extending tax 
deductibility 
TAX_SUB (+1) 
TAX_INCENT (+1) 
1996 Personal 
Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act, 
1996 
Limited the social protection eligibility 
of most non-citizens 
MEANS_COV (-1) 
2000 The Senior Citizens' 
Freeedom to Work 
Act of 2000 
Eliminated the Social Security 
earnings test for retirement benefits. 
Anyone reaching full retirement age 
allowed to work and receive full Social 
Security retirement benefits 
ACTIVATION (+1) 
2001 Economic Growth 
and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act, 
2001 (EGTRRA) 
Increased the amounts that workers 
may contribute to tax favoured 
retirement plans 
Offered small businesses further tax 
breaks to broaden the private pension 
coverage 
Introduced the Saver’s Credit, a 
government matching contribution in 
the form of a non-refundable tax credit 
for voluntary individual contributions 
to 401(k)-type plans, IRAs, and similar 
retirement savings arrangements 
TAX_SUB (+1) 
TAX_INCENT (+1) 
TARGET_SUB (+1) 
TARGET_INCENT  
(+1) 
 Job Creation and 
Worker Assistance 
Act of 2002 
Contribution limit to Simplified 
Employee Pensions (SEPs) increased 
TAX_SUB (+1) 
TAX_INCENT (+1) 
2006 The Pension 
Protection Act, 2006 
Removed barriers to auto-enrolment 
into defined contribution plans 
REG_SEC (+1) 
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Made permanent the temporary 
higher contribution limits of EGTRRA 
2001 
Strengthened the funding 
requirements for DB pension plans. 
Underfunded sponsors to pay higher 
premiums to the Pension Benefit 
Guarantee Corporation 
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APPENDIX D: SOLUTION TABLES 
 
 
Table 23. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'significant universalising reform', conservative solution 
Model: reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, broad_fin, non_left). Conservative solution. 
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
Consistency cutoff: 0.755396 
Cases in bold are uniquely covered by the relevant solution term  
Solution  
hi_targ* lo_erel* lo_natsav* 
broad_fin*  non_left 
+ 
hi_targ* lo_erel* ~lo_natsav* 
~broad_fin*  non_left 
+ 
hi_targ* lo_erel* lo_natsav* 
~broad_fin* ~ non_left 
→ reform  
Single 
country 
coverage 
DEN80, NZ90, AUS00  IRE80, IRE90,IRE00  
 
UK00 
 
  
 
Consistency 
 
0.830508 
  
0.755396 
  
0.971014 
  
Raw 
Coverage 
 
0.367316 
  
0.314843 
  
0.100450 
  
Unique 
Coverage 
 
0.367316 
  
0.314843 
  
0.100450 
  
 
Solution consistency: 0.815625; Solution coverage: 0.782609 
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Table 24. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'significant universalising reform', parsimonious solution 
Model: reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, broad_fin, non_left). Parsimonious solution. 
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
Consistency cutoff: 0.755396 
Cases in bold are uniquely covered by the relevant solution term  
  
Solution  lo_erel* lo_natsav*  non_left + hi_targ* lo_erel* ~broad_fin  → reform  
Single 
country 
coverage 
DEN80, NZ90, AUS00  IRE80, IRE90,IRE00, UK00   
 
Consistency 
 
0.589744 
  
0.752500 
  
Raw 
Coverage 
 
0.413793 
  
0.451274 
  
Unique 
Coverage 
 
0.367316 
  
0.404798  
  
 
Solution consistency: 0.679105; Solution coverage:  0.818591 
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Table 25. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'no significant universalising reform, conservative solution 
Model: ~reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, non_left). Conservative solution. 
Frequency cutoff: 2.000000   
Consistency cutoff: 0.768965 
Cases in bold are uniquely covered by the relevant solution term  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Solution  
 ~lo_erel* lo_natsav* 
non_left 
+ 
lo_erel* lo_natsav* 
~non_left 
+ 
hi_targ* ~lo_erel* 
non_left 
+ 
~hi_targ* lo_erel* 
~lo_natsav*  non_left  
→ ~reform  
Single 
country 
coverage 
US80, US90, US00,  
UK80, UK90, 
CAN90 
 
AUS80, AUS90, 
NZ80, NZ00, DEN90, 
UK20 
 
 
CAN80 , CAN90, 
CAN00, 
UK80, UK90 
 
NET80, NET90, 
NET00, SWI80, 
SWI90, SWI20 
  
 
Consistency 
 
1.000000 
  
0.852747 
  
1.000000 
 
1.000000   
Raw 
Coverage 
 
0.274962 
  
0.190851 
  
0.229710 
 
0.226267   
Unique 
Coverage 
 
0.118052 
  
0.179046 
  
0.083128 
 
0.208067   
 Solution consistency: 0.958073; Solution coverage: 0.753074 
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Table 26. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'no significant universalising reform', parsimonious solution 
Model: ~reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, non_left). Parsimonious solution. 
Frequency cutoff: 2.000000  
Consistency cutoff: 0.768965 
Cases in bold are uniquely covered by the relevant solution term  
  
Solution   ~lo_erel*  + ~ non_left + ~hi_targ → ~reform  
Single 
country 
coverage 
US80, US90, US00, UK80, 
UK90, CAN80, CAN90, CAN00  
 
AUS80, AUS90, NZ80, 
NZ00, DEN90, 
UK20 
 
NET80, NET90, NET00, SWI80, 
SWI90, SWI20, NZ80, NZ00, 
US80, US90, US00 
  
 
Consistency 
 
0.963293 
  
0.766784 
 
1.000000   
Raw 
Coverage 
 
0.425971 
  
0.213478 
 
0.541072   
Unique 
Coverage 
 
0.228726 
  
0.126414 
 
0.261628   
 Solution consistency: 0.965590; Solution coverage: 0.897196 
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Table 27. 'Five-year' analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'no significant universalising reform', conservative solution 
Model: ~reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, non_left). Conservative solution. Country-five-years as cases. 
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
Consistency cutoff: 0.760714 
Cases in bold are uniquely covered by the relevant solution term  
  
Solution   ~lo_erel* non_left  + 
lo_erel* lo_natsav* 
~non_left   
+ ~hi_targ* non_left → ~reform  
Single 
country 
coverage 
US80, US85, US90, US95, US00, 
US05, UK80, UK85, UK90, 
CAN80, CAN85, CAN90, CAN95, 
CAN00, CAN05  
 
AUS85, AUS90, NZ85, 
NZ00, NZ05, DEN80, 
DEN95, UK00, UK05 
 
NET80, NET85, NET90, NET95, 
NET00, NET05, SWI80, SWI85, 
SWI90, SWI95, SWI00, SWI05,  
US80, US85, US90, US95, US00, 
US05 
  
 
Consistency 
 
0.963293 
  
0.827985 
 
1.000000   
Raw 
Coverage 
 
0.375469 
  
0.142290 
 
0.404589   
Unique 
Coverage 
 
0.192146 
  
0.124862 
 
0.221046   
 Solution consistency: 0.961024; Solution coverage: 0.728877 
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Table 28. 'Five-year' analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'no significant universalising reform', parsimonious solution 
Model: ~reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, non_left). Parsimonious solution. Country-five-years as cases. 
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
Consistency cutoff: 0.768965 
Cases in bold are uniquely covered by the relevant solution term  
  
Solution   ~lo_erel* non_left  + lo_erel* ~ non_left   + ~hi_targ → ~reform  
Single 
country 
coverage 
US80, US85, US90, US95, US00, 
US05, UK80, UK85, UK90, 
CAN80, CAN80, CAN90, CAN95, 
CAN00, CAN05  
 
AUS85, AUS90, NZ85 , 
NZ00, NZ05, DEN80, 
DEN95,  
UK20, UK25  
 
NET85, NET90, NET95, NET00, 
NET05, NZ80,  NZ00, NZ05, 
SWI80, SWI85, SWI90, SWI95, 
SWI00, SWI05, US80, US85, 
US90, US95, US00, US05 
  
 
Consistency 
 
1.000000 
  
0.817783 
 
1.000000   
Raw 
Coverage 
 
0.375469 
  
0.164350 
 
0.463269   
Unique 
Coverage 
 
0.192146 
  
0.098390 
 
0.231193   
 Solution consistency: 0.928533; Solution coverage: 0.843581 
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Table 29. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘extension of private pension coverage’, conservative solution 
Frequency cut-off: 1.000000; Consistency cut-off: 0.796610 
  
Solution lo_erel*hi_left*~hi_ud* 
~hi_frag      + 
lo_erel*cuts*hi_frag*~hi_left*~ 
hi_ud     + 
lo_erel*cuts*hi_frag*hi_left 
*hi_ud    → 
univ  
Single 
country 
coverage 
AUS 90, NZ20,UK00 SWI80, SWI90, SWI00, NET90 DEN90   
Consistency 0.951456 0.796610 0.942529   
Raw 
Coverage 
0.400545 0.320163 0.111717   
Unique 
Coverage 
0.358311 0.320452 0.074932   
Solution consistency: 0.890796; Solution coverage: 0.777929  
192 
 
Table 30. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘extension of private pension coverage’, parsimonious solution 
Frequency cut-off: 1.000000; Consistency cut-off: 0.796610 
  
Solution hi_left*~hi_ud + lo_erel*cuts*hi_frag*~hi_left*~hi_ud     
+ 
hi_left*hi_frag  → univ  
Single 
country 
coverage 
AUS 90, NZ00,UK00 SWI80, SWI90, SWI00, NET90 DEN90   
Consistency 0.958904 0.658786 0.928571   
Raw 
Coverage 
0.476839 0.378747 0.159401   
Unique 
Coverage 
0.392371 0.305177 0.074932   
Solution consistency: 0.802296; Solution coverage: 0.856948 
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Table 31. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘no extension of private pension coverage’, conservative solution 
Frequency cut-off: 1.000000; Consistency cut-off: 0.951872 
  
Solution ~hi_left*~hi_ud*~hi_frag      + lo_erel* ~cuts* hi_left    + cuts* ~hi_frag* ~hi_left  → 
univ 
 
Single 
country 
coverage 
AUS00, CAN80, CAN90, CAN00, 
IRE00, NZ90, UK90, US80, US90, 
US00 
AUS00, DEN80, IRE80, IRE00, 
NET80, NET00   
CAN80, CAN90, IRE90, NZ90, 
UK80, UK90, US80, US90 
  
Consistency 0.991089 1.000000 0.985731   
Raw 
Coverage 
0.509156 0.303154 0.421668   
Unique 
Coverage 
0.096643 0.205494 0.106816   
Solution consistency: 0.992624; Solution coverage: 0.821465  
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Table 32. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘no extension of private pension coverage’, parsimonious solution 
Frequency cut-off: 1.000000; Consistency cut-off: 0.951872 
  
Solution ~hi_left* ~hi_frag      + ~cuts* ~hi_left    + ~cuts* hi_frag  → 
univ 
 
Single 
country 
coverage 
AUS00, CAN80, CAN90,  
CAN00, IRE80, IRE90, IRE00, 
NZ90, UK80, UK90, US80, 
US90, US00 
AUS00, CAN00, DEN80, IRE80, 
IRE00, NET80, NET00, US00 
DEN80, NET80, NET90   
Consistency 0.991071 1.000000 0.973770   
Raw 
Coverage 
0.677518 0.404883 0.151068   
Unique 
Coverage 
0.421668 0.019837 0.000000   
Solution consistency: 0.987842; Solution coverage: 0.826551 
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Table 33. Country-five-year analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘no extension of private pension coverage’, conservative solution 
Frequency cut-off: 1.000000; Consistency cut-off: 0.825758 
  
Solution ~hi_left* 
~hi_frag* 
~hi_ud   + 
lo_erel* ~cuts* 
~hi_left   + 
~hi_frag* 
~hi_left* cuts   + 
hi_ud* 
~hi_left* 
lo_erel   + 
~lo_erel* 
cuts* 
~hi_ud* 
~hi_frag   + 
lo_erel* 
~cuts* 
hi_ud* 
hi_frag 
 → 
univ 
 
Single 
country 
coverage 
AUS95, AUS00, 
AUS05,CAN80, 
CAN85, CAN90, 
CAN95, CAN00, 
CAN05, IRE00, 
IRE05, NZ90, 
NZ95,UK90, 
US80, US85, 
US90, US95, 
US00, US05 
AUS00, AUS05, 
DEN85, DEN90, 
DEN00, IRE80, 
IRE85, IRE90, 
IRE00, IRE05, 
NZ80, NET80, 
NET85, NET95, 
NET00, NET05, 
US85, US00, 
US05, SWI80 
AUS80, AUS95, 
CAN85, CAN90, 
CAN95, IRE95, 
NZ90, NZ95, 
UK80, UK85, 
US80, US90, 
US95 
AUS80, DEN85, 
DEN90, DEN00, 
DEN05, IRE80, 
IRE85, IRE90, 
IRE95, NZ80 
CAN85, 
CAN90, 
CAN95, UK95 
DEN80, 
DEN85, 
DEN90,  
DEN95, 
DEN00 
 
Consistency 0.996585 0.941047 1.000000 0.936550 1.000000 0.871080  
Raw 
Coverage 
0.434773 0.455203 0.277506 0.223026 0.083848 0.106406  
Unique 
Coverage 
0.0622992 0.168972 0,052139 0.020004 0.006810 0.036817  
   
Solution consistency: 0.859332; Solution coverage: 0.966723  
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Table 34. Country-five-year analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘no extension of private pension coverage’, parsimonious solution 
Frequency cut-off: 1.000000; Consistency cut-off: 0.825758 
 
Solution ~hi_left* ~hi_frag  + hi_frag* ~cuts   + hi_frag* hi_ud  + ~lo_erel  → univ  
Single 
country 
coverage 
CAN80, CAN85, 
CAN90, CAN95, 
CAN00, CAN05, 
IRE80, IRE85, 
IRE90, IRE00, NZ80, 
UK80, UK85, UK90, 
US80, US85, US90, 
US95, US00, US05  
DEN80, DEN85, DEN90, 
DEN95, DEN00, SWI80, 
SWI85, SWI90, SWI95, 
SWI05, NET80, NET85, 
NET95, NET00, NET05  
DEN80, DEN85, 
DEN90, DEN95, 
DEN00, DEN05 
CAN80, CAN85, CAN90, 
CAN95, CAN00, CAN05, 
UK80, UK85, UK90, 
UK95 
 
Consistency 0.997527 0.870060 0.871129 0.944908  
Raw 
Coverage 
0.600979 0.276442 0.141094 0.240902  
Unique 
Coverage 
0.375399 0.133433 0,021281 0.022984  
 
Solution consistency: 0.947869; Solution coverage: 0.889977  
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APPENDIX E: TRUTH TABLES 
 
 
Truth Table for ‘reform’ using country-decade cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
hi_targ2 lo_erel lo_natsav hi_right broad_fin number reform raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
SYM 
consist 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.971014 0.971014 1 
1 1 1 1 1 3 1 0.830508 0.829932 0.995935 
1 1 0 1 0 3 1 0.755396 0.679245 0.76087 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.448819 0.444444 0.982759 
1 1 1 0 1 3 0 0.149321 0 0.5 
0 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0  
1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0  
1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0  
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0  
0 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 0  
0 1 0 1 0 6 0 0 0  
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Truth Table for ‘~reform’ using country-decade cases 
hi_targ2 lo_erel lo_natsav hi_right number ~reform raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
SYM 
consist 
0 1 0 1 6 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 4 1 0.768965 0.7393 0.871094 
1 1 0 1 4 0 0.360494 0.233728 0.685446 
1 1 1 1 3 0 0.253482 0.236467 0.919192 
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Truth Table for ‘~reform’ using county-five-year cases  
hi_targ lo_erel lo_natsav1 hi_right1 number ~reform raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
SYM 
consist 
0 1 0 1 12 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 4 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 7 1 0.760714 0.74573 0.928105 
1 1 1 1 6 0 0.664678 0.645202 0.923715 
1 1 0 1 10 0 0.643973 0.620238 0.911532 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0.488372 0.488372 1 
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Truth Table for ‘univ’ using country-decade cases 
lo_erel2 cuts2 hi_left hi_frag hi_ud number fuzzy_univ2 raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
SYM 
consist 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.968421 0.968421 1 
1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.943925 0.929825 0.82449 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.942529 0.932432 0.863158 
1 1 0 1 0 4 1 0.79661 0.693878 0.703593 
1 1 1 0 1 2 0 0.580838 0.453125 0.713235 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.311765 0.286585 0.898305 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.160428 0.054217 0.588235 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.083333 0.046667 0.684211 
0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0.047521 0.017058 0.605263 
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.045802 0.023437 0.666667 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0  
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0  
1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0  
1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0  
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Truth Table for ‘~univ’ using country-decade cases 
lo_erel2 cuts2 hi_left hi_frag hi_ud number ~fuzzy_univ2 raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
SYM 
consist 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 
0 1 0 0 0 5 1 0.983471 0.982942 0.96945 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.977099 0.976563 0.977099 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.955128 0.953333 0.96129 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.951872 0.945783 0.894472 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.723529 0.713415 0.953488 
1 1 1 0 1 2 0 0.652695 0.546875 0.736486 
1 1 0 1 0 4 0 0.525424 0.285714 0.610236 
1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0.257009 0.070175 0.561224 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.206897 0.067568 0.580645 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.031579 0.031579 1 
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Truth Table for ‘~univ’ using country-five-year cases 
lo_erel cuts hi_left hi_ud hi_frag number ~univ5 raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
SYM 
consist 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.971014 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.971014 
1 1 0 0 0 6 1 1 1 0.973646 
0 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 0.994872 
0 1 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 0.975741 
1 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 0.980296 
1 0 0 0 0 7 1 0.990897 0.990789 0.988327 
1 0 0 1 0 4 1 0.990157 0.99006 0.990157 
0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0.980874 0.980447 0.978202 
1 0 1 1 1 2 1 0.964647 0.962963 0.955 
1 0 0 0 1 10 1 0.920616 0.917284 0.958076 
1 0 0 1 1 3 1 0.825758 0.808864 0.903315 
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.764706 0.757576 0.962963 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.684783 0.491228 0.642857 
1 1 0 0 1 2 0 0.604396 0.37931 0.625 
1 0 1 0 0 4 0 0.566832 0.525745 0.867424 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0.524476 0.484848 0.872093 
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APPENDIX F: ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENT 
CONDITIONS WITH COUNTRY-FIVE-YEARS 
AS CASES 
 
I recoded the data into country-five-year cases, and conduct the QCA again. In the 
five-year analysis, the causal conditions are insufficient to explain the majority of 
cases of reform. Most cases of reform remain uncovered by the solution formula, 
reflecting the fact that sometimes the presence of all the causal conditions was not in 
itself sufficient to bring about reform within a five year period.  
The analysis of the non-reform case using country-five-years as cases has 
greater explanatory power, and reinforces the country-decade analyses. Table 14 at 
the end of chapter four presents the results. Again, three ‘paths’ to non-reform 
emerge. The first path, with a consistency score of 1.000000, uniquely covers the UK 
from 1980 to 1995, and Canada from 1980 to 2009. It reinforces the idea that the 
presence of a significant earnings-related pension is sufficient to explain the absence 
of universalising reforms in these cases - even in the presence of a non-left 
government.  
The second path reinforces the idea that the presence of a left party in 
government is sufficient to explain why there were no universalising reforms - 
despite the absence of a significant earnings related pension - in Australia between 
1985 and 1994, in New Zealand between 1985 and 1990, and in Denmark between 
1980 and 1984 and between 1995 and 2000. Again, the high consistency score of 
0.817783 masks the seemingly deviant case of the UK in the 2000s which is 
discussed in chapter 6.  
The solution formula reinforces the causal importance of targeting for 
bringing about universalising reform. In addition to uniquely explaining the absence 
of reform in Switzerland and the Netherlands, the third ‘path’ shows that ‘the non-
prevalence of targeting’ – or rather the high coverage of non-means tested pensions 
of which this is the flip-side – is also sufficient to explain the complete absence of 
universalising reform in the US, and the absence of reform in New Zealand between 
1980 and 1984 and between 2000 and 2009.  
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Overall, the five-year analysis suggests that the causal conditions identified 
under country-decade cases are robust, but that more information is needed if we 
are to understand why sometimes the presence of all the causal conditions was not 
sufficient to bring about reform within the five year period. Ultimately, the choice of 
country-decades as cases strikes an appropriate balance between parsimony, and 
explaining the myriad reasons why reforms do not occur the moment the relevant 
sufficient conditions are in place. 
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